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INTRODUCTION
A lender secured by crops enjoys by law a kind of control
over the farmer that is not possible in any other type of financ-
ing except by agreement between the creditor and debtor. The
crop lender enjoys a practical monopoly in the extension of pro-
duction credit to the farmer. Production credit enables the
farmer to buy the goods and services needed to grow crops dur-
ing the production season. Having a monopoly over production
credit thus empowers the lender to make unilateral and arbi-
trary decisions regarding the debtor's farming operations. Even
in the absence of default, the lender can dictate the terms by
which the farmer produces crops or decide that the farmer will
no longer produce at all, thereby putting the farmer out of
business.
The lender expresses its decision by refusing to make a
production loan or by conditioning the loan on its terms, and
the priority rules of Uniform Commercial Code Article 91 en-
force the lender's decision. This statute governs consensually
created security interests in personal property or fixtures, that
is, any agreement between a creditor and debtor to use the
debtor's personal property or fixtures as security or collateral
for a debt owed the creditor. Article 9 governs, therefore, when
a lender's collateral is crops, 2 and its priority rules effectively
prevent the farmer from obtaining production credit for new
crops from any source other than the initial secured lender.
Significantly, Article 9 facilitates alternative financing to en-
able debtors to produce and otherwise acquire every kind of
collateral except crops.
As currently applied to crops, Article 9's priority rules give
the lender first claim to any crops the farmer grows even when
the lender contributed nothing to the production of the crops.
Other financers who enabled the farmer to produce new crops
cannot share in the bounty until the farmer fully satisfies all
debts to the lender that are secured by crops. These debts
could easily absorb so much of the crops' value that the bal-
ance, if any, would not fully satisfy the crop financers' claims.
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations and references to the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) are to the 1978 Official Text and Comments.
2. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a).
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This risk discourages other financers from underwriting the
production of crops.3 As a result, the usual lender is effectively
the farmer's only source of production financing; the lender
thereby enjoys monopolistic control over the farmer's
enterprise.
As Part I of this Article explains, the law of creditor's
rights in general, and Article 9, in particular, ordinarily inhibit
this kind of control through a policy of priority for enabling in-
terests in property. The interest of a creditor who enabled the
debtor to acquire property is preferred to conflicting claims of
other creditors who contributed nothing to the debtor's acquisi-
tion of the property. One justification for preferring enabling
creditors is to free the debtor from total reliance on an earlier
creditor as a source of borrowed capital. An older, more basic
justification is to prevent unjust enrichment of the earlier cred-
itor. As between the earlier creditor and a financer who ena-
bled the debtor to acquire new property, plain and simple
fairness dictates applying the property first against the enabling
debt owed the financer.
Part II of this Article explains, however, that crop produc-
tion financing is an exception to the pervasive policy of priority
for enabling interests because of the conventional interpreta-
tion of UCC section 9-312(2), a key section among Article 9's
priority rules. The black-letter, general principle of UCC sec-
tion 9-312(2) is that a "security interest in crops for new value
given to enable the debtor to produce the crops ... takes prior-
ity over an earlier perfected security interest."'4 Additional lan-
guage in the section qualifies this priority "to the extent that
3. Indeed, the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), which is often
the financer of last resort for financially troubled farmers, will not make a
production or other farm operating loan unless the loan is secured by a first
lien on all property to be produced using the loan proceeds. 7 C.F.R. § 1941.19
(1986). FmHA guarantees to other people making production loans to farmers
are effectively conditioned on a similar first-lien priority. Id. § 1980.60(a)(11)
& app. G (Request for Guarantee Form, in which applicant must state that
borrower's title to collateral will be subject only to the instruments securing
the loan to be guaranteed). If a farmer's usual lender will not agree to
subordinate its claim to the farmer's future crops, the FmHA usually cannot
make a production loan or guarantee such a loan made by someone else. The
farmer is thus at the mercy of her usual lender.
4. The entire section provides:
A perfected security interest in crops for new value given to en-
able the debtor to produce the crops during the production season and
given not more than three months before the crops become growing
crops by planting or otherwise takes priority over an earlier perfected
security interest to the extent that such earlier interest secures obli-
gations due more than six months before the crops become growing
1137
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such earlier interest secures obligations due more than six
months before the crops become growing crops by planting or
otherwise."'5 The authorities have interpreted this qualification
so as to transform the section's general principle of priority into
a narrow rule that gives priority only rarely and fortuitously to
enabling interests in crops. The anomalous effect of the con-
ventional interpretation is that an enabling security interest in
crops is ordinarily subordinate to a prior secured party's claim
to the collateral.
Part III reveals that the drafters of Article 9 did not intend
this anomalous effect. They designed Article 9's provisions on
crop financing, including section 9-312(2), in full compliance
with the statute's pervasive policy of priority for enabling inter-
ests in property of all kinds. Their design, however, was art-
less. As a result, a literal construction of section 9-312(2),
which is the sine qua non of its conventional interpretation,
defeats the original design and real purpose of the provision.
Interpreted less rigidly and more purposively, in light of the
original drafters' intentions, UCC section 9-312(2) insures that,
upon compliance with certain procedural requirements, an en-
abling security interest in crops will always, rather than rarely
and fortuitously, take priority over the claim of a prior secured
party who contributed nothing to the production of the
collateral.
This Article argues for righting the anomaly by any means
because there is no principled basis for perpetuating it. No
good reason exists for restricting farmers' access to enabling
credit more than any other class of businesspeople. Farmers
should be set free to shop for enabling credit on the same basis
as everyone else by eliminating the disincentive to crop produc-
tion credit that is the unintended, unfair result of Article 9's
priority rules, primarily UCC section 9-312(2), as conventionally
interpreted.
To right the unintended anomaly created by the conven-
tional interpretation of UCC section 9-312(2), two possibilities
exist. The courts can reinterpret the section in its present form
in a manner consistent with the original drafters' intentions. A
faster, more certain means of righting the anomaly is to enact a
substitute for the present section 9-312(2) that more clearly ex-
crops by planting or otherwise, even though the person giving new
value had knowledge of the earlier security interest.
U.C.C. § 9-312(2).
5. Id
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presses the real purpose and true meaning of the provision.
This Article thus proposes, in Part IV, a new UCC section 9-
312(2), with commentary, that accomplishes this goal in suffi-
cient detail to make the scope and operation of the law both
certain and fair.
I. PERVASIVE POLICY OF PRIORITY FOR ENABLING
INTERESTS: THE LAW'S BRIDLE ON
FLOATING LIENS
A. SECURED CREDITORS' FLOATING LIENS
1. The Concept of a Floating Lien
A secured creditor has an interest in property of the debtor
that is security for the debtor's obligation to the creditor. The
property is security in the sense that it can be seized and sold,
and the proceeds applied to satisfy the obligation, if the debtor
does not willingly pay. A creditor is secured either through
agreement with the debtor 6 or by operation of law,7 and the
6. Any debt, including any loan of money or other extension of credit,
can be secured by contractual agreement between creditor and debtor. The
debtor voluntarily gives the creditor an interest in real or personal property,
or both, as collateral for the debt. Providing collateral induces the creditor to
extend the credit because having the property as security reduces the credi-
tor's risk of losing her investment. See generally Kripke, Law and Economics:
Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fac
133 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 946 (1985) (arguing that "[t]he lender's risk is reduced
by the taking of security"); White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal
Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473, 508 (1984) (granting security expands
credit to risky debtors); see also Jackson & Schwartz, Vacuum of Fact or Vac-
uous Theory: A Reply to Professor Kipke, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 987, 993 (1985)
(no one "denies that security reduces the risks that secured creditors face").
But see generally Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Deb 37 VAND.
L. REv. 1051, 1068 (1984) (arguing that simple notions that 'security interests
reduce risk' do not explain the secured debt puzzle). Having property as se-
curity also reduces the creditor's costs in forcibly recouping the investment
from the debtor's estate, Kripke, supra, at 948 ("Security is desirable because
it makes available summary legal procedures that bypass the slowness with
which the mills of justice grind."), lowers the creditor's costs in monitoring the
debtor for misbehavior, see Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Pri-
orities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1152-53 (1979) (arguing that collat-
eral is likely to reduce the cost of monitoring the debtor), and gives the
creditor significant control over the debtor's business decisions. See Scott, A
Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901, 904 (1986)
(suggesting that "leverage obtained by holding the debtor's assets hostage em-
powers the secured creditor to influence the debtor's business decisions").
7. There are three principal situations in which the law creates security
for creditors. First, reducing the investment and collection risks to some
classes of creditors is so economically or politically important that the law
gives them security in property of the debtor for the credit they extend as
1139
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property used as security can be real, personal, or both. This
Article refers to the security as collateral however the interest
is created and without regard to the nature of the property.
The term lien is used generically to refer to a secured creditor's
interest in collateral.
A creditor's collateral is not necessarily limited to property
the debtor owns when the obligation is originally secured. The
collateral often includes property of the same type as the origi-
nal collateral that the debtor later acquires, whether or not the
creditor somehow funded the acquisition. Such collateral is
known as after-acquired property,8 and the term after-acquired
interest describes a secured creditor's claim to after-acquired
property.
The creation of an after-acquired interest does not usually
depend on formally recognizing it when the debtor actually ac-
quires the property. Rather, the interest attaches automatically
at the instant the debtor acquires rights in the property. In fig-
urative terms, a creditor's claim to after-acquired property
"floats" over the debtor's estate,9 attaching immediately when
the debtor buys or otherwise obtains property subject to the af-
ter-acquired interest. This figuration of an after-acquired inter-
est explains why it is often called a floating lien. Although the
term floating lien is commonly reserved for describing after-ac-
soon as they extend it. The collateral is usually property that absorbed the
value given by the creditor. Good examples are liens the law gives to artisans
who repair or otherwise improve goods and to laborers and suppliers of mater-
ials who improve real estate. See infra text accompanying notes 39-42 & 85-97.
Second, when a debt owed any creditor is reduced to judgment, the debt is
thereafter secured by all of the debtor's nonexempt real estate, see infra text
accompanying notes 11-13, and also by any of her nonexempt personal prop-
erty that the sheriff seizes in enforcing the judgment through execution pro-
cess, see infra note 56. Finally, whenever a debtor threatens unfair, contrived
action to put her assets beyond the easy reach of a creditor, the law will act as
preemptor by attaching sufficient property to satisfy an anticipated judgment
against the debtor. Good examples are the prejudgment, provisional remedies
of attachment and garnishment. Whenever security is created by law in these
and other situations, the debtor's consent is not required, and her objection is
meaningless.
8. After-acquired property, broadly defined, includes increases in the
value of original collateral caused by additions or improvements to the prop-
erty or caused solely by market forces and also includes proceeds resulting
from the disposition of original collateral. For most purposes, however, this
Article uses the term after-acquired property in a narrower sense to mean
property of the same type as the original collateral but wholly distinct from it.
9. The term "debtor's estate" simply means the collection of property in-
terests the debtor owns, including all legal and equitable interests in real and
personal property.
1140 [Vol. 71:1135
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quired interests resulting from consensual security arrange-
ments, liens also float when the security is created by law.' 0
For example, a judgment creates by law a lien on the
debtor's interests in real estate located within the territorial ju-
10. Security created by law, through a judgment lien or the like, see infra
text accompanying notes 11-15, includes after-acquired property because, hav-
ing determined that the debtor's estate in real or personal property is liable
for the debts, there is no logic in limiting liability to property owned when the
lien arises. In Harrison v. Roberts, 6 Fla. 711 (1856), the argument was made
that a judgment lien reaches only the debtor's interests in real property she
owned on the day of judgment and not property she thereafter acquired. The
court rejected the argument, reasoning:
When it is enacted that judgments "shall create a lien and be binding
upon the real estate of the defendant," it is not for this court to say
that any portion of that estate shall be exempt from such lien. This
would be to create a distinction and make a restriction... in itself
unnatural and unreasonable. Why should property, acquired perhaps
by the very means of a loan, be relieved from liability to a judgment
rendered for the identical fund with which it was purchased? Such a
rule would confound all our ideas of right and justice.
Id. at 713. The Tennessee Supreme Court, in an even older case, justified judg-
ment liens reaching after acquired property on the basis of "symmetry of the
law." Chapron & Nidelete v. Cassaday, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 661, 663 (1842).
Consensually created security includes after-acquired property only when,
and to the extent, the parties have agreed to the arrangement, see infra text
accompanying notes 16-23. The law enforces their agreement for the same rea-
sons it enforces any other kind of contract, primarily because of the principle
of private autonomy. On the meaning of this principle as applied to contracts
generally, see Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 CoLUM. L. REv. 799, 806-08
& nn.9-11 (1941) (private autonomy as substantive basis of contract liability).
The law allows after-acquired interests to float, in the sense of attaching
automatically to after-acquired property, mainly for reasons of convenience
and efficiency. A judgment lien or the like would be largely useless as an aid
in collection if the creditor got an interest in after-acquired property only by
taking some new action every time the debtor added property to her estate.
This requirement would force the creditor to monitor closely the debtor's
transactions and to act quickly to catch property passing through the estate.
The costs of the process would be so high, and its reliability so low, that the
lien would benefit very few creditors insofar as it provided security in after-
acquired property. Moreover, allowing a judgment lien to float does not seri-
ously prejudice purchasers from the debtor who will be affected by the lien.
See, e.g., Barron v. Thompson, 54 Tex. 235, 238 (1881) (the record of an unsatis-
fied judgment puts purchasers on notice).
Convenience and efficiency also explain the automatic attachment of con-
sensually created after-acquired interests. A debtor and secured creditor often
have an on-going relationship in which credit is periodically extended to the
debtor on the basis of fresh collateral. The transaction costs for each of these
extensions of credit is reduced by allowing the creditor's collateral to expand
automatically to include after-acquired property. Jackson & Kronman, supra
note 6, at 1166-67. Besides, the validity of any security created by agreement is
based essentially on the debtor's consent. By agreeing to an after-acquired
property clause, a debtor thereby consents to binding her future property and
nothing else is necessary as far as validation is concerned.
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risdiction of the court that rendered the judgment. 1 This lien
reaches real estate that the debtor owns when the judgment is
rendered or docketed, without further ado.12 The lien also
reaches automatically any interests in real estate that the
debtor later acquires during the life of the judgment.'3 Simi-
larly, the federal tax lien' 4 "embraces not only property owned
by the taxpayer when the lien arises but all that he may ac-
11. 2 A. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 928 (E. Tut-
tle 5th ed. 1925) [hereinafter FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS] ("Ordinarily the lien is
not effective outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the court [in which the
judgment was rendered].").
12. 1i § 918 ("Judgment liens being entirely statutory, the time when
they take effect depends largely upon the provisions of the statutes creating
them."). State statutes that create the lien on the rendition of judgment in-
clude ARK. STAT. ANN. § 29-130 (1979) and Mo. ANN. STAT. § 511.350 (Vernon
Supp. 1987). Statutes that create the lien on the docketing, filing, or recording
of the judgment include FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.10 (West Supp. 1986) (record-
ing), MJINN. STAT. § 548.09 (1986) (docketing), and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 706 (West Supp. 1987) (filing).
13. See, e.g., Trustees of R.E. Bank v. Watson & Hubbard, 13 Ark. 74, 82-
85 (1852) (holding that judgment of the circuit court attaches upon land "sub-
sequently acquired by the judgment debtor, as well as upon [land] which was
seized on the day of its rendition"); Harrison v. Roberts, 6 Fla. 711, 712-14
(1856) (holding that property acquired after a judgment lien is subject to the
lien); Wales v. Bogue, 31 Ill. 464, 467 (1863) (holding that subsequently ac-
quired property is subject to a lien); Campbell v. Martin, 87 Ind. 577, 580 (1882)
(holding that an existing judgment against a devisee attaches to devised land
upon the testator's death); Colt v. DuBois, 7 Neb. 391, 396 (1878) (holding that
land acquired subsequent to the rendition of a judgment is subject to its pay-
ment); Greenway & Marshall v. Cannon, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 177, 179 (1842)
(holding that a statutory lien extends to after-acquired property as well as to
property owned at the time of the judgment); Thulemeyer v. Jones, 37 Tex.
560, 571 (1872) (holding that judgment liens attach to after-acquired property);
Coad v. Cowick, 9 Wyo. 316, 325, 63 P. 584, 586 (1901) (holding that judgment
liens attach to the after-acquired lands of the debtor); T. CRANDALL, R.
HAGEDORN & F. SMITH, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAw MANUAL 6.05[2][e] (1985)
(stating that "[a]fter judgment, the judgment debtor may acquire property of a
type that is potentially subject to judgment liens"); 2 FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS,
supra note 11, § 955 (noting that a "lien of prior judgment on after-acquired
property attaches ... to the interest actually acquired by the debtor"); W.
HAWKLAND & P. LOIsEAUX, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS 17 (1979) (noting
that some state statutes expressly state that after-acquired property is covered
by the lien); E. SUGDEN, THE LAW OF VENDORS AND PURCHASERS OF ESTATES
520 (14th ed. 1862) (noting that "[j]udgments bound after-purchased lands").
14. "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the
same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United
States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, be-
longing to such person." 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1982). The lien arises automatically
"at the time the assessment is made and shall continue until the liability for
the amount so assessed.., is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of
lapse of time." Id. § 6322.
[Vol. 71:11351142
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quire during the life span of the lien."'1 5
Consensual security arrangements create floating liens
only if the debtor agrees that the creditor's collateral will in-
clude after-acquired property.16 A debtor who gives a creditor
personal property collateral commonly agrees to include after-
acquired property as a matter of course. Article 9 usually gov-
erns creation of a lien in personal property,17 which the UCC
labels a security interest.'8 Ordinarily, the debtor creates a se-
curity interest under Article 9 by signing a written security
agreement that describes the collateral.19 Common standard-
form security agreements provide a space for describing the
property that is collateral or, more conveniently, provide a list
of various kinds of property with a box to check by each kind
that is collateral. Close by, in the fine print, is language provid-
ing that the collateral includes not only property of the kind
described "now owned" by the debtor but also any such prop-
erty "hereafter acquired." This language is commonly referred
to as an after-acquired property clause, which Article 9 ex-
15. W. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX LIENS 26 (3d ed. 1972).
16. The debtor's consent is not always necessary, however, for a consensu-
ally created lien to extend to after-acquired property as broadly defined supra
note 8. For example, an Article 9 security interest in goods automatically at-
taches, by force of law alone, to proceeds of the collateral, U.C.C. §§ 9-203(3), -
306(2), and also to accessions to the collateral, Nickles, Accessions and Accesso-
ries Under Pre-Code Law and U.C.C. Article 9, 35 ARK. L. REV. 111, 115-17
(1981). A mortgage on real estate similarly embraces fixtures. Quicquid
plantatur solo, solo cedit (whatever is annexed to land, becomes part of the
land). 5 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.7 (A. Casner ed. 1952) (stating that
mortgages presumably intend all additions to become permanent part of the
land: "Where the fixture is installed after the execution of the mortgage, the
courts generally hold.., that the intent of the annexor at the time of the an-
nexation is the determining factor." Id, § 19.7, at 29-30.); G. NELSON & D.
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAw § 9.5, at 693 (2d ed. 1985) ("Suppose
that a real estate mortgage is executed and recorded, and the mortgagor
purchases... some.., item that becomes a 'fixture.' If it becomes a fixture,
under the normal rules of real property it becomes part of the real estate and
therefore covered by the real estate mortgage."); G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 38, at 67-68 (2d ed. 1970) (stating that "[i]nsofar as
property subsequently acquired by the mortgagor becomes an accession to the
mortgaged property it feeds the mortgage unaided by any after-acquired prop-
erty clause"); 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 651[3] (1986) (not-
ing that "[t]he courts have established clear rules giving rights to a real estate
mortgagee in articles affixed to the land either prior to the execution of the
mortgage or afterwards").
17. See U.C.C. §§ 9-102(1)(a), -203(1).
18. "'Security interest' means an interest in personal property or fixtures
which secures payment or performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
19. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a).
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pressly sanctions.20
An after-acquired property clause in an Article 9 security
agreement creates a floating lien that survives as long as any
debts covered by the security agreement are unpaid. If the
debtor later acquires any property of a kind described as collat-
eral in the security agreement, the creditor automatically ob-
tains an interest in the after-acquired property whether or not
she advanced credit that enabled the debtor to acquire the
property. The property becomes collateral for all debts covered
by the security agreement.
21
Mortgages of real estate can similarly create floating liens
by providing that the mortgage debt is secured not only by the
tract specifically described in the mortgage but also by all land
the debtor later acquires.22 After-acquired property clauses are
20. Except in the case of consumer goods given as additional security, "a
security agreement may provide that any or all obligations covered by the se-
curity agreement are to be secured by after-acquired collateral." U.C.C. § 9-
204(1). For the exception regarding consumer goods, see U.C.C. § 9-204(2).
The most exhaustive technical analysis of floating liens under Article 9 is
Skilton, Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 925. For a thorough historical and policy
analysis of Article 9 floating liens, see Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72
HARV. L. REV. 838 (1959).
21. A security agreement typically defines the debts to be secured by the
collateral to include every obligation owed the secured creditor presently and
in the future, without regard to when, why, or how the obligation was in-
curred. This kind of language covering obligations that the debtor may later
incur to the secured party is commonly referred to as a future advance clause,
which Article 9 expressly allows. U.C.C. § 9-204(3). Consequently, if the
debtor repays everything she owes the creditor and, a week or months later,
incurs a fresh debt of any kind from the same creditor, the creditor is auto-
matically secured by the collateral described in the security agreement, when-
ever and however the collateral was acquired. A new agreement is
unnecessary. The life of a security agreement is not limited by law. It thus
never dies unless the parties include an expiration date, which they rarely do.
The typical security agreement used in farm financing describes the collat-
eral as all the debtor's inventory, equipment, farm products, accounts, other
rights to payment, and general intangibles. This list encompasses all of the
farmer's personal property except consumer goods. The agreement also con-
tains an after-acquired property clause and an all-inclusive definition of debts
the agreement secures. Consequently, the creditor's collateral includes all the
goods and intangibles the farmer has or will acquire in connection with her
farming enterprise; and every item of this property secures every debt owed
the secured creditor, without regard to when or why the collateral was ac-
quired or the debt was incurred.
22. See, e.g., Franklin v. Community Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 629 F.2d 514,
516 (8th Cir. 1980) (validity of after-acquired interest under Missouri law);
Pearll v. Williams, 146 Ariz. 203, 206, 704 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Ct. App. 1985) (after-
acquired interest valid under Arizona statute); Wright v. Baumann, 239 Or.
1144 [Vol. 71:1135
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not as common in mortgages of land as they are in security
agreements covering personal property. Nonetheless, they are
effective to give a mortgagee an interest in real estate subse-
quently acquired by the debtor without the debtor's further
agreement.23
2. Usual Priority of Floating Liens
Floating liens in after-acquired property often conflict with
other interests in the collateral. These other interests may
have existed in the property before the debtor acquired it, or
they may have arisen at the time of or after the debtor's acqui-
sition. The interests can represent claims of ownership or
claims of security. For example, the debtor may have sold the
after-acquired property to a buyer who asserts an exclusive
right to it. Alternatively, a competing interest may belong to
another secured creditor, and the value of the after-acquired
property may be insufficient to satisfy both claims completely.
In either case, the question of priority arises. That is, which
claim is superior? When the competing claimants are a floating
lienor and another secured creditor, the answer determines
whose claim will be paid first from the proceeds of a sale of the
collateral.
Priority is never decided by agreement between creditor
and debtor. Rather, priority is always decided by rules of law
that balance the policy effects of preferring one kind of claim
over the other.24 Even when secured by agreement, the credi-
tor and the debtor cannot bilaterally determine the rights of
third parties to the collateral. Their agreement is limited in ef-
fect to giving the creditor an interest in the property that is col-
lateral and to defining their own respective rights and duties
with respect to the collateral. They cannot immunize the col-
410, 416-17, 398 P.2d 119, 122 (1965) (transfer of after-acquired interest in real
estate does not create legal interest, only equitable mortgage) (citing Straus v.
Wilsonian nv. Co., 177 Wash. 167, 171, 31 P.2d 516, 518 (1934)); see generally G.
NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 16, § 9.3 (discussion of after-acquired prop-
erty clauses and the variations existing in different jurisdictions).
23. The interest is ordinarily equitable and unrecordable; hence, it is typi-
cally enforceable only against third persons who know of it, which accounts
for its infrequent use. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 16, § 9.3, at
686-87.
24. Creditors with conflicting liens on collateral can, however, contractu-
ally modify the law's priority rules as applied to them. The creditor entitled to
priority may agree to subordinate her claim to that of the other creditor whose
claim, by law, is junior. Article 9 expressly provides that its priority rules can
be varied by subordination agreements. U.C.C. § 9-316.
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lateral from other claims,25 and they cannot effectively agree
that the creditor's interest in the collateral will be superior to
any other claim to the property. These matters are regulated
exclusively by law.26 Indeed, the principal concern of Article 9,
which governs most consensually-created liens on personal
property, is the limits of such an interest in relation to other
claims to the collateral 7
The fundamental rule of priority, applied generally
throughout the law to order conflicting liens, claims, and inter-
ests of every kind in property, is that interests rank in the or-
der in which they were created or perfected, that is, first in
time is first in right.28 Creation refers to the requirements for
25. Article 9 makes this point explicitly: "The debtor's rights in collateral
may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred (by way of sale, creation or a
security interest, attachment, levy, garnishment or other judicial process)
notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement prohibiting any transfer
or making the transfer constitute a default." U.C.C. § 9-311.
26. The only kind of agreement that can alter the law's priority rules is a
subordination agreement among the creditors themselves. See supra note 24.
27. U.C.C. § 9-101 comment.
28. For example: (1) Nonpurchase-money Article 9 security interests
rank in the order of perfection, U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (technically, filing or
perfection), or, if neither interest is perfected, in the order in which the inter-
ests were created. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(b). See also Jackson & Kronman, supra
note 6, at 1162 (first-in-time rule prevails under Article 9 and was established
in the chattel security field long before enactment of the UCC). (2) Apart
from recording statutes, real estate mortgages rank in the order of creation.
G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 181 (1951). Because of
recording statutes, the ranking of real estate mortgages is commonly deter-
mined by the order in which the mortgages were perfected by public record-
ing, although in many states the second mortgagee wins priority by recording
first only if she lacks actual notice of the earlier encumbrance. See id. § 196;
6A R. POWELL, supra note 16, 1 905; see also R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK &
D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.9, at 775 (1984) (when debtor gives
two competing mortgages, the first mortgage in time will have priority). (3)
Priority between a federal tax lien and a real estate mortgage or Article 9 se-
curity interest generally depends on which of the claims was first perfected.
26 U.S.C. § 6323(a), (h)(1) (1982). (4) Judgment liens generally rank in the
order in which the liens attached to the property. T. CRANDALL, R.
HAGEDORN & F. SMrIH, supra note 13, 6.05[2][f], at 6-81 to 6-82 (stating that
"the relative priority among competing judgment liens depends upon the time
at which the judgment lien attaches, with the first to attach being granted pri-
ority"); 2 FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS, supra note 11, § 975, at 2053-54 ("The pri-
ority of judgment liens with respect to one another is normally governed by
the time at which they become effective on the property in question, so that
the one which first takes effect thereby takes precedence over those subse-
quently becoming operative." (footnote omitted)). (5) Moreover, with respect
to the priority between judgment liens and other kinds of liens and interests,
"[iln the absence of statute otherwise providing, there is nothing about a judg-
ment lien which would take it out of the general rule which ranks liens and
other interests in real property in the order in which they were created." Id.
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making the transfer of the lien or other interest enforceable
against the transferor. Perfection refers to the steps necessary
to make a lien or other interest in property enforceable, as far
as is legally possible, against third parties' claims. The perfec-
tion requirement often involves public filing or some other
kind of notorious conduct, such as taking possession of personal
property, to alert the world at large to the interest. Interests
subject to a perfection requirement are usually ranked, for pur-
poses of the first-in-time rule, as of the time the requirement
was satisfied.
The first-in-time rule is essentially an expression of the
§ 969, at 2034. (6) In states where execution creates a lien on the judgment
debtor's property upon actual levy by the sheriff, priority among competing
executions is determined according to the order in which the executions were
levied. See, e.g., Partch v. Adams, 55 Cal. App. 2d 1, 10, 130 P.2d 244,250 (1942)
(priority of successive executions depends upon the priority of the levies);
Jackson-Hinds Bank v. Davis, 244 So. 2d 633, 637-38 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (liens
of ordinary creditors seizing same property are ranked inter se in the order of
their seizures), writ ref., 258 La. 359, 246 So. 2d 681 (1971); Albrecht v. Long,
25 Minn. 163, 172 (1878) (without regard to when the writs of execution were
delivered to the sheriff); Johnson v. Graham Lighter Corp., 83 Ohio App. 489,
494, 80 N.E.2d 690, 693 (1948) ("[Iln either an attachment or execution, priority
must be accorded the writ in the execution of which the property is first seized
by the officer."). In states where a lien of execution arises as soon as the writ
of execution is delivered to the sheriff, execution liens are ranked according to
when the sheriff got the writs. See, e.g., Trapnall v. Jordan, 7 Ark. 430, 434
(1847); Flagship State Bank v. Carantzas, 352 So. 2d 1259, 1261-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977); Walton v. Hillier, 128 N.J.L. 119, 122, 24 A.2d 219, 220-21 (1942).
(7) Liens of attachment are similarly ranked in the order in which the liens
arose. See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank v. Traffic Eng'g Assocs., Inc., 166 Conn. 195,
348 A.2d 637 (1974) (real property); Petri v. Sheriff of Washoe County, 87 Nev.
549, 491 P.2d 43 (1971) (personal property). (8) Moreover, in deciding a con-
test between an execution lien and a lien of attachment, the "liens are of equal
dignity, both being statutory creatures," and, therefore, the principle of first in
time, first in right applies. Commercial Transp. Corp. v. Robinson Grain Co.,
345 F. Supp. 342, 344 (W.D. Ky. 1972). (9) Service of a writ of garnishment
creates a lien on property of the debtor held by the garnishee, and the long-
established general rule as to priority between several garnishments against
the same property by different creditors is that the garnishment liens rank in
the order of time of service of the garnishment summons on the garnishee.
See, e.g., Grand v. Kado, 279 So. 2d 811, 814 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Fico, Inc. v.
Ghinger, 287 Md. 150, 162, 411 A.2d 430, 437-38 (1980); J. ROOD, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF GARNISHMENT § 188 (1896). (10) The first-in-time principle is not
limited to priority disputes involving legal liens such as those noted here. As a
general rule, equitable liens, estates, and other equitable interests rank inter
se according to the same principle. 2 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 678, 682, 683, 718 (S. Symons 5th ed. 1941); 2 E. SUGDEN,
THE LAW OF VENDORS AND PURCHASERS OF ESTATES 396 (8th Am. ed. 1873).
(11) Some states declare by statute that the first-in-time principle is the gen-
eral rule of priority for all liens. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2897 (West 1974);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-01-14 (1980).
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principle of derivative title, which basically holds that a trans-
feree of property acquires the title of the transferor.29 Such a
rule is essential to a system like ours that is largely dedicated
29. The UCC codifies this proposition in several places: U.C.C. § 2-403(1)
("A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power
to transfer. .. ."); § 3-201(1) ("Transfer of an instrument vests in the trans-
feree such rights as the transferor has therein ... ."); § 7-504(1) (transferee of
document "acquires the title and rights which his transferor had or had actual
authority to convey"); § 8-301(1) (purchaser of security "acquires the rights in
the security which his transferor had or had actual authority to convey").
The principle of derivative title is repeatedly expressed in Article 9. First,
Article 9 makes clear that a debtor cannot create a security interest in prop-
erty in which she has no rights. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c). Concomitantly, as a gen-
eral rule a security interest only attaches to collateral to the extent that the
debtor has rights therein. See R. HILLMAN, J. MCDONNELL & S. NICKLES,
COMMON LAw AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 18.01[2
(1985). A specific expression of the corollary that a security interest attaches
only to the extent of the debtor's rights in the collateral is the rule of § 9-
318(1), which applies when the collateral is accounts. This section restates the
common-law maxim that an assignee stands in the shoes of her assignor. In
technical terms, "the rights of an assignee are subject to... all terms of the
contract between the account debtor [i.e., the obligor] and assignor and any de-
fense or claim arising therefrom," and are also subject to "any other defense
or claim of the account debtor against the assignor which accrues before the
account debtor receives notification of the assignment." U.C.C. § 9-318(1).
Also, again because of the principle of derivative title, an Article 9 secur-
ity interest is generally unaffected by the debtor's transfer of the collateral,
whether by sale or creation of another encumbrance. The security agreement
between the secured party and the debtor, and thus the interest created by the
agreement, is generally enforceable against the debtor's subsequent transfer-
ees. U.C.C. § 9-201 (security agreement is effective against third parties as
well as against the debtor herself); § 9-306(2) (security interest continues in
collateral notwithstanding debtor's disposition of the property).
Of course, there are exceptions to each of these expressions of the princi-
ple of derivative title. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (good faith purchaser from
seller having only voidable title acquires good title); § 2-403(2) (buyer in ordi-
nary course from merchant to whom goods entrusted acquires all rights of the
entruster); § 3-305 (holder in due course of instrument takes free of all claims
to instrument and most defenses to it); § 7-502 (holder of negotiable document
who acquires it by due negotiation acquires all title to the document and to the
goods); § 8-302(3) (bona fide purchaser of security acquires her interest in the
security free of any adverse claim).
A large part of Article 9 is devoted to creating exceptions to the principle
of derivative title. Indeed, the drafters commented that "[t]he rules set out in
this Article are principally concerned with the limits of the secured party's
protection against purchasers from and creditors of the debtor." U.C.C. § 9-101
comment (emphasis added). The principle generally fails to protect a secured
party who has not perfected her interest, i.e., given public notice of it, by filing
or otherwise. Although "[a] perfected security interest may still be or become
subordinate to other interests ... in general after perfection the secured party
is protected against creditors and transferees of the debtor and in particular
against any representative of creditors in insolvency proceedings instituted by
or against the debtor." U.C.C. § 9-303 comment 1. The text following this note
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to protecting private ownership of property because it prevents
a party from transferring away interests that belong to an-
other.3 0 The transferee of property, including a transferee of a
limited interest therein, therefore takes subject to all claims
and interests existing at the time of the transfer.
A perfection requirement is a modification of the deriva-
tive title principle, designed to protect creditors and transferees
against dishonest debtors and transferors who would repeatedly
encumber and convey property without being truthful about
the state of the title. Perfection allows potential creditors and
transferees to know in advance of a transaction the state of title
of property to be used as collateral or transferred. An effect of
a perfection requirement, if not also a purpose, is to establish a
clear, certain, and uniform signal as to when a lien or other in-
terest has been created for purposes of applying the first-in-
time rule. The efficiency of the rule is thereby enhanced.3 1
Under the rule of first-in-time, a floating lien would enjoy
priority over any competing claim to the collateral that arises
after the lien was originally created or perfected. Suppose, for
example, that Debtor agrees that Bank shall have an Article 9
security interest in all of Debtor's goods, including goods later
acquired,32 to secure a loan. This agreement will give Bank an
after-acquired interest in any goods Debtor acquires in the fu-
explains the relationship between perfection and the principle of derivative
title.
30. An economic justification of the first-in-time rule, at least as applied
in consensual security transactions, is that it achieves "what the parties would
do for themselves in its absence, and thereby achieves a savings in transaction
costs." Jackson & Kronman, surra note 6, at 1164.
31. Under Article 9, it is possible for a secured creditor to take the usual
step for perfecting a security interest, that is, filing a financing statement,
even before the interest is created. U.C.C. § 9-402(1). The interest will not be
perfected, in the fullest sense of the term, until the steps for creating the in-
terest have been taken. U.C.C. § 9-303(1). Yet, under Article 9's first-in-time
rule that governs conflicts between competing Article 9 security interests, pri-
ority is based on time of perfection or filing, so that the secured party who
first filed wins even though her interest was not the first security interest cre-
ated in the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a). In this type of system, there are
other purposes and effects of perfection, defined narrowly to mean simply giv-
ing notice of a potential interest. See Jackson & Kronman, sup'ra note 6, at
1178-82 (cost-benefit analysis of Article 9's notice filing system); Scott, sup'ra
note 6, at 952-59 (Article 9's extraordinary protection of floating liens is justi-
fied by establishing an "exclusive financing relationship" that allows the
lender "to manage the [debtor's] growth prospect properly and to insure the
optimal timing of inputs necessary to achieve maximum return to the joint en-
terprise." Id. at 956.).
32. This clause is authorized by U.C.C. § 9-204(1). See supra text accom-
panying notes 16-21.
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ture. The Bank perfects by public filing.33 Debtor thereafter
buys new goods from Seller on credit. Seller secures payment
of the purchase price by reserving and perfecting an Article 9
security interest in the new goods. These goods are also subject
to Bank's after-acquired interest. Under UCC section 9-312(5),
the first-in-time rule that governs conflicts between Article 9
security interests, Bank's after-acquired interest would be enti-
tled to priority over Seller's interest.3 In this kind of case,
however, the first-in-time rule of section 9-312(5) is subject to
exceptions that will give Seller priority, if she complies with
certain procedural requirements, because Seller's interest is an
enabling interest.
B. FLOATING LIENS VERSUS ENABLING INTERESTS
1. The Concept of an Enabling Interest
A common competitor of a secured creditor's floating lien
in after-acquired property, and also her claim in original collat-
eral, is the interest of a person who, by making a loan or other-
wise extending value, directly enabled the debtor to buy,
otherwise acquire, or improve the property.35 Such an enabling
interest is occasionally created by law and can always be cre-
ated by agreement with the debtor. There are a great many ex-
amples of enabling interests, which can be grouped into three
major types: purchase money, production money, and improve-
ment money interests.
33. Perfection of an Article 9 security interest ordinarily requires filing a
"financing statement," U.C.C. § 9-302(1), which is described in § 9-402, with the
Secretary of State or a local county official, or with both of them, U.C.C. § 9-
401.
34. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).
35. A general operating loan to a debtor that allows her to stay in busi-
ness certainly enables her subsequent acquisition or improvement of property.
The lender's interest in the debtor's inventory to secure the loan is not an en-
abling interest, however, because this kind of value only indirectly makes pos-
sible increasing the debtor's estate. For the proposition that Article 9 security
interests for general operating loans and the like do not qualify as purchase
money interests entitled to special priority, see 2 G. GILMORE, SEcuRITY INTER-
ESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 28.2, at 750 (1965) (a claim must be "directly"
related to the acquisition of property in order to rank as purchase money);
Jackson & Kronman, supra note 6, at 1164-66, 1175-78 (unrestricted, general
purpose loans have never received, and should not gain, purchase money sta-
tus, even if the loan may have increased the value of the collateral); McLaugh-
lin, Qualifying as a Third-Party Purchase-Money Financier: The Hurdles to
Be Cleared, the Advantages to Be Gained, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 225, 232-33 (1981)
(purchase-money debts are limited to money that actually purchases identifi-
able collateral).
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By far the most common type of enabling interest is a
purchase money interest, which describes a creditor's interest
in property that secures credit extended to enable the debtor to
purchase the property. The creditor may be a lender or a
seller, and the property may be real estate or personal prop-
erty. In some cases, purchase money interests are created by
force of law alone,3 6 but most commonly such interests are cre-
ated by agreement between creditor and debtor. A lender who
loans a debtor the price of a house and secures the loan with a
mortgage on the property has a purchase money interest. If the
seller finances the purchase through a sale contract and retains
an interest in the property until the price is paid, the retained
interest is a purchase money interest. If the subject of either
transaction were personalty governed by Article 9, the lender's
or seller's interest would be classified, in the statute's own
terms, as a purchase money security interest.3 7 A purchase
money interest attaches to the collateral whether or not the
property is also subject to another secured creditor's floating
lien.
Buying is not the only means of acquiring personal prop-
erty. For instance, a debtor can acquire goods by manufacturing
or otherwise producing them from component parts, raw
materials, or the like. In this case, too, an Article 9 security in-
terest in the product that secures the creditor who financed ac-
quisition of the constituent elements is an enabling interest. It
is not, however, a purchase money security interest because the
36. See infra note 49 (authorities cited on vendor's implied equitable lien
on real estate). Some states have codified the vendor's lien on real estate. See,
e.g., IDAHO CODE § 45-801 (1977); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382.070
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1970); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3249 (West 1952). Under
UCC Article 2, a seller of goods may reclaim the property delivered to an in-
solvent buyer, U.C.C. § 2-702(2), or may stop delivery of goods in the posses-
sion of a bailee. U.C.C. § 2-705. While these rights are available only in
limited circumstances, they do confer a form of purchase money interest aris-
ing by operation of law. See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3227 (West 1952),
construed in Wallace Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Gentry, 469 F.2d 396, 402 (5th
Cir. 1972) ("By operation of [art. 3227] title [to goods sold] passes to the pur-
chaser but the vendor retains the vendor's privilege .... " Id. A lien is some-
times called a "privilege" under Louisiana law. Id. at 400.).
37. Article 9 defines a purchase money security interest as a security in-
terest that is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or
part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obliga-
tion gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
collateral if such value is in fact so used.
U.C.C. § 9-107.
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creditor did not enable the debtor to acquire the product
through purchase. Rather, the debtor acquired the product
through production. The creditor's enabling interest is thus a
production money interest, which is a term coined for purposes
of this Article.
For example, when a manufacturer buys flour and sugar
on credit to make cake mix and gives the seller a security inter-
est in the mix, the seller's interest is a production money secur-
ity interest.38 So, too, when a supplier sells seed, fertilizer, and
petroleum on credit to a farmer, who then grows wheat, the
supplier's Article 9 security interest in the crop, or a lien on the
crop given by law, is a production money interest. A produc-
tion money interest can attach even if another secured creditor
has a floating lien on all of the debtor's products.
Property is also acquired, in the broad sense of increasing
the worth of a person's estate, when the value of property
within the estate increases. A debtor can acquire property in
this way by improving real or personal property presently
owned. A secured creditor's claim to property repaired, trans-
formed, or otherwise improved with materials or services sup-
plied on credit is thus a form of enabling interest which can be
labeled an improvement money interest. For instance, an arti-
san who supplies parts or services to repair goods, or a person
who supplies materials or labor to improve real estate, acquires
by law a lien on the goods39 or land40 for the value of the re-
38. The seller's security interest in the raw materials--the flour and
sugar-would be a purchase money security interest. U.C.C. § 9-107(a).
39. "By the common law, a workman who by his skill and labor has en-
hanced the value of a chattel has a lien on it for his reasonable charges, pro-
vided the employment be with the consent, either express or implied, of the
owner." 1 L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LmNS § 731, at 480 (2d ed.
1894). Generally, under the common-law, the artisan loses her lien when she
surrenders possession of the goods. R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY § 13.2, at 396 (W. Raushenbush 3d ed. 1975); 1 L. JONES, supra, § 745, at
492. Her only remedy is to hold the goods hostage for payment. In most
states, however, the common-law lien has been codified and enhanced so that
many states now allow the artisan to enforce the lien by selling the property
herself or by forcing a judicial sale of it. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 45-806 (1977);
MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 16-302 (1983); MINN. STAT. § 514.20 (1986); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 85-7-101 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 52-203 (1984); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 42, § 91 (West 1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-15-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1986). Another common enhancement is continuing the lien when the artisan
parts with possession, the continuation occurring either automatically or by
the artisan recording a lien notice. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-415 (1971);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-201 (1983); MINN. STAT. § 514.18 (1986); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 52-202 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-13-02 (1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN.
§ 44-11-3 (1983).
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sources supplied. In each instance, the lien is an improvement
money interest.
Any increase in the value of property that is improved will
inure to the benefit of a creditor having a preexisting lien on
the collateral.4 1 In this sense, the added value is a form of af-
ter-acquired property, broadly defined.42 The preexisting lien
floats, in the sense of automatically embracing the value added
to the collateral, just as a floating lien attaches without formali-
ties when the debtor acquires property subject to the lien
through purchase or production. The existence of a preexisting
lien on the property, however, does not prevent attachment of
an improvement money interest.
Properly labeling an enabling interest according to this
three-prong classification scheme-purchase, production, and
improvement money interests-is not terribly important. The
scheme is primarily designed for convenience in organizing the
following discussion, which makes the essentially important
point that enabling interests of all classes generally enjoy prior-
ity over floating liens.
2. Exceptional Priority for Enabling Interests
The first-in-time rule, which is the law's general rule of
priority, could always subordinate an enabling interest in collat-
eral to any floating lien created or perfected before the prop-
erty was acquired or improved.4 3 The first-in-time rule,
however, is frequently subject to an exception whereby an en-
abling interest is superior to the conflicting interest of another
secured creditor who claims the collateral through a floating
lien as security for unrelated debt, which means liability for
40. See infra text accompanying notes 91-97; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 713.05 (West Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 45-501 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 82,
para. 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 376.010
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. § 514.01 (1986); see generally
G. NELSON & D. WHrTmAN, supra note 16, § 12.4, at 860.
41. As obviously true as this statement is, a few authorities have been
compelled to declare it true. See, e.g., 2 G. GLENN, MORTGAGES § 350, at 1450
(1943) ("[I]f the mortgagor brings upon the premises a thing which by its own
nature becomes a part of the land.., the mortgagee may enjoy the resulting
benefit .... ."); cf. Kinney v. Vallentyne, 15 Cal. 3d 475, 478-79, 541 P.2d 537,
539, 124 Cal. Rptr. 897, 899 (1975) (judgment lien reaches subsequent increases
in the value of the debtor's equity in the property); Bank of Santa Fe v. Gar-
cia, 102 N.M. 588, 698 P.2d 458, 461 (Ct. App. 1985) (same); Smith v. Popham,
266 Or. 625, 640, 513 P.2d 1172, 1179 (1973) (same).
42. See supra note 8.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34.
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credit that did not directly enable the debtor to acquire or im-
prove the property.
When applicable, this exception prefers an enabling inter-
est to a floating lien without regard to how, or the order in
which, the conflicting interests were created or perfected, as
long as any applicable procedural requirements have been satis-
fied.44 This is not to say that an enabling interest of any kind,
however created, is always entitled to priority over a floating
lien. Yet, some kind of enabling interest that is entitled to pri-
ority usually is available to a creditor who makes possible the
debtor's acquisition of property.45
44. Typically, such procedural requirements include perfecting the en-
abling interest within a short time after it is created, seasonably taking action
to enforce the interest, personally notifying other creditors of the interest, or
complying with a combination of these kinds of requirements.
If applicable procedural requirements of this kind are not satisfied, the
usual priority principle of first in time ordinarily applies and the enabling in-
terest is thus subordinated to the floating lien. See, e.g., ITT Indus. Credit Co.
v. Regan, 487 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1986) (Article 9 purchase money security
interest in equipment, if not filed within the statutory period prescribed by
§ 9-312(4), completely subordinate to an earlier perfected security interest in
after-acquired property), overruling International Harvester Credit Corp. v.
American Nat'l Bank, 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1974); Circle 76 Fertilizer, Inc. v. Nel-
sen, 219 Neb. 661, 668-69, 365 N.W.2d 460, 466-67 (1985) (petroleum products
lien, a kind of enabling interest created by law, was subordinate to a prior se-
curity interest in crops because the petroleum lienor did not comply with the
law providing for the lien that required foreclosure of the lien within a certain
time period); Edmiston v. Kiersted, 140 Or. 299, 304-05, 12 P.2d 299, 300-01
(1932) (construction lienor who supplied materials for improvement of real es-
tate subordinate to the holder of a preexisting claim of the property to whom
the construction lienor had not given statutorily prescribed notice).
45. For example, a seller's Article 2 right of reclamation, U.C.C. §§ 2-507,
2-511, 2-702, is subordinate to the floating lien, that is, after-acquired Article 9
security interest, of the buyer's secured party that attaches to the goods. Los
Angeles Paper Bag Co. v. James Talcott, Inc., 604 F.2d 38, 39-40 (9th Cir. 1979);
In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976);
Lavonia Mfg. Co. v. Emery Corp., 52 Bankr. 944, 946-47 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (seller's
right of reclamation was subordinate to interest of debtor's secured creditors,
but court noted that any seeming unfairness was mooted because seller could
have protected itself by complying with purchase money provisions of UCC);
R. HiLLmAN, J. McDoNNELL & S. NIcKLEs, supra note 29, % 18.02[4]. Yet, if
the seller retains an Article 9 purchase money security interest in the goods,
this interest will prevail over the floating lien of another secured party of the
buyer. U.C.C. § 9-312(3), (4). See, e.g., Ever Ready Machinists, Inc. v. Relpak
Corp. (In re Relpak Corp.), 25 Bankr. 148, 153 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (seller's
purchase money security interest in equipment had priority under § 9-312(4)
over after-acquired equipment clause of conflicting security interest). See in-
fra notes 67-75 and accompanying text. Also, an artisan's Article 9 security in-
terest in goods she repaired loses to a prior perfected security interest in the
property. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a). This is simply an application of the first-in-time
principle of priority. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34. On the other
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The exceptional priority for enabling interests over floating
liens applies to cases involving real and personal property col-
lateral and to cases in which the floating lien, the enabling in-
terest, or both, were created by law or by agreement. Yet, the
priority is most clearly stated and most consistently applied in
Article 9, which governs consensually created security interests
in personal property.46 For this reason, and also because this
Article will soon focus on Article 9's treatment of production
money interests in crops,47 the priority rules of Article 9 are
emphasized in the following discussion illustrating the priority
of enabling interests over floating liens.48
hand, an artisan's lien that arises by law often enjoys priority over any other
claim to the collateral, including prior, perfected security interests. See infra
notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
46. There is a reason why Article 9 so firmly provides priority for en-
abling interests. The "primary controversy" surrounding Article 9 in its devel-
opment and infancy was the statute's endorsement of floating security
interests. Coogan, supra note 20, at 839. Critics worried that the floating liens
would result in a debtor "tying up all of his assets with one creditor and ham-
pering his ability to get credit from anyone else." Id. The principal answer to
this concern was the special priority for purchase money financers. Id. at 861
("especially important means by which security transactions can at least par-
tially escape from the blanket-like coverage"); see also Gilmore, The Purchase
Money Priority, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1336-37 (1963) (the priority of purchase
money interests is the most important limitation designed to avoid unjust re-
sults of the floating lien). Indeed, according to Professor Gilmore: "No previ-
ous security statute has so warmly embraced the ... after-acquired property
interest. It is also true that no previous statute has so sternly insisted on the
priority for purchase money interests." Id. at 1334. This insistence on balanc-
ing the effects of floating security interests is also seen in provisions giving
special priority to other kinds of enabling liens, as discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 76-97.
47. For the discussion of production money interests in crops, see infra
text accompanying notes 111-17.
48. The priority of enabling interests among themselves is not resolved
according to a single principle of priority. Rather, every jurisdiction provides a
largely nonuniform assortment of different rules for ranking enabling liens in-
ter se. The appropriate rule in a particular case usually depends on law that is
peculiar to the kinds of enabling interests in conflict. The range of these pri-
ority rules is very wide.
At one extreme is the familiar first-in-time principle applied to conflicting
enabling interests. For example, this principle is said to govern conflicts
among Article 9, purchase money security interests in the same collateral. 2
G. GiLMORE, supra note 35, § 29.2, at 784 (1965) (purchase money security in-
terests in the same collateral that are perfected at different times are regu-
lated by § 9-312(5), which is an expression of the first-in-time principle); J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNiFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 25-5, at 1051-52 (2d ed. 1980) (same); Hogan, Financing the Acqui-
sition of New Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 B.C. INDuS. &
COM. L. REv. 115, 130-33 (1962) (same); Special Project, The Priority Rules of
Article Nine, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 834, 882-84 (1977) (although policy favors
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a. As applied to purchase money interests
Whether created by law or agreement, a floating lien that
pro rata distribution among conflicting purchase money security interests, the
language of the Code dictates that they rank according to § 9-312(5)); cf. U.C.C.
§§ 9-313(4)(a), 9-312(6) (construction mortgage and purchase money interest in
fixtures rank according to rule of first to file or record); but see B. CLARK, THE
LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE q
3.9[5], at 3-68 to 3-69 (1980) (better reading of § 9-312 is to award a pro rata
recovery when the dispute is between two competing purchase money inter-
ests); cf. Baker, Priority Conflicts Involving Purchase-Money Security Inter-
ests, PRAC. LAW., Oct. 15, 1983, at 67, 78 (conflicting purchase money interests
can rank according to the first-in-time rule of § 9-312(5) or the secured parties
can share ratably according to their contributions). Even Professor Gilmore
suggests that purchase money security interests should rank equally if they at-
tach or are perfected simultaneously. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 35, § 29.2, at
784; accord Note, Competing Purchase Money Security Interests, 22 BAYLOR L.
REV. 456, 461-62 (1970); cf. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 28, § 719, at 1041 ("Ordi-
narily, where two [real estate] mortgages... are simultaneously executed on
the same property by the same mortgagee, and are recorded, or delivered for
record at the same time, their liens are concurrent....").
Scattered throughout the law are other instances of enabling liens ranking
inter se in the order in which the liens attached or were perfected, that is, ac-
cording to the first-in-time principle. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-14-340,
-342 (1982) (landlords' liens on crops for goods and money furnished tenants in
producing crops generally rank, as between themselves, according to date);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 572.17 (West 1970) (construction liens on real property
rank in order of filing); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS ANN. § 38-17-8 (1977) (liens on
crops for seed furnished farmer shall have preference in order of filing).
At the other extreme is a rule that ranks later enabling liens ahead of ear-
lier ones so that last in time is first in right. For example, this rule generally
applies to conflicting enabling liens on vessels, that is, maritime liens:
[Tihe general principle has always been that liens ... take precedence
in the inverse order of their time of accrual, the later liens prevailing
over the earlier... [because] the earlier lienors, having a proprietary
interest in the ship, have been benefitted by the services rendered to
all interests in her by the later lienors.
2 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 51, at 4-4 (7th ed. 1986); see also The St. Jago de
Cuba, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 409, 416 (1824) ("[Ihe last lien given will supersede
the preceding... [because] [t]he vessel must get on."); see generally G. GIL-
MORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADmRALTY 743 (2d ed. 1975).
The middle position is a relatively common rule that ranks enabling liens
equally inter se, in which case the lien holders share ratably in the proceeds of
the collateral. In many states this rule applies to multiple construction, that
is, improvement, liens on the same parcel of real property. See, e.g., ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-992, -1000 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-611 (1971);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-36 (West Supp. 1986) (excluding lien of principal
contractor); HAW. REV. STAT. § 507-46 (1985); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 570.1119 (West Supp. 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-7-263 (1972); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 71-3-502 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.060 (Butterworth 1981); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 34-28-25 (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 44-9-44 (1983); TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.122 (Vernon 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-10 (1974);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 1923 (1984); W. VA. CODE §§ 38-2-17, -18 (1985); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 779.11 (West 1981); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-305 (Michie 1977). It
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attaches to after-acquired property to secure unrelated debt
generally ranks behind a purchase money interest in the same
collateral. Suppose, for instance, that A acquired and docketed
a judgment against D. D later buys a nonexempt parcel of real
estate in the county where the judgment is outstanding. D's
purchase was made possible by a loan from B, who has a con-
also applies to conflicting production money security interests in goods. U.C.C.
§ 9-315. Pro rata sharing is common, too, when the conflict involves produc-
tion and improvement money liens arising by operation of law. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 83.10 (West Supp. 1986) (landlords' liens on crops for rent and
supplies furnished tenant rank equally); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3217 (West
1952) (various privileges securing property and services are concurrent inter
se); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-401 (1985) (farm laborers' liens rank equally and
are paid pro rata from proceeds of foreclosure sale of collateral); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 35-07-03 (Supp. 1985) (grain threshing and drying liens have equal pri-
ority); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 87.146(b), .216, .222, .226 (Butterworth 1981 &
Supp. 1986) (certain laborers' liens on chattels have equal priority); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 29-13-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (laborers' liens on crops rank equally);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-12-104 (1982) (landlords' liens rank equally).
Finally, and least commonly, the order among conflicting enabling liens is
occasionally determined with reference to the nature of the underlying claims,
without regard to the order in which the liens arose. The best examples are
the construction lien laws of several states that rank conflicting construction
liens in the following, or a similar, order: (1) laborers; (2) suppliers of materi-
als; (3) subcontractors; (4) original or general contractors. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 38-22-108 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 713.06 (West 1969); IDAHO CODE
§ 45-512 (1977); NEv. REV. STAT. § 108.236 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. 48-2-13
(1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-27-22 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 43-23 (1981);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 60.04.130 (Supp. 1987). Another, related example of
deciding priority among enabling liens by reference to the nature of the under-
lying claims is the widely accepted rule that ranks purchase money mortgages
ahead of construction liens regardless of the order in which the different en-
cumbrances attached or were recorded. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-605,
-607 (1971) (materialmen's lien generally superior to prior liens on improve-
ment except purchase money liens); D.C. CODE ANN. § 38-109 (1986) (construc-
tion liens prior to subsequent claims except purchase money mortgages); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 507-46 (1985) (in certain cases construction liens are subordinate
to subsequent purchase money mortgages); 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 16, § 16.106H, at 239 ("As a general rule purchase money mort-
gages, whether in favor of the grantor or a third party, prevail over mechanics'
liens even though these arose under contracts that antedated the mortgages.");
cf. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 1921 (Supp. 1986) (construction lien shall not take
precedence over a mortgage given upon the project or upon the land as secur-
ity for the payment of money loaned and to be used in payment of expenses of
same); but see OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.025(6) (Butterworth Supp. 1986) (con-
struction lien has priority over earlier recorded mortgage given to secure a
loan made to finance the improvement). Also, for one reason or another, ven-
dors' liens on real estate are similarly superior to purchase money mortgages
on the property. See, e.g., Schoch v. Birdsall, 48 Minn. 441, 51 N.W. 382 (1892)
(encumbrance in favor of vendor preferred to earlier recorded purchase
money mortgage on the realty); Rader v. Dawes, 651 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983) (same); G. NELSON & D. W=&AN, supra note 16, § 9.2, at 681-82.
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sensually created purchase money mortgage on the land, or by
an extension of credit from B as the seller, who retained a ven-
dor's lien created by law on the land.49 A's judgment lien auto-
matically attached to the land.50 This lien originated with the
docketing of A's judgment,51 which occurred before the crea-
tion of B's mortgage or lien. In a sense, therefore, A's judg-
ment lien is first in time. Nevertheless, B's mortgage or
vendor's lien has priority because a purchase money interest in
real estate, however created, always prevails over the lien of an
antecedent judgment.5 2 Similarly, if A claimed the land
49. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 28, § 10.6
("Courts of equity generally recognize an implied lien, much like a mortgage
on the land, in the favor of the vendor for the amount of the unpaid purchase
price." Id. at 657-58.); 2 L. JONES, supra note 39, § 1061, at 1 (vendor of real
estate has implied lien for purchase money); 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 28,
§ 1261, at 770 (A vendor's lien "is only another mode of expressing his equita-
ble interest... arising from the doctrine of conversion... and so far as it has
any distinctive signification, it simply means his right of enforcing his claim
for the purchase money out of the vendee's equitable estate by means of a suit
in equity."); see authorities cited supra note 36; see also Quintana v. Anthony,
109 Idaho 977, 980, 712 P.2d 678, 681 (Ct. App. 1985) (IDAHO CODE § 45-801 codi-
fies vendor's equitable lien to secure amount of unpaid purchase price); Grace
Dev. Co. v. Houston, 306 MiUnn. 334, 335, 237 N.W.2d 73, 75 (1975) ("A vendor's
lien is an implied equitable lien upon real property for the amount of the un-
paid purchase price."); Rader v. Dawes, 651 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
(priority of vendor's lien over recorded down-payment mortgage); Bean v.
Walker, 95 A.D.2d 70, 74, 464 N.Y.S.2d 895, 898 (1983) (vendor "holds the legal
title in trust for the vendee, subject to the vendor's equitable lien for the pay-
ment of the purchase price in accordance with the terms of the contract");
Russo v. Cedrone, 118 R.I. 549, 556, 375 A.2d 906, 909 (1977) (vendor's equitable
lien is recognized, but not favored, under Rhode Island law).
50. See supra text accompanying notes 11-15.
51. See authorities cited in supra note 12.
52. See Federal Land Bank v. Bank of Lenox, 192 Ga. 543, 16 S.E.2d 9
(1941), in which the court opined:
[A]nother principle, long settled in this State and recognized with lit-
tle dissent in other jurisdictions, [is] that a mortgage or deed to land,
securing its purchase-money, and executed as a part of the same
transaction in which the purchaser acquires title, will exclude or take
precedence over any prior lien against the property arising through or
against the purchaser.
Id. at 556, 16 S.E.2d at 17; Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 396 (Utah 1983)
("[The State's judgment lien, like other judgment liens, takes priority as of
the time it is duly docketed or recorded. Like other judgment liens, however,
it must also yield to the special priority accorded a vendor's purchase money
mortgage."); accord, Associates Discount Corp. v. Gomes, 338 So. 2d 552 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Bank of Homewood v. Gembella, 48 Ill. App. 2d 316, 199
N.E.2d 293 (1964); Liberty Parts Warehouse, Inc. v. Marshall County Bank &
Trust, 459 N.E.2d 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); see also T. CRANDALL, R.
HAGEDORN & F. SMITH, supra note 28, 6.05[2][f], at 6-83 ("There is general
agreement that a purchase-money mortgage on after-acquired property has
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through an after-acquired property clause in an earlier mort-
gage agreement with D, 53 real estate finance law would favor
B's interest over that of A.1
The same result would ensue if B's consensually created
purchase money interest was in goods. Article 9 would then
govern the creation, perfection, and priority of B's interest,
which is a purchase money security interest under the Code.5 5
priority over a judgment lien based on a judgment docketed before the acquisi-
tion of title."); H. HERMAN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EXECUTIONS 195, 364-65
(1875) (a judgment lien on the interest of a vendee of land is subject to the lien
of the vendor); G. NELSON & D. WHInMAN, supra note 16, § 9.1, at 676-77
(purchase money mortgage enjoys "superiority ... over liens arising under
judgments against the grantee-mortgagor under a judgment obtained and
docketed or recorded before the purchase money mortgage is executed"); 2 J.
POMEROY, supra note 28, § 725, at 1072-79 (same); 2 E. SUGDEN, supra note 28,
at 395 (persons claiming by operation of law through vendee of real estate take
subject to vendor's lien, noting specifically that vendor's lien prevails against
judgment creditor of the vendee).
53. Regarding floating liens created by agreement, see supra text accom-
panying notes 16-23.
54. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 16, § 9.1, at 677 (purchase
money mortgage "often wins over after-acquired property clauses in previ-
ously executed mortgages that would cover the subject matter of the purchase
money mortgage"). On the basis of very traditional reasoning, a vendor's lien
should also prevail over the interest of a prior mortgagee claiming under an
after-acquired property clause in an earlier mortgage between her and the
vendee. The mortgagee should lose because the newly acquired property
would secure a preexisting debt. A vendor's lien is defeated only by a pur-
chaser for new value, not by a purchaser who takes her interest for preexist-
ing debt. 2 L. JONES, supra note 39, § 1079, at 20-22 (1888). Because a vendor's
lien and an after-acquired interest in real property are both equitable claims,
there is another traditional reason for the result: In equity, a general lien,
such as that on all after-acquired property of the debtor, is generally
subordinate to a specific lien on particular property the debtor acquires later.
See 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 28, § 720, at 1053-54. Finally, a vendor's lien
accompanies the transfer of the estate to the vendee and therefore is
intrinsically superior to a lien created by the latter in favor of a third
person, since such lien can have no being before the title to the estate
has vested in the vendee and the title comes to him burdened with
the vendor's equity.
Eubank v. Finnell, 118 Mo. App. 535, 544, 94 S.W. 591, 593 (1906) (purchase
money mortgage in favor of third person to secure downpayment on land
subordinate to vendor's lien for balance of the purchase price). This rule was
recently followed in Rader v. Dawes, 651 S.W.2d 629, 631-32 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983) (vendor's lien has priority over a downpayment mortgage even though
the mortgage was recorded first and the vendor has actual knowledge of it); cf.
Schoch v. Birdsall, 48 Minn. 441, 443-44, 51 N.W. 382, 382 (1892) (purchase
money mortgage in favor of third person to secure part of price of land
subordinate to mortgage given vendor to secure balance of price even though
third person's mortgage was recorded earlier); Protection Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
v. Knowles, 54 N.J. Eq. 519, 34 A. 1083 (N.J. Ch. 1896) (same).
55. U.C.C. § 9-107. For technical analyses of the Article 9 purchase money
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Article 9 would subordinate A's floating lien claim to B's
purchase money security interest whether A's claim was based
on a lien of execution 56 arising by law or on an after-acquired
property clause in an earlier security agreement with D. In
either event, Article 9 would condition B's priority only on B
fulfilling certain procedural requirements.
Assume, for instance, that A's floating lien was based on a
lien of execution. A is a lien creditor for purposes of Article
9.57 B is a secured party, which is Article 9's name for a person
in whose favor a security interest exists.58 Generally, UCC sec-
tion 9-301(l)(b), which is a form of the first-in-time rule, deter-
mines priority between a lien creditor and a secured party.
Under section 9-301(1)(b), the lien creditor prevails if the lien
attached before the Secured party perfected. 59 In contrast, the
security interest, and the special priority Article 9 accords it, see Baker, supra
note 48; Hogan, supra note 48, at 118-37; McLaughlin, supra note 35, at 225-26;
Special Project, supra note 48, at 869-92. For the most authoritative historical
and policy analysis of purchase money priority, see 2 G. GILMORE, supra note
35, § 29.
56. Execution is the process through which a judgment is coercively col-
lected by state action. See 1 A. FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EXECU-
TIONS § 1 (3d ed. 1900); see, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-21-06 (1985) ("The writ
of execution must be issued in the name of the state of North Dakota .... ").
Execution is initiated through pro forma issuance of an appropriate writ to the
sheriff who is thereby instructed to seize and sell so much of the debtor's non-
exempt property as is necessary to satisfy the judgment. Execution creates by
law a lien on personal property of the debtor. 1 A. FREEMAN, supra, §§ 38, 40;
2 id.,§ 202. In some states, the lien arises upon delivery of the writ to the sher-
iff and attaches to all of the debtor's nonexempt personal property within the
sheriff's jurisdiction. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-116 (1979); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 9553(b) (1975) ("[Fjrom the time an execution is delivered to a
constable or sheriff, it shall bind all the goods and chattels of the defendant
within the bailiwick of such constable or sheriff which are actually levied upon
within 30 days thereafter."). In other states, creation of the lien of execution
awaits levy by the sheriff and attaches only to property she actually or con-
structively seizes. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-9-60 (1975) (lien is created at time of
levy and notice of levy); CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 697.710 (West Supp. 1987)
(lien is created upon levy on judgment debtor's property); MINN. STAT. § 550.10
(1986) ("Until a levy, property not subject to the lien of the judgment is not
affected by the execution."). Everywhere the lien reaches after-acquired prop-
erty. 2 A. FREEMAN, supra, § 197, at 1011 ("An officer having an execution in
his hands is entitled to levy it upon any property which he may find belonging
to the debtor, although acquired subsequently to delivery of the writ.").
57. For Article 9 purposes, the term "lien creditor" includes a creditor
who acquires a lien on property through attachment, levy or the like. U.C.C.
§ 9-301(3).
58. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(m).
59. The actual language is as follows: "[A]n unperfected security interest
is subordinate to the rights of ... a person who becomes a lien creditor before
the security interest is perfected." U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).
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secured party prevails if perfection of the security interest oc-
curred before or at the same time as the lien attached.
B can thus insure priority of the purchase money security
interest by filing before D acquires rights in goods. Not until D
acquires rights will A's floating lien of execution attach to the
property.60 B's interest will attach at the same point6 ' and also
will be perfected then because of the earlier filing.62 Because
A's interest did not attach before perfection of B's interest, B's
purchase money security interest prevails under section 9-
301(1)(b). 63
Moreover, Article 9 provides additional protection for a
purchase money security interest as against a lien of execution
or the like that attaches after the security interest is created
60. An execution lien only attaches to property in which the judgment
debtor has an interest. See, e.g., Eastern Shore Bldg. & Loan Corp. v. Bank of
Somerset, 253 Md. 525, 530, 253 A.2d 367, 370 (1969); In re Estate of Robbins, 74
Misc. 2d 793, 795, 346 N.Y.S.2d 86, 89-90 (Sur. Ct. 1973); Belnap v. Blain, 575
P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1978); see also H. HERMAN, supra note 52, § 113, at 140-41
("Generally, the right to seize and sell property on execution is confined to the
seizure and sale of such property as an owner himself can sell, or that can be
sold, if there be no law to the contrary.").
61. U.C.C. § 9-203(2) provides that a security interest attaches as soon as
all the requirements of § 9-203(1) are met, and § 9-203(1) requires that the
debtor have rights in the collateral. See, e.g., Babson Credit Plan, Inc. v. Cor-
dele Prod. Credit Ass'n, 146 Ga. App. 266, 271, 246 S.E.2d 354, 358 (1978) (both
purchase money interest and competing security interest attached at moment
of delivery which was when buyer obtained rights in the collateral).
62. "A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all of
the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken.... If such steps
are taken before the security interest attaches, it is perfected at the time when
it attaches." U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (emphasis added).
63. Cf. Sperry Corp. v. Farm Implement, Inc., 760 F.2d 196, 198 (8th Cir.
1985) (even if security interest and lien attached simultaneously, lien creditor
would lose under § 9-301(1)(b)); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States, 466
F.2d 1040, 1048 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting that even if judgment lien and security
interest were perfected simultaneously, under Article 9 security interest
would still have priority), cert denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973); accord Carlson &
Shupack, Judicial Lien Priorities Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Part 1, 5 CARDozo L. REv. 287, 345-46 (1985) (noting that in case of
"tie," secured party wins). The same analysis would give priority to a nonpur-
chase money, after-acquired security interest attaching to the property so long
as the secured party had filed before lien of execution attached and, when the
lien attached, the debtor was obligated to the secured party.
A purchase money security interest in personal property also prevails over
other kinds of floating liens created by law, including the most important fed-
eral tax lien. Fetzer, The Purchase Money Security Interest and the Federal
Tax Lien: A Proposal for Legislative Change, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 873, 892-95
(1985). Also, a purchase money interest in real property generally enjoys pri-
ority over floating liens whether created by law or by agreement. See supra
text accompanying notes 49-54.
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but before the interest is perfected. Under these circumstances,
section 9-301(1)(b) gives the lien creditor priority.64 The se-
cured party, however, can rely on a special, exceptional rule,
section 9-301(2), which gives a ten-day grace period for perfec-
tion of purchase money security interests.65 This rule gives the
purchase money secured party priority over the intervening
lien creditor "[i]f the secured party files . . . before or within
ten days after the debtor receives possession of the
collateral."66
If competing claimants are both secured parties, Article 9
again provides protection for the party who claims a purchase
money interest as against the party with a floating lien in after-
acquired property. For example, now assume that A's floating
lien on D's goods, newly purchased from B, is based on an after-
acquired clause in a security agreement between A and D. In
this case, A and B are both Article 9 secured parties. Each of
them has an Article 9 security interest in the same goods, but
only B's interest is a purchase money security interest. Con-
flicts between perfected security interests are generally gov-
erned by the first-in-time rule embodied in section 9-312(5)(a).
This rule ranks interests in the order of filing or perfection and
thus prefers A's interest because it was filed long before B en-
tered the scene. Many exceptions to section 9-312(5)(a) exist,
however.
Significantly, two special rules together protect purchase
money security interests in every kind of collateral against ear-
lier perfected floating security interests. The broader of these
64. See supra note 59.
65. Many states have enlarged this grace period. Florida and Georgia
have increased the ten-day period to fifteen days. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.301(2)
(West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 11-9-301(2) (1982). Of the states increas-
ing the period, the majority have enlarged it to twenty days. See, e.g., ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-9301(B) (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-301(2)(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-301(2) (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 9-301(2) (Supp. 1986); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 440.9301(2) (West Supp. 1986).
66. U.C.C. § 9-301(2). See Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys, Inc., 129
Misc. 2d 37, 40, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355, 358 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (noting that purchase
money secured party's failure to file within ten days of debtor receiving pos-
session of the collateral would defeat its security interest under § 9-301(2) only
with respect to a lien creditor or trustee in bankruptcy whose lien arose prior
to filing, but did not apply to priority with respect to purchasers); 2 G. GIL.
MORE, supra note 35, § 29.5, at 800; id § 45.3.2, at 1297; J. WHITE & R. SuM-
MERS, supra note 48, § 24-3, at 998; id, § 25-2, at 1032.
For an excellent discussion of the issues raised by § 9-301(2), see Carlson
& Shupack, supra note 63, at 326-40.
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two purchase money rules is section 9-312(4). It gives priority
to a "purchase money security interest in collateral other than
inventory ... over a conflicting security interest in the same
collateral ... if the purchase money security interest is per-
fected at the time the debtor receives possession of the collat-
eral or within ten days thereafter."67 If, for example, the
collateral claimed by A and B is cattle added to D's dairy herd,
B's purchase money interest in the additions as farm products
will have priority over A's after-acquired interest in them, if B
perfected within ten days of D receiving the animals.68 The
67. U.C.C. § 9-312(4). The ten-day grace period for filing has been in-
creased in many states. Florida, Georgia, and Indiana have increased it to fif-
teen days. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.312(4) (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 11-9-312(4) (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9-312(4) (Burns Supp. 1986). An
even larger group of states has increased the ten-day period to twenty days.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47-9312(C) (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 9-
312(4) (Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.9312(4) (West Supp. 1986); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 84-9-312.4 (Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9-312(4) (1985).
68. United States v. Mid-States Sales Co., 336 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (D. Neb.
1971) (recognizing that under § 9-312(4) purchase money security interest in
cattle that were not inventory had priority over conflicting security interest in
debtor's after-acquired livestock that could be identified under the security
agreement). United States v. Hooks (In re Hooks), 40 Bankr. 715, 722 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1984) (under § 9-312(4), purchase money security interest in cows
which were farm products had priority over a conflicting security interest in
the cows); The purchase money secured party's failure to file within the time
specified in § 9-312(4) renders the section inapplicable so that priority is deter-
mined according to the usual first-in-time rule of § 9-312(5)(a), which ordina-
rily means that the purchase money interest in the collateral is subordinate to
a floating lien on the collateral. See, e.g., Bank of Madison v. Tri-County Live-
stock Auction Co., 123 Ga. App. 768, 769-70, 182 S.E.2d 687, 689 (purchase
money security interest in cattle not timely filed); North Platte State Bank v.
Production Credit Ass'n, 189 Neb. 44, 52-53, 200 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1972) (same);
Burlington Nat'l Bank v. Strauss, 50 Wis. 2d 270, 277, 184 N.W.2d 122, 125-26
(1971) (same).
U.C.C. § 9-312(4) will not give priority to a security interest taken directly
in the cattle for feed and other goods and services used in maintaining or im-
proving the herd. The reason is that such an interest in the cattle is not a
purchase money security interest in them because the credit extended to the
debtor was given to enable her to purchase the supplies, not to acquire rights
in the cattle themselves. U.C.C. § 9-107. On the same reasoning, a security in-
terest in crops for the goods and services necessary to produce them is not a
purchase money security interest in the crops. See infra notes 134-36 and ac-
companying text.
The supplier's security interest given directly in the livestock is neverthe-
less a kind of enabling interest, an improvement money interest. See supra
text accompanying notes 39-42; infra notes 85-97. The inferiority of this inter-
est to a floating lien on the livestock does not undermine the proposition that
the claims of creditors who provide enabling credit with respect to collateral
generally outrank after-acquired interests in the property.
First, in some states suppliers of certain goods and services for livestock
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same result follows if the collateral is consumer goods or equip-
ment, such as a tractor, used in connection with D's business.6 9
enjoy liens created by law that prevail over after-acquired interests in the col-
lateral (but such liens, so potent in priority, are not very common). See, e.g.,
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 570A.3, .5 (West Supp. 1986) (lien of agricultural supply
dealer furnishing feed to farmer given limited priority over earlier perfected
security interest in the livestock); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-220 (1983) (agister's
lien on livestock preferred to any prior security interest or other encum-
brance); MINN. STAT. § 514.92(4) (1986) (veterinarian's lien entitled to priority
over all other liens and security interests on the animals to the extent services
performed primarily for protecting human health, preventing spread of dis-
eases, or preserving the health of the animal or animals treated); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 44A-2(c) (1984) (lien of person for boarding animals has priority over
perfected security interests); see also Defiance Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Hake, 70
Ohio App. 2d 185, 187-88, 435 N.E.2d 692, 695 (1980) (liens of farmers who
boarded hogs were entitled to priority over earlier perfected security interests
in the animals). But see Washington County Bank v. Red Socks Stables, Inc.,
221 Neb. 300, 302-03, 376 N.W.2d 782, 784 (1985) (agister's lien held subordinate
to previously perfected security interest because statute creating lien provided
that the agister shall have a "'first, paramount and prior lien'" only if "hold-
ers of any prior liens on that livestock 'shall have agreed in writing to the con-
tract for the feed and care of the livestock involved"' (quoting NEB. REV.
STAT. § 54-201 (1984))).
Also, in cases where feed or other goods consumed by the livestock are
supplied, an Article 9 security interest retained in the goods should continue
in the livestock and either outrank or rank equally with an after-acquired se-
curity interest in the animals. See U.C.C. § 9-315 (a perfected security interest
in goods that become part of a product or mass continues in the product or
mass); R. HnI AN, J. McDONNELL & S. NICKLES, supra note 29, %
22.05[1][a][iii]; Clark, Some Problems in Agricultural Lending Under the UCC,
39 U. CoLo. L. REv. 352, 362-63 (1967); see also infra text accompanying notes
76-84 (regarding application of § 9-315 to production money security interests
in manufactured goods); but see Meadville Prod. Credit Ass'n v. McDougal (In
re McDougal), 60 Bankr. 635, 636 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) (cattle not a product
or mass within meaning of § 9-315, and security interest in feed does not con-
tinue into cattle that consume the feed); First Nat'l Bank v. Bostron, 39 Colo.
App. 107, 109, 564 P.2d 964, 966 (1977) (same). In any event, if the earlier in-
terest belongs to a person who financed the purchase of the livestock, this per-
son's interest is also an enabling interest. Giving her claim priority is in accord
with the common practice of ranking conflicting enabling interests according
to the first-in-time principle. See supra note 48.
69. Bank One v. Farmers Prod. Credit (In re Miller), 44 Bankr. 716, 720
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (purchase money security interest in equipment given
priority under § 9-312(4)); Tuftco Sales Corp. v. Garrison Carpet Mills, Inc.,
158 Ga. App. 674, 675-76, 282 S.E.2d 159, 161 (1981) (purchase money security
interest in equipment, perfected by filing within 10 days after debtor obtained
possession, had priority over previously perfected security interest in debtor's
after-acquired property even though purchase money secured party subse-
quently forfeited its priority by terminating its financing statement); Miku-
licka v. Baer, 184 N.J. Super. 457, 460-61, 446 A.2d 555, 556 (1982) (purchase
money security interest in fixtures had priority over competing security inter-
est in same fixtures); John Deere Co. v. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 39 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1882, 1884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (purchase money security in-
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If the newly purchased collateral is inventory, another
purchase money rule, UCC section 9-312(3), similarly gives pri-
ority to B's enabling interest over A's after-acquired interest in
the property.70 The major differences between sections 9-312(3)
and 9-312(4) are procedural, not substantive. For example, sec-
tion 9-312(3) has no ten-day grace period within which B can
file the purchase money security interest in the inventory. B
must perfect before D receives the inventory.71 Also, before D
receives the inventory, B must give A written notice of B's in-
terest.72 Despite these procedural differences,7" the ultimate
theme of sections 9-312(3) and (4) is the same. A purchase
money security interest in personal property collateral of any
kind is entitled to priority over an after-acquired security inter-
est in the property, notwithstanding the order of filing,74 to the
terest in farm equipment had priority over competing security interest in same
equipment under § 9-312(4)).
70. This section provides:
A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has
priority over a conflicting security interest in the same inventory and
also has priority in identifiable cash proceeds received on or before
the delivery of the inventory to a buyer if
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time
the debtor receives possession of the inventory; and
(b) the purchase money secured party gives notification in writ-
ing to the holder of the conflicting security interest if the holder had
filed a financing statement covering the same types of inventory (i)
before the date of the filing made by the purchase money secured
party, or (ii) before the beginning of the 21 day period where the
purchase money security interest is temporarily perfected without fil-
ing or possession (subsection (5) of Section 9-304); and
(c) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the no-
tification within five years before the debtor receives possession of the
inventory; and
(d) the notification states that the person giving the notice has or
expects to acquire a purchase money security interest in inventory of
the debtor, describing such inventory by item or type.
U.C.C. § 9-312(3).
71. Id. § 9-312(3)(a).
72. Id. § 9-312(3)(b).
73. For detailed comparison and explanation of the procedural differences
between § 9-312(3) and (4), see Coogan, supra note 20, at 861-64; Special Pro-
ject, supra note 48, at 873-80.
74. This theme is repeated in UCC § 9-313, which governs priority dis-
putes concerning fixtures. The principle of first-in-time is the general rule of
priority between a real estate encumbrancer and an Article 9 secured party
whose collateral is fixtures that have become part of the real estate., U.C.C.
§ 9-313(4)(b), (7). Thus, the secured party loses if her security interest was
perfected after the real estate mortgage was recorded. The result is different,
however, if the secured party's interest in the fixtures is a purchase money se-
curity interest. In this event, the security interest is entitled to priority if the
secured party perfects "before the goods become fixtures or within ten days
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extent the after-acquired interest secures unrelated debt.75
b. As applied to production money interests
Under Article 9, consensually created production money
interests in manufactured goods also have priority over, or rank
equally with, after-acquired interests for unrelated debts. Sup-
pose A has a perfected Article 9 security interest in all of D's
inventory, present and after-acquired. D manufactures widgets
that are produced by combining several components which lose
their identity in the product. D buys components on credit
from B who reserves an Article 9 security interest in them. D
produces a batch of widgets with the components purchased
from B. By operation of law, specifically UCC section 9-315(1),
B's interest in the components continues in the new widgets as
products of the collateral.76 A's floating lien attaches to the
components, as well as the widgets produced therefrom, be-
cause the security agreement with D covers after-acquired
inventory.
The relative priority of A and B in the batch of newly pro-
duced widgets is an open question under Article 9, which has
been variously interpreted by the authorities, but in no event
does A's earlier perfection give her complete priority. Relying
on UCC section 9-315(2), 77 some authority holds that the con-
flicting interests of A and B rank equally and, therefore, A and
B share ratably in the product.78 Arguably, however, even
thereafter," notwithstanding that the mortgage is already recorded. U.C.C.
§ 9-313(4)(a). The usual first-in-time rule returns to govern if the real estate
encumbrance is a construction money mortgage, U.C.C. § 9-313(7), which is ap-
propriate because in this event the conflict is between two enabling interests.
See supra note 48 and authorities cited therein.
75. If the after-acquired interest is also a purchase money security inter-
est, the standard rule of first in time applies, as expressed in UCC § 9-
312(5)(a). See supra authorities cited in note 48.
76. According to UCC § 9-315(1)(a):
(1) If a security interest in goods was perfected and subsequently
the goods or a part thereof have become part of a product or mass, the
security interest continues in the product or mass if
(a) the goods are so manufactured, processed, assembled or
commingled that their identity is lost in the product or mass ....
77. "When under subsection (1) more than one security interest attaches
to the product or mass, they rank equally according to the ratio that the cost
of the goods to which each interest originally attached bears to the cost of the
total product or mass." U.C.C. § 9-315(2).
78. In re San Juan Packers, Inc., 696 F.2d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1983); 2 G. GIT-
MORE, supra note 35, § 31.5, at 854-56; Hogan, supra note 48, at 153-54. B need
not comply with the procedural requirements of U.C.C. § 9-312(2) to enjoy this
equal priority status because § 9-315 overrides § 9-312. U.C.C. § 9-312(1); 1A P.
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under section 9-315(2), B wins completely if she fully financed
the cost of the component goods.79 Other authority holds that
section 9-315(2) is inapplicable to the dispute between A and B
because the provision applies only when each competing inter-
est has attached to the product or mass solely through section
9-315(1).80 In the hypothetical case, A's interest in the widgets
is not dependent on section 9-315(1). Although A's interest at-
tached to the component parts as inventory8 l and continued in
the parts as they were transformed into widgets, A's interest
also attached directly to the widgets themselves as inventory.
Accordingly, if section 9-315(2) is inapplicable, section 9-312
governs the dispute.8 2 Because B's interest in the components
was a purchase money security interest, her interest in the
products is also such an interest.8 3 B's purchase money interest
in the widgets is thus eligible for complete priority over A's in-
terest in them under UCC section 9-312(3),84 assuming B com-
plies with the section's procedural requirements for priority.
c. As applied to improvement money interests
To illustrate the priority generally given an improvement
money interest, suppose that A has a perfected Article 9 secur-
ity interest in certain goods belonging to D. The collateral
secures an unrelated debt D owes A. B furnishes materials or
services to repair or otherwise improve the goods. By operation
of law, B acquires an artisan's lien on the goods to secure the
value of materials and services supplied. Because of UCC sec-
tion 9-310,85 B's artisan's lien outranks A's interest in the col-
COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS, J. McDONNELL, BENDER'S SECURED TRANSAC-
TIONS UNDER THE UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7.11A[2][y] (1986).
79. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 35, § 31.5, at 854-56.
80. Frisch, UCC Section 9-315: A Historical and Modern Perspective, 70
MINN. L. REV. 1, 48-52 (1985) (emphasizing that by its own terms, the rule of
§ 9-315(2) applies only when the competing security interests in a product or
mass attached "under subsection (1)").
81. As Article 9 defines "inventory", the term includes raw materials and
materials used or consumed in a business. U.C.C. § 9-109(4). Security agree-
ments covering inventory typically define the term just as broadly.
82. Frisch, supra note 80, at 52.
83. Jackson & Kronman, A Plea for the Financing Buyer, 85 YALE L.J. 1,
29 (1975); McLaughlin, supra note 35, at 237-38, 250-51.
84. McLaughlin, supra note 35, at 252-55. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) is quoted
supra note 70 and explained supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
85. This section provides:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes serv-
ices or materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a
lien upon goods in the possession of such person given by statute or
rule of law for such materials or services takes priority over a per-
1987] 1167
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lateral, unless extra-Code law specifically provides otherwise. 86
fected security interest unless the lien is statutory and the statute ex-
pressly provides otherwise.
U.C.C. § 9-310.
86. See, e.g., Peavy's Serv. Center, Inc. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 335
So. 2d 169 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) (common-law, possessory mechanic's lien for
repairs to diesel truck takes priority over a perfected security interest), cert
denied, 335 So. 2d 172 (Ala. 1976); Carolina Aircraft Corp. v. Commerce Trust
Co., 289 So. 2d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (repairer's lien on airplane had pri-
ority over properly perfected security interest in the goods); National Bank v.
Bergeron Cadillac, Inc., 38 Ill. App. 3d 598, 347 N.E.2d 874 (1976) (common-
law, possessory mechanic's lien for services and materials used in repairing
motor vehicle had priority over perfected security interest in same), fffd, 66
Ill. 2d 140, 361 N.E.2d 1116 (1977); Corbin Deposit Bank v. King, 384 S.W.2d
302 (Ky. 1964) (statutory repairman's lien on automobile was entitled to prior-
ity over a prior perfected security interest of bank); General Motors Accept-
ance Corp. v. Colwell Diesel Serv. & Garage, Inc., 302 A.2d 595 (Me. 1973)
(common-law mechanic's lien, where the repairman retains possession of the
repaired goods, has priority over a perfected security interest in the goods);
Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Mississippi Road Supply Co., 348 So. 2d 1016 (Miss.
1977) (repairman's lien was entitled to priority over perfected security interest
in equipment); United States Nat'l Bank v. Atlas Auto Body, Inc., 214 Neb.
597, 335 N.W.2d 288 (1983) (auto body shop's artisan's lien outranks bank's se-
curity interest to extent of repairs made to collateral); Ferrante Equip. Co. v.
Foley Mach. Co., 49 N.J. 432, 231 A.2d 208 (1967) (conditional seller's security
interest in bulldozer was inferior to common-law artisan's lien of machine
company for repairs which had enhanced the value of the vehicle); Gulf Coast
State Bank v. Nelms, 525 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1975) (mechanic's lien for repairs
made to an automobile entitled to priority over a previously perfected security
interest in the vehicle); cf Bond v. Dudley & Moore, 244 Ark. 568, 426 S.W.2d
780 (1968) (artisan's lien statute expressly subordinated lien to prior interest of
seller of goods to secure price); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Madden,
331 So. 2d 882 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (repairman's lien statute expressly
subordinated lien to vendors' privilege or chattel mortgage); Hackensack Trust
Co. v. Alvarez, 66 N.J. 275, 330 A.2d 359 (1974) (purchase money security inter-
est in motor vehicle prevails over repair shop's claim of a lien for subsequent
repairs inasmuch as lien statute subordinates the lien to the interest of a prior
conditional vendor or chattel mortgagee). Giving priority to an earlier per-
fected purchase money security interest, as in the last three cases cited here, is
consistent with the common practice of resolving conflicts between conflicting
enabling interests according to the general rule of first in time. See supra note
48 and authorities cited therein.
UCC § 9-310 does not apply when the artisan is asserting a lien against
property she no longer possesses. Recent, well-reasoned authority, however,
holds that the policy behind § 9-310 to protect enabling claims should be ap-
plied in a dispute between a lienor for services or materials, who is out of pos-
session, and a secured party. First Maryland Lease Corp. v. M/V Golden
Egret, 764 F.2d 749 (11th Cir. 1985) (even though § 9-310 did not apply to non-
possessory state watercraft lien, the policy behind § 9-310 entitled properly
perfected watercraft lien to priority over all other liens including security in-
terests); but see Balzer Mach. Co. v. Klineline Sand & Gravel Co., 271 Or. 596,
533 P.2d 321 (1975) (negative implication of § 9-310 is that all statutory nonpos-
sessory liens are subordinate to perfected security interests). See also Recent
Decisions, Liens-Priority Under U..C. Section 9-310-Artisan's Lien Takes
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Moreover, if B's improvement of the collateral involves af-
fixing or otherwise adding goods thereto that constitute acces-
sions,87 B could have additional protection under the Code. B
could retain an Article 9 security interest in the accessions,
which would outrank A's floating lien 8 that automatically ex-
tends to the added goods.89 Under UCC section 9-314(4), B
could then remove the accessions from the collateral without
having to account to A "for any diminution in value of the
whole caused by the absence of the goods removed."90
If the collateral was realty to which B contributed services
or materials for improvements, B would acquire by law a con-
struction lien on the property.9 1 In many states, a construction
Priority Over Prior Perfected Security Interest Notwithstanding Lack of Con-
tinuous Possession of Repaired Property, 48 Miss. L.J. 1113 (1977).
87. "An accession is literally something added." R. BROWN, supra note 39,
§ 6.1, at 49. Under the law of property, however, goods that are added to other
goods are accessions "only in those cases in which the additions have become
so permanently united with the original materials as to form together but one
article." The Law of Accession Viewed in Its Relations to Personal Property, 2
COLUM. JURIST 374, 375 (1886). According to the majority of courts, a suffi-
cient integration occurs
where the articles later attached to... [the] principal article of per-
sonal property become so closely incorporated with the principal arti-
cle that they cannot be identified and detached therefrom without
injury to the ... principal article ... [and when they are so attached,]
such articles become a part of the machine or principal article to
which they are so attached and will pass by accession [that is, by oper-
ation of law] to the one having a chattel mortgage or other lien upon
the principal article, if the lien is enforced.
Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. Pratt Motor Co., 198 Minn. 259, 261-62, 269 N.W.
464, 465 (1936). See generally R. BROWN, supra note 39, §§ 6.1-6.7 (discussing
the law of accession).
88. U.C.C. § 9-314(1) (if B's interest in the accessions attached before the
goods were installed or affixed to the collateral).
89. See, e.g., Bancorp Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Stadeli Pump & Constr.,
Inc., 81 Or. App. 371, 724 P.2d 948 (1986) (engine installed in motor vehicle);
Mack's Used Cars & Parts, Inc. v. Tennessee Truck & Equip. Co., 694 S.W.2d
323 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) (wrecker assembly bolted to the frame of a truck);
Nickles, supra note 16, at 111-35.
90. U.C.C. § 9-314(4).
91. A construction lien, also known as a mechanic's or materialman's lien,
is a lien given by statute to secure the claims of persons who supply goods or
services for the improvement of real estate. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN,
supra note 16, § 12.4; S. PHMLIPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MECHANICS'
LIENS ON REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 15 (3d ed. 1893) ("The lien of the
mechanic ... is a remedy in the nature of a charge on land.., to secure a
priority or preference payment of money for the performance of labor or sup-
ply of materials to buildings or other improvements.... ."). The states agree
about the need for such a lien, but they disagree on many of the incidents and
aspects of the lien. This disagreement includes not only the procedural details
with respect to recognizing and enforcing the lien, but also, although to a
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lien enjoys priority over an earlier recorded mortgage or other
encumbrance on the land, at least with respect to the improve-
ment that the lienor helped to make.92 In any event, if B's im-
much lesser extent, the classes of persons entitled to the lien. See, e.g., KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1101 (1983) ("[alny person furnishing labor, equipment, mate-
rial, or supplies used or consumed for the improvement of real property");
Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-7-131 (Supp. 1986) ("architects, engineers, surveyors, la-
borers, and materialmen and/or contractors who rendered services and con-
structed improvements"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8 (1984) ("[a]ny person who
performs or furnishes labor or professional design or surveying services or fur-
nishes materials"); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.010 (Butterworth 1981) (laborers,
materials suppliers, lessors of equipment, trustees of the employee benefit
plans of the workers involved in a project, architects, and surveyors).
Despite a wide range of disagreements among the states regarding the par-
ticulars of construction liens, there is general agreement that the lien attaches
not only to the improvement itself that is repaired, altered, or constructed, but
also to the land, or some part of it, on which the improvement sits. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE §§ 35-11-210, -217 (1975), interpreted in O'Grady v. Bird, 411 So. 2d
97, 105 (Ala. 1981) (lienor may claim up to one acre surrounding the structure
or improvement); MINN. STAT. § 514.01 (1986) (grants lien on improvement
and land); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 429.010 (Vernon Supp. 1987) (same).
92. ALA. CODE § 35-11-211 (1975) (priority over prior liens with respect to
the building or other improvement); ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.060(c) (1985) (a lien
for work actually performed, or for an employee benefit trust for such efforts,
is preferred to prior encumbrances); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-605, -607 (1971)
(liens attach to the building or improvements in preference to any prior lien
or encumbrance or mortgage existing upon the land before the building or im-
provements were erected thereon, except prior liens given for the purpose of
raising money to make such building or improvement); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-
22-103(2) (1973) (when the lien is for work done or materials furnished for any
entire structure, erection or improvement, the lien attaches to the structure,
erection or improvement in preference to any prior lien or encumbrance); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 82, para. 16 (Smith-Hurd 1987) (construction lienor preferred
to the value of improvements over prior encumbrances); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 572.20 (1950) (mechanics liens attach to the building or improvement upon
which the work was done in preference to any prior encumbrance or mortgage
upon the land where the building or improvement was erected or situated);
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3268 (West 1952) ("When the vendor of lands finds
himself opposed by workmen seeking payment for a house or other work.., a
separate appraisement is made of the ground and of the house, [and] the ven-
dor is paid to the amount of the appraisement on the land, and the other to
the amount of the appraisement of the building."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:4821 (West 1983) (construction liens of laborers are prior to previous mort-
gages); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 429.050 (Vernon 1979) (the liens are preferred to any
prior lien or encumbrance or mortgage upon the land upon which the build-
ings, erections, or improvements or machinery have been erected or placed);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-502(2) (1985) (liens attach to the building, structure,
or improvement in preference to any prior lien, encumbrance, or mortgage
upon the land); N.Y. LIEN LAw § 13(1) (McKinney 1966) (liens have priority
over earlier attachment or money judgment upon a claim which was not for
materials furnished, labor performed or moneys advanced for the improve-
ment of the property); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-22 (1984) (lien has priority over
all other interests previously created); N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-27-21 (1980) (a
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provement of real estate collateral consists of adding fixtures9 3
in which B retains a perfected Article 9 security interest, B's in-
terest in the fixtures themselves would outrank A's mortgage
interest,9 4 which would automatically embrace the fixtures.9 5
The mortgagee, A, would prevail as to the fixtures only if she
held an earlier recorded construction mortgage-that is, a
mortgage securing an obligation incurred to acquire the land or
to build an improvement thereto.96 In such a case, A's interest
also would be an enabling interest, and priority would be de-
cided according to the usual rule of first-in-time. 97
3. Justifications for the Priority of Enabling Interests
(Especially Purchase Money Interests)
Modern justifications for the law's pervasive policy of pri-
ority for enabling interests generally rely on principles of fair-
ness and of economics. Although the arguments usually focus
on reasons for preferring purchase money interests in the con-
text of consensual secured transactions, some or all of these
lien attaching to an original, complete, and independent building, whether it is
placed upon a foundation or not, has preference to any prior title, claim, lien,
encumbrance, or mortgage upon the land); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.025(1)
(Butterworth 1984) (lien upon any improvement has priority over all prior
liens, mortgages or other encumbrances upon the land); TEx. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 53.123 (Vernon 1984) (lien upon the improvement shall be preferred to
any prior lien or encumbrance upon the land, but liens upon the structure and
land existing at the time of the inception of the lien are not affected); VA.
CODE ANN. § 43-21 (1981) (lien for erection of building or structure is superior
to prior liens); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 29, § 186 (1985) (lien has priority over all
other debts of the property owner). Cf. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 92, 96
(West 1979) (laborer's lien given priority over recorded mortgage), discussed
in Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Bohmar Minerals, Inc., 661 P.2d 521, 523-24
(Okla. 1983) (reasons for giving laborer's lien, as distinguished from construc-
tion lien, priority over prior interests).
On the reasons for giving a construction lien priority as to the building or
improvement made by the lienor (generally to avoid unjustifiable enrichment
of the prior encumbrancer of the land) and also on enforcing the lien's priority
over an earlier encumbrance on the land (which usually involves severing the
improvement or selling the entire property and apportioning the fund), see 4
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 16.106G, at 234-38.
93. Fixtures are goods, U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(h), that "become so related to
particular real estate that an interest in them arises under real estate law."
U.C.C. § 9-313(1).
94. U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a).
95. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16, §§ 19.7, 19.12; see
also authorities cited supra note 41.
96. U.C.C. § 9-313(1)(c).
97. U.C.C. § 9-313(7). Regarding the first-in-time principle as governing
disputes between conflicting enabling interests in the same collateral, see
supra note 48.
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reasons apply equally well to justify priority for any kind of en-
abling interest.98
The authorities sometimes cite fairness as a reason for pre-
ferring purchase money interests.99 The argument for fairness
is that "[s]ince the credit supplied by the purchase money
lender is what makes the debtor's acquisition of the collateral
possible, it is just, as well as financially necessary, that the
purchase money lender should prevail over other secured par-
ties in any priority dispute regarding the collateral itself."10 0
Moreover, any consensually secured lender who must look to
after-acquired collateral that she did not finance is almost al-
ways partly to blame for her predicament. She either inscalcu-
lated the present or future value of collateral that existed when
advances were made, misjudged the debtor's ability or honesty,
or deliberately decided to take an unsecured risk. Allowing
this lender to grab after-acquired, collateral that she did not fi-
nance allows her to shift the costs of her mistakes, and the
risks she assumed, to the innocent purchase money financer.
The effect would be to give the lender a windfall, and because
the lender is culpable, the result would be unjust enrichment.
A complementary view posits that the lender who claims
an interest in after-acquired property, without having financed
it, could not have justifiably relied on the collateral during
dealings with the debtor. Moreover, because the purchase
money financer gets priority only in goods she financed or their
proceeds, the lender's position is no worse than if the debtor
had not acquired the goods. 0 1 Giving priority to the purchase
money financer, therefore, essentially takes nothing away from
the floating lien lender.10 2
Economics is more often cited as the reason for preferring
98. Cf. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 83, at 8-9 ("Mhe rationale under-
lying the purchase money priority [has] never been limited to any specific type
of collateral.").
99. E.g., Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 394 (Utah 1983); Fetzer, supra
note 63, at 885 (intrinsic fairness, justice, and equity); Skilton, supra note 20, at
948 (fireside equities); Note, Defeating the Priority of an After-Acquired Prop-
erty Clause, 48 HARV. L. REv. 474, 476 (1935) (fairness and financial
expediency).
100. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 83, at 6-7.
101. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 258 n.23 (1978); Recent Cases, Se-
cured Transactions-Purchase Money and After-Acquired Property Interests-
Priority of Security Interests Under UCC 9-312, 26 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 708,
711 (1976); Comment, The Value of "Value" in a Purchase Money Security In-
teres4 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 667, 673 (1976).
102. Kripke, supra note 6, at 936 (In purchase money situations the secured
party adds to the assets of the debtor and takes nothing from other creditors.).
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purchase money interests over floating liens in the context of
consensual secured transactions. In general terms, this prefer-
ence is necessary "to encourage future lenders to extend credit
when the first secured party would or could not,"'0 3 for other-
wise an "unyielding creditor may be able to frustrate future
outside borrowing."' 0 4 One explanation for facilitating new
sources of credit when a debtor's usual lender is unwilling to
supply it deems borrowing and spending purchase money to be
desirable ends in themselves. 05 A more common explanation
is that the purchase money priority averts a monopoly10 6 in the
supply of credit to a debtor. 0 7
This sort of monopoly is economically harmful because, at
the very least, it gives the lender who enjoys it a competitive
advantage, and thus breeds inefficiency in the credit market-
place.'0 8 A related harm is that when a debtor is totally depen-
103. Comment, supra note 101, at 672.
104. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 83, at 1; see also Coogan, supra note
20, at 839, 861 (discussing the "primary controversy surrounding Article 9"
which was allowing a debtor to create a floating lien "tying up all of his assets
with one creditor and hampering his ability to get credit from anyone else,"
and focusing in part on purchase money priority as an "especially important
means by which security transactions can... escape" floating liens).
105. Baker, supra note 48, at 68-69 (encourages new money and attracts
new credit); Fetzer, supra note 63, at 885 (encourages the acquisition of new
assets).
106. R. BRAUTCHER & R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMNERciAL TRANs-
ACTIONS 464 (1977) (purchase money priority prevents a creditor from taking
advantage of the debtor); Fetzer, supra note 63, at 885 (encourages the acquisi-
tion of new assets and averts a monopoly of the debtor's resources); Jackson &
Kronman, supra note 6, at 1167 (purchase money priority is best thought of as
a device for preventing a situational monopoly); Special Project, supra note 48,
at 870-71 (purchase money priority provides an alternative source of funds
when a floating lienor refuses to extend credit and thereby facilitates com-
merce and reduces the potential unfairness created by the monopolization of
credit).
107. In broader, simpler terms, which were used in the New York Law Re-
vision Commission analysis of the purchase money priority rules of Article 9,
this sort of preference is necessary to prevent monopolizing activity. Letter
from Harold F. Birnbaum to Milton P. Kupfer (April 8, 1954), reprinted in 2
STATE OF NEw YORK, LAw REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECORD OF
HEARNGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1056-57 (1954), and thereby re-
duce a lender's control over a debtor, 3 STATE OF NEw YORK, LAW REVISION
COMMISSION, REPORT-STUDY OF THE UNIFoRM CoMMERCIAL CODE 2025
(1955).
108. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 6, at 1167 (1979). There are, of
course, arguments in favor of tying a debtor to a single creditor in a monopo-
listic relationship. As Professor Coogan observed:
There undoubtedly are situations in which a lender is fully justified in
refusing to do any financing unless he is the only secured lender or
possibly even the only long-term lender. Entirely apart from the dan-
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dent for credit on a single lender, the lender has a veto over
many of the debtor's most important business decisions. Conse-
quently, the debtor cannot freely respond to market forces and
opportunities if the lender interprets the market differently.
Entrepreneurial enterprise is therefore stifled and credit may
be inefficiently applied. Additionally, as Professor Robert Scott
has recently theorized, because the lender's
rate of return is fixed in advance, [the lender] has less incentive than
the debtor to pursue high-risk, high-return opportunities that arise
after the initial venture is planned. The [result of the] creditor's con-
servatism in adhering to the initial development plan may be inconsis-
tent with maximizing the value of the [debtor's] firm.10 9
Wider impacts of wedding a debtor to a single lender are an ar-
tificially low limit on available credit and an artificially high
price on the cost thereof, which unnecessarily inhibit economic
growth.110
ger of fraud, the lender might reasonably be concerned with the possi-
bility of double financing which results from poor record keeping....
[Moreover,] [i]n the absence of any power of a major financer to con-
trol the creation of other debts and liens, it is possible that a smaller
creditor would enter a situation that he would otherwise stay away
from, knowing that the large creditor has too much at stake to permit
the enterprise to fail....
Nor is a rule which encourages one secured creditor to exercise a
considerable amount of control necessarily bad for the debtor. The
intelligent debtor often willingly ties himself to one major financer so
that the financer will find it difficult as a matter of business morality
to desert the debtor when he is in trouble. To spread that responsibil-
ity among several financers is to dispel it completely. And this re-
sponsibility is not limited to supplying money. Since the typical users
of credit secured by personal property are the smaller companies,
often those still in the learning stage, the financer's greatest contribu-
tion may be advice.
Coogan, supra note 20, at 876-77 (citation omitted). See also Scott, supra note
6, at 956 ("[E]xclusive financing relationship encourages the creditor to man-
age the growth prospect properly and to insure the optimal timing of inputs
necessary to achieve maximum return to the joint enterprise."). The law has
decided, however, that on balance, the advantages of complete monopoly con-
trol by a floating lienor are outweighed by the benefits of limiting the control
to the extent accomplished by purchase money priority.
109. Scott, supra note 6, at 962. Professor Scott also justifies the purchase
money priority on the basis that purchase money financers may more effi-
ciently monitor against debtor misbehavior (asset conversions and substitu-
tions) than the lender, and may provide other specialized skills that benefit
the debtor's business. As a result of these efficiencies, the lender benefits de-
rivatively. Id. at 963.
110. "[IThe purchase money provisions give the debtor somewhat greater
bargaining power and at least theoretically enlarge his ability to get credit." J.
WHITE & R. SuMMERs, supra note 48, § 25-5, at 1043.
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4. Justifications Extend to Production Money
Interests in Crops
The reasons for subordinating an after-acquired interest in
collateral to a purchase money interest in the property argue
just as strongly for similarly preferring production money in-
terests in crops. Farm lenders are not so much wiser than
other secured parties, and farmers no more childlike than other
debtors, as to justify a higher degree of paternalism in financ-
ing crop production. Also, now more than ever, no business ex-
ceeds farming in the need for laws that work to stimulate and
efficiently distribute credit and to insure fairness and prevent
windfalls; and farming has no less right to such laws.
Appropriately, production money interests in crops that
are created by law frequently enjoy priority over after-acquired
interests in the collateral. For example, threshers' liens, and
liens for other services that contribute to crop production, typi-
cally rank ahead of any mortgages, encumbrances, or other
liens on the crops.11 1 Statutorily created liens for certain goods
111. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-901 (1971) (owner of cotton gin has a lien
on the cottonseed and the baled cotton to secure payment of the ginning,
which lien is superior to all other liens); id § 51-909 (1971) (rice processor's
lien shall be superior to all other prior liens); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3061.5 (West
Supp. 1987) (laborers who harvest or transport crops or farm products have a
lien on the goods that is "prior in dignity to all other liens, claims, or encum-
brances"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 4101 (1974) (owner of threshing machine,
cornpicker or hay baler has a prior lien upon crops threshed, picked or baled);
IDAHO CODE § 45-301 (1977) ("Any person who does any labor on a farm or
land in tilling the same, or in cultivating, harvesting, threshing, or housing any
crop or crops raised thereon, has a lien upon such crop or crops for such labor.
Such lien shall be a preferred and prior lien thereon to any security interest
... ."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 571.1, .2 (West 1950 & Supp. 1986) (thresherman or
cornsheller has a first lien on grain and seed threshed, on any farm product
baled, or on corn shelled or husked that has priority over a security interest in
the grain, seed or crop); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-218 (1983) (liens for threshing
and husking have priority over any prior security interest or encumbrance);
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 3186, 3217 (West 1952) (Privilege on crops for labor-
ers' wages shall not be divested by any prior mortgage.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, §§ 3401, 3402 (1980) (Laborer who cuts or harvests hay has a lien on the
hay for services performed that has precedence over all other claims except
state liens.); MINN. STAT. § 514.65 (1986) (person owning or operating a thresh-
ing machine, combined thresher and harvester, clover huller, cornpicking
machine, corn sheller, corn shredder, grain dryer, ensilage cutter, or hay baler
has a lien upon the product for the price or value of his service that is pre-
ferred to all other liens or encumbrances except seed liens); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 85-7-1 (Supp. 1986) (every person who may aid by his labor to make, gather,
or prepare for sale or market any crop have a lien for his wages that is para-
mount to all liens and encumbrances or rights of any kind except a landlord's
lien); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-401 (1985) (farm laborer's lien has priority over
all other liens, chattel mortgages, or encumbrances); id. §§ 71-3-801, -804 (1985)
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used in producing crops, such as seed liens, often have a similar
preference, 112 as do landlord liens on tenants' crops.113
(all threshermen or swathers owning or operating threshing or swathing ma-
chines and all owners of combine harvesters and threshers have a lien upon
the grain and other crops swathed or threshed that shall be prior to and have
precedence over any mortgage, encumbrance or other lien upon grain or other
crops, except liens for the seed furnished for the purpose of growing the par-
ticular crop); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-5-1, -3 (1978) (owner or lessee of thresh-
ing machine who threshes grain for another has a lien on the grain for the
value of his services, and the lien has priority over all other liens); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 35-07-01, -03 (Supp. 1985) (owner or lessee of a threshing machine or
combine or a grain drying machine who threshes or dries grain has a lien upon
the grain that has priority over all other liens and encumbrances upon the
grain, including mortgages upon the crop or grain given by the person claiming
the lien); id. § 35-10-01 (1980) (any person furnishing labor or services neces-
sary in the production, harvesting and hauling of sugar beet crops shall be en-
titled to a lien upon the crops so raised that has priority over all other liens
and encumbrances except government seed liens); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 38-17-14, -16 (1977) (thresher's and processor's lien on grain processed shall
have priority over all other liens and encumbrances upon the grain if timely
filed); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-15-101 (1982) (the charges of ginners for ginning
and baling cotton are secured by a lien on the cotton that has priority over all
other liens except landlords' liens for rent and furnishings); id. §§ 66-12-113 to
-115 (1982) (any person who performs any labor or renders services to another
in cultivating the soil and in producing a crop has a lien upon the crop for the
payment of the compensation or wages agreed on, and the lien is superior to
all liens except landlords' liens for rent or supplies); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 1991 (1984) (person cutting or drawing logs has a lien thereon for his wages
that has precedence over all other claims except taxes); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 60.11.020, .050 (Supp. 1987) (supplier of work or labor shall have lien
upon the crops that is preferred and prior to any other lien or security interest
upon the crops); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 779.50 (West 1981) (lien for threshing,
husking or baling shall be preferred to all other liens and encumbrances);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-5-102, -104 (Michie 1981) (all persons owning or operat-
ing harvesting machines are entitled to a lien on the crops havested by them
for their work performed, which lien has priority over any mortgage or
incumbrance).
112. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 45-1604 (1977) (seed lien has priority as to crops
covered thereby over all other liens and encumbrances except farm laborers'
liens); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-218 (1983) (seeding and baling liens preferred to
any prior security interest or encumbrance); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3186,
3217 (West 1952) (privilege given for debts due for necessary supplies fur-
nished to any farm or plantation, and debts due for money actually advanced
and used for the purchase of necessary supplies and the payment of necessary
expenses for any farm or plantation, which privilege shall not be displaced by
any prior mortgage); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-3-701, -702 (1985) (lien for seed
or grain has, as to the crop covered thereby, priority over all other liens and
encumbrances thereon); N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-09-01 (1980) (person who fur-
nishes or applies fertilizer, farm chemicals, or seed shall have a lien upon crop
produced therefrom that is generally prior to all other liens and encum-
brances); id. § 35-10-01 (1980) (any person who furnishes seed, insecticide, fer-
tilizer, or material, or cash advances, necessary in the production, harvesting,
and hauling of sugar beet crops shall be entitled to a lien upon the crop so
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A preference for consensually created production money
raised that shall have priority over all other liens and encumbrances except
government seed hens); S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-13-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (any
person furnishing provisions, supplies, and other articles for agricultural pur-
poses shall have a lien in preference to all other liens, existing or otherwise,
upon such provisions, supplies and other articles, until they shall be consumed
in the use); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 38-17-3, -8 (1977) (except inter se and
as against thresher's liens, seed liens shall have priority over all other liens
and encumbrances); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 60.11.020, .050 (Supp. 1987)
(supplier who furnishes seed, fertilizer, pesticide, fungicide, weed killer or her-
bicide shall have a lien on the crops that is entitled to priority over earlier
filed liens and security interests, except lien of supplier of work or labor); cf.
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 570A.3, .5 (West Supp. 1986) (agricultural supply dealer
furnishing chemical, seed, or petroleum product to a farmer has a lien on
crops that, in certain circumstances, is equal to prior perfected liens).
113. ALA. CODE § 35-9-30 (1975) (landlord has a lien on crops grown on
rented lands for the rent for the current year and for advances for the suste-
nance of the tenant or his family or for cultivating, gathering, saving, handling
or preparing the crop for market, and the lien is paramount to and has prefer-
ence over all other liens); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.08, .10 (West 1964 & Supp.
1986) (landlord's lien for rent on agricultural products raised on the land
leased or rented shall be superior to all other liens, although of older date, and
landlord's lien on crops for advances made in money and other things for sus-
taining tenant and tenant's family or in producing crops shall be paramount to
all other liens except landlord's lien for rent); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-341
(1982) (landlord's lien for rent on crops grown on land rented from landlord is
superior to all other liens except tax liens); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 383.070
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1970) (landlord renting premises for farming shall have
a lien on the produce of the premises rented and on the other personal prop-
erty of the tenant which, to the extent of four months rent, is superior to all
other liens); MINN. STAT. § 514.960 (1986) (person leasing property for agricul-
tural production has lien for unpaid rent on the crops produced on the prop-
erty, which lien has priority over all other liens or security interests in the
crops); Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-7-51 (1972 & Supp. 1972-1986) (landlord's lien on
agricultural products of leased premises to secure the payment of rent and of
money advanced to the tenant is paramount to all other liens, claims or de-
mands upon such products); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-6-1 (1978) (all persons leas-
ing or renting agricultural lands shall have a preference lien for rent that may
become due and for all money and the value of all equipment and supplies fur-
nished by the landlord to the tenant, which lien shall attach to the crop raised
and the property furnished); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-15 (1984 & Supp. 1985)
(landlord's lien on crops for rent accrued and advances made to aid in the cul-
tivation of crops is preferred to all other liens); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-10, -30
(Law. Co-op. 1976) (every landlord leasing land for agricultural purposes shall
have a prior and preferred lien for his rent to the extent of all crops raised on
the lands leased by him, which lien is preferred to all other liens); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 66-12-101 to -104 (1982) (landlord shall have a lien upon crops for rent;
for the payment of necessary food, household fuel, money, and clothing sup-
plied to the tenant or the tenant's dependents; and for payment of necessary
fertilizer, implements, work stock, feed for stock, seed, labor, and insecticide
furnished to and used by the tenant in the production of crops, and the lien
shall be superior to any other encumbrance, lien, levy, or contract on the crops
regardless of the date of the other encumbrance, lien, levy, or contract); VA.
CODE ANN. § 43-29 (1981) (landlord who advances tenant money, supplies, or
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security interests in crops is also important. Production money
interests in crops that are created by law, and that have priority
over after-acquired interests in the property, do not cover com-
pletely the full range of services and goods that a farmer needs
to produce crops.114 Suppliers of goods and services that are
other things has a lien to the extent of the advances on all the crops or live-
stock that are made or seeded or raised, or grown or fed on the land during
the year in which the advances are made which is prior to all other liens);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 60.11.020, .050 (Supp. 1987) (landlord's lien on crops
grown on demised premises is superior to prior liens and security interests, ex-
cept for liens for work or labor); see also Schneider v. Ray (In re Roberts), 38
Bankr. 128, 134 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1984) (landlord's lien preserved and asserted
by bankruptcy trustee entitled to priority over perfected security interest in
the crops to the extent rent was due); Dwyer v. Cooksville Grain Co., 117 Ill.
App. 3d 1001, 1003, 454 N.E.2d 357, 359 (1983) (noting that the long-established
rule in Illinois is that the landlord's crop lien is paramount to all other liens);
B. CLARK, supra note 48, 8.5[2][d], at 8-56 (in priority contests between secur-
ity interests and landlords' liens on crops the decisions have frequently fa-
vored the landlord); Meek, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 18 ARK. L. REV. 30, 54-55 (1964) (local landlord's crop lien
"will take priority over the tenant's security agreement"); see also Meyer, Po-
tential Problems Connected with the Use of "Crops" as Collateral for an Arti-
cle 9 Security Interest, 3 AGRiC. L.J. 115, 143 (1981-1982) (landlord crop-share
lease has priority over a perfected security interest in the crops because
farmer cannot encumber landlord's share); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 60.11.020
(Supp. 1987) ("A landlord with a crop share agreement has an interest in the
growing crop which shall not be encumbered by crop liens," except liens for
suppliers of goods and services used in producing the crop.); cf Hunt & Coates,
The Impact of the Secured Transactions Article on Commercial Practices with
Respect to Agricultural Financing, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 178 (1951)
(Article 9 covers crop-share lease).
114. The collection of statutes cited supra notes 111-13 is a largely com-
plete survey of statutory liens on crops for the value of land, goods and serv-
ices used in producing the crops that by the terms of the statutes are expressly
preferred to all other claims on the crops. Scattered throughout the states are
several more statutory liens on crops that do not by their terms assure priority
by law for the lienholder either because (1) the statutes are silent on the issue
of priority, see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-901 (1974) (lien for person who
labors or furnishes labor or machinery or equipment in improving and prepar-
ing agricultural lands for planting crops); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-201, -203
(1971) (landlord's lien for rent and for advances of supplies to enable tenant to
make and gather the crop); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6715 (Supp. 1986) (same);
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-8-33-1 (Burns 1980) (lien for owner or operator of any
machine or tools used in crop production); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 441.280, .290
(Vernon 1986) (landlord's lien for rent or money or supplies furnished tenant);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 52-501 (1984) (thresher's lien); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.226
(Butterworth 1984) (lien for person who performs labor, supplies materials or
provides services on farmland to aid the growing or harvesting of crops); or,
less commonly, or (2) the statutes effectively condition priority on the consent
of the floating lienor or otherwise give the floating lienor a veto on priority for
the statutory enabling lien, see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-241 to -246 (Supp.
1985) (agricultural input lien for labor and certain goods furnished in produc-
ing crops is not given priority over previously perfected security interest in
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not covered would be discouraged from extending production
credit to farmers for new crops if the law also failed to prefer
the suppliers' consensual interests in the crops. To this extent,
farmers would be subjected to the potentially monopolizing
control of their usual lenders.
It is no surprise, therefore, that the drafters of Article 9 in-
cluded section 9-312(2) which, by part of its terms, prefers a
consensual production money security interest in crops over an
earlier perfected, after-acquired security interest for unrelated
debt.115 The intended symmetry between this provision and the
purchase money priority rules of Article 9116 is explicit. The
original commentary to section 9-312(2) described the provision
as directly analagous to the purchase money priority rules, that
is, simply "another instance of the preference which [Article 9]
gives a secured party who makes a present advance over one
who takes security for an old debt."'117
As conventionally interpreted, however, section 9-312(2)
does not generally prefer enabling security interests in crops to
an earlier perfected security interest that attaches to the crops
as after-acquired collateral. The after-acquired, floating secur-
ity interest ordinarily ranks ahead of the interest of a secured
party who extended credit to enable the debtor to produce the
crops, even though the holder of the after-acquired interest
contributed nothing to the production of the collateral. The
crops of farmer's lender if lender refuses upon notice to guarantee payment
for the labor or goods); MINN. STAT. §§ 514.950 -.959 (1986) (same); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 52-1101 to -1103 (1984) (priority of statutory enabling interest for
goods and labor used in producing crops conditioned on prior lienholder agree-
ing in writing); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 113 (1979) (threshers' and combin-
ers' hens are subject to prior mortgage liens unless the mortgagee has
consented in writing to the threshing or combining). Statutes creating en-
abling liens on crops very rarely, by their terms, subordinate the liens to prior
encumbrances. But cf. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 43-31-101 to -106 (Supp. 1986) (pri-
ority of agricultural production input lien for certain goods and services used
in production crops determined by UCC Article 9). Likewise, the courts rarely
interpret such statutes to subordinate the enabling liens.
A fair summary of the situation throughout the country is that the major-
ity of states provide no statutorily created enabling liens on crops, save possi-
bly a thresher's lien. Moreover, in most states that provide for such liens, only
a limited range of the supplies and services necessary for producing crops is
covered, and the limited coverage is usually accomplished through a patch-
work of very narrowly drawn statutes that ordinarily, but not always, guaran-
tee priority for the holders of the enabling liens.
115. The full text of UCC § 9-312(2) appears inrfra text accompanying note
136.
116. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
117. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 7 (Official Draft Text and Comments 1952).
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next part of this Article explains how section 9-312(2) has been
construed so as to create this anomalous situation in crop fi-
nancing and thereby subject farmers and their suppliers of pro-
duction credit to the ills of unbridled, floating security
interests.
II. THE ANOMALY IN CROP FINANCING: UCC
SECTION 9-312(2) AS CONVENTIONALLY
INTERPRETED
A. SETTING THE CONTEXT
In the typical case, a farmer's lender finances virtually
every aspect of the farmer's enterprise. Lender hereafter
means the collection of institutions that are the farmer's usual
sources of credit: principally, commercial "country" banks;
agencies of the Farm Credit System such as the Federal Land
Bank and the Production Credit Association; and federal agen-
cies such as the Farmers Home Administration. The lender's
collateral usually includes practically everything the debtor
presently owns and anything later acquired, including land,
equipment, crops, livestock, other farm products, and receiv-
ables from sales of these products.
An alternative source of production credit for new crops is
the suppliers of the seed, petroleum, fertilizer, and other goods
and services necessary to produce the crops. One who sells
these goods and services on credit provides the farmer with
production financing, enabling the farmer to produce crops.
Similarly, one who loans money to the farmer to buy the goods
and services consumed in producing crops also provides produc-
tion financing. These two types of crop production financers
differ in that the former provides goods and services directly
while the latter provides money to purchase the goods and
services. Nevertheless, both directly enable the farmer to pro-
duce the crops, and the term supplier, as used hereinafter in
this Article, will refer to either financer.
Suppliers take a very large risk when they extend credit to
farmers who cannot get production credit from lenders or who,
for other reasons, are shopping for alternative financing. Be-
cause typically everything the farmer owns is heavily or com-
pletely mortgaged to the lender, the farmer's equity in existing
property will not fully secure the suppliers. Moreover, what
equity the farmer may have is illusory because it will shrink if
the value of the property declines or the secured debt grows.
The suppliers also can take as collateral the crops the
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farmer will grow using the goods and services that they have
financed. This security arrangement is governed by Article
9.118 Each supplier and the farmer execute a simple agreement
through which the farmer grants to the supplier a security in-
terest in the future crops." 9 The supplier's interest attaches
automatically as soon as the crops begin to grow. For conven-
ience, the supplier's interest in the crops is referred to as a crop
production security interest, which is simply a variation of the
earlier-defined and broader term "production money inter-
est."120 The term crop production security interest thus means
an Article 9 security interest securing credit that directly ena-
bled the debtor to produce the crops that serve as collateral.
Taking a crop production security interest in the farmer's
future crops does not substantially reduce the suppliers' risk,
however. The collateral is worthless until the crops are har-
vested, and until then the suppliers, like the farmer, are at Na-
ture's mercy. Additionally, even if Nature smiles on them, the
market may frown and pay a price for the harvest that is less
than production costs. Finally, the farmer's lender undoubt-
edly will acquire a security interest in the crops as after-ac-
quired collateral, which will likely have priority over the
supplier's interest.
In earlier dealings with the lender, the farmer probably
agreed as a matter of course that all kinds of debts owed the
lender, including the loan that the farmer used to buy the farm,
would be secured by crops whenever grown by the farmer.' 12
So, the lender automatically gets a security interest in the crops
that the suppliers financed even though the lender advanced
none of the direct production credit.122 Contrary to the pre-
ferred treatment usually accorded enabling interests, 123 the
suppliers' crop production security interests will likely be
subordinate to the lender's after-acquired interest in the collat-
eral. This anomalous situation results from the conventional
interpretation of UCC section 9-312(2), which is explained
118. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a).
119. U.C.C. § 9-203(1).
120. See supra text between notes 37 and 38.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21 (regarding after-acquired
property clauses); supra note 21 (regarding future advance clauses). The ef-
fect of both kinds of clauses in combination is referred to as "cross-security,"
that is, "collateral acquired at any time may secure advances whenever made."
U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 3.
122. See infra text following note 129.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 43-97.
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shortly.1 4 When suppliers extend production credit on the
strength of the crops as collateral, therefore, they must gamble
on a continuing equilibrium between the value of the lender's
existing collateral and the size of the farmer's debt.
Even if the supplier wins this gamble, however, the risk re-
mains that the lender will have reason to seize security and de-
cide to claim the crops or their proceeds instead of other
collateral. Courts do not often require a secured party to ex-
haust the collateral in which others do not claim an interest
before seizing shared collateral. 125 As a result, junior creditors
124. See infra text accompanying notes 128-49.
125. According to the doctrine of marshaling of assets, "where a creditor
has a lien on two funds in the hands of the same debtor and another creditor
has a lien on only one of them, ... equity... will compel the former to make
his debt out of that fund to which the latter cannot resort." First Am. Nat'l
Bank v. Alcorn, Inc., 361 So. 2d 481, 492 (Miss. 1978). See also R. MEGARRY &
P. BAKER, SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 404 (27th ed. 1973). The doctrine "is
designed, not to protect the debtor's interests, but rather those of the junior
lienor, by requiring the senior lienor to exhaust other securities readily avail-
able to him before resorting to a fund which is the junior lienor's only secur-
ity." Associates Realty Credit v. Brune, 89 Wash. 2d 6, 14, 568 P.2d 787, 792
(1977). A junior lienor cannot depend on the doctrine of marshaling, however,
because the doctrine is equitable and is applied "by the benevolence of the
court in its sound discretion" and "only where its application will do justice."
Enloe v. Franklin Bank & Trust Co., 445 N.E.2d 1005, 1007-08 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983). For more on the doctrine, see generally Karasik & Kolodney, The Doc-
trine of Marshaling Under the Bankruptcy Code, 89 COM. L.J. 102 (1984) (ar-
guing for the invocation of the doctrine on equitable grounds); Labovitz,
Marshaling Under the UCC The State of the Doctrine, 99 BANKING L.J. 440
(1982) (arguing that an Eighth Circuit decision to make an equitable adjust-
ment between properly protected secured creditors and unsecured creditors
was an anomaly that should be ignored by other circuit courts and trustees in
bankruptcy); Lachman, Marshalling Assets in Bankruptcy: Recent Innova-
tions in the Doctrine, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 671 (1986) (arguing that in the inter-
ests of equity and economic efficiency courts should not invoke the doctrine of
marshaling against corporate guarantors or sureties in favor of unsecured
creditors); Note, Marshaling: Equitable Rights of Holders of Junior Interests,
38 RUTGERS L. REv. 287 (1986) (examining the availability, application, and ad-
vantages of the equitable doctrine of marshaling, and advocating statutory rec-
ognition of the doctrine).
For recent cases in which the courts have refused to apply the doctrine,
see, e.g., Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Center Wholesale, Inc. (In re
Center Wholesale, Inc.), 759 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1985); Telefest, Inc. v. VU-TV,
Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1368 (D.N.J. 1984); Loeb v. Franchise Distributors, Inc. (In re
Franchise Systems, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 158 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985); Bank Leumi
Trust Co. v. Diamond Sales Co. (In re Diamond Sales Co.), 32 Bankr. 21
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); Whitlock v. Max Goodman & Sons Realty (In re Good-
man Industries), 21 Bankr. 512 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); United States v. Friend
(In re A.E.I. Corp.), 11 Bankr. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); S. Lotman & Son v.
Southeastern Fin. Corp., 288 Ala. 547, 263 So. 2d 499 (1972); Enloe v. Franklin
Bank & Trust Co., 445 N.E.2d 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Grise v. White, 355
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in shared collateral frequently receive little protection.
Suppliers who extend production credit secured by crops
are naturally expected to chance the weather and the market.
It is unnatural, however, in the sense of being anomalous, to
expect them to chance having their collateral-the crops they
enabled the farmer to acquire-siphoned off by a lender who,
with respect to the particular harvest, did not take the risks
they accepted.126 If the law's policy of priority for enabling in-
terests actually does insure fairness and efficiency in financing
arrangements, 127 the absence of this priority for crop produc-
tion credit means that crop financing is fertile ground for un-
fairness, inefficiency, and the other ills that accompany lenders'
unbridled floating liens. Yet, giving lenders' floating liens on
crops free rein is exactly the result of the conventional inter-
pretation of UCC section 9-312(2).
B. How ARTICLE 9's PRIORITY RULES PREFER LENDERS: THE
CRITICAL ROLE OF UCC SECTION 9-312(2) AS
CONVENTIONALLY INTERPRETED
The superiority of a lender's claim to crops as after-ac-
quired collateral is based on UCC section 9-312(5)(a), which
states the usual rule for determining priority between conflict-
Mass. 698, 247 N.E.2d 385 (1969); Lieberman Music Co. v. Hagen, 394 N.W.2d
837 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Platte Valley Bank v. Kracl, 185 Neb. 168, 174
N.W.2d 724 (1970); Production Credit Ass'n v. Jacobson, 131 Wis. 2d 550, 388
N.W.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1986); cf. Jefferson Nat'l Bank v. I.A. Durbin, Inc. (In re
I.A. Durbin), 65 Bankr. 4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (creditor not compelled to
look to collateral of principal debtor before resorting to property of surety); In
re Hostetler, 49 Bankr. 737 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985) (marshaling doctrine not
applicable in favor of Chapter 11 debtors); Moody Day Co. v. Westview Nat'l
Bank, 452 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (transferee of collateral not enti-
tled to marshaling). But see, e.g., Berman v. Green (In re Jack Green's Fash-
ions for Men-Big and Tall), 597 F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1979); Consumers Time
Credit, Inc. v. Remark Corp., 248 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Pa. 1965); In re Kids Stop
of Am., Inc., 64 Bankr. 397 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986); Fundex Capital Corp. v.
Balaber-Strauss (In re Tampa Chain Co.), 53 Bankr. 772 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985); In re Emerald Hills Country Club, Inc., 32 Bankr. 408 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1983); Peoples Bank v. Computer Room, Inc. (In re Computer Room, Inc.), 24
Bankr. 732 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982); Merrigan v. Small Business Admin. (In re
Clary House, Inc.), 11 Bankr. 462 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981); Shedoudy v. Beverly
Surgical Supply Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 730, 161 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1980); Charles
Constr. Co. v. Leisure Resources, Inc., 1 Mass. App. Ct. 755, 307 N.E.2d 336
(1974); Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 469 n.3, 234 A.2d 860, 863 n.3 (1967) (dic-
tum); Associates Realty Credit Ltd. v. Brune, 89 Wash. 2d 6, 568 P.2d 787
(1977); cf. Community Bank v. Jones, 278 Or. 647, 566 P.2d 470 (1977) (doctrine
applied in favor of transferees of collateral).
126. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ing security interests in the same collateral. 2 8 The rule ranks
the interests "according to priority in time of filing or
perfection."'129
The lender's assertion of a security interest in the new
crops is typically based on an old security agreement in which
the debtor agreed that the collateral for debts owed the lender
would consist of currently owned and after-acquired property
of the kind described in the agreement, including crops and
other farm products. As soon as the future crops come into
existence, therefore, the lender's floating security interest auto-
matically attaches. No new agreement between the lender and
farmer is necessary, and no new advance by the lender is re-
quired. The crops become fresh collateral for all outstanding
debts the farmer owes the lender, for any subsequent increases
in these debts, and for new advances.
The lender's after-acquired interest in the new crops is per-
fected by the financing statement filed when the security agree-
ment was executed. A new filing with respect to after-acquired
collateral is not necessary if the financing statement already on
record covers the property. The financing statement covers the
new crops if they fit within the statement's general description
of collateral, regardless of whether it warns that the collateral
includes after-acquired property. 30 Because the lender filed
long before the suppliers acquired and perfected their security
interests, the lender's interest in the new crops is entitled to
priority under section 9-312(5)(a) even though the purchase of
goods and services necessary to produce the collateral was fi-
nanced entirely by the suppliers. Ordinarily, this priority auto-
matically attaches to proceeds of the collateral even if the
lender authorized the disposition.131
The section 9-312(5)(a) first-to-file-or-perfect rule, like the
broader first-in-time principle of which it is a variant,132 is not
absolute. Notwithstanding section 9-312(5)(a), a purchase
money security interest in goods of any kind takes priority over
a conflicting interest that attaches under an after-acquired
property clause in an earlier security agreement between the
debtor and a prior secured party. As already discussed, the spe-
cial rules of sections 9-312(4) and 9-312(3) override the usual
128. See supra text accompanying note 34.
129. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).
130. Id § 9-204 comment 5.
131. Id §§ 9-306(2),(3), 9-312(5)(a), 9-312(6).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34.
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first-to-file-or-perfect rule of section 9-312(5)(a) for purchase
money security interests in all types of goods. 1 33
A supplier's crop production security interest could con-
ceivably fit within the definition of purchase money security in-
terest. Article 9 describes a purchase money security interest
as "[a] security interest... taken by a person who by making
advances... gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights
in . . . collateral."13 Broadly defined, the term "advances"
could include extensions of credit in which a supplier permits a
farmer to defer payment of the purchase price for property and
services needed for crop production. This extension of credit,
which is value, enables the farmer to acquire rights in the crops
in the sense that without the credit there would be no produc-
tion and thus no crops.
Most authorities assume, however, that a purchase money
security interest arises only when the debtor buys or rents col-
lateral with the secured enabling advance, not when the debtor
uses the advance to create the collateral. For this reason, a
crop production security interest is not a purchase money se-
curity interest and thus is not entitled to the priority of UCC
section 9-312(4).: 35
The strongest argument for this conclusion is that Article 9
elsewhere and otherwise deals specifically with crop production
security interests. That is, UCC section 9-312(2) carves an ex-
ception to the usual first-to-file-or-perfect rule of priority and
gives a crop production security interest super priority over the
133. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (inventory), § 9-312(4) (collateral other than inven-
tory), § 9-313(4)(a) (fixtures). See supra text accompanying notes 67-75.
134. U.C.C. § 9-107(b).
135. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 35, § 32.5, at 869 n.4 (crop interests are not
purchase money interests because the drafters did not affirmatively so indicate
and because § 9-312(2) specifically deals with them); Clontz, Financing the
Farmer Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 U.C.C. L.J. 119, 138 (1969)
(believes drafters had no intention of applying purchase money security inter-
est concept to crops, but sees possibility of stretching concept to cover them);
Miller, Farm Collateral Under the UCC" "Those Are Some Mighty Tall Silos,
Ain't They Fella?'" 20 S.D.L. REV. 514, 534 (1975) (crop production lender gains
rights only in the seed, not in the crop, and therefore has no purchase money
interest in the crop); Note, Secured Interests in Growing and Future-Growing
Crops Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 IOWA L. REv. 1269, 1285 n.102
(1964) (provision in § 9-312(2) for crop loans leads to conclusion that crop in-
terests do not come within purview of purchase money priority); but see Phil-
lips, Agricultural Financing Under the U..CC, 12 ARIZ. L. REv. 391, 408 (1970)
(arguing that a crop production loan creates a purchase money interest be-
cause it enables the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral).
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after-acquired interest of a prior lender, even though the lender
filed first. The section provides:
A perfected security interest in crops for new value given to enable
the debtor to produce the crops during the production season and
given not more than three months before the crops become growing
crops by planting or otherwise takes priority over an earlier perfected
security interest to the extent that such earlier interest secures obli-
gations due more than six months before the crops become growing
crops by planting or otherwise, even though the person giving new
value had knowledge of the earlier security interest.
1 3 6
As conventionally interpreted, however, section 9-312(2) is
only a tiny exception to the first-to-file-or-perfect rule. The
section gives priority to crop production security interests only
if, and to the extent that, the earlier filed, after-acquired inter-
est secures stale obligations, that is, obligations more than six
months overdue when the crops began to grow.137
Suppose, for example, that in 1984, farmer owes lender
$250,000, to be satisfied by installment payments spread over
the next ten years. Also in 1984, as partial security for the
debt, farmer gives lender an Article 9 security interest in the
farmer's present and after-acquired crops. Lender properly
files a financing statement covering all the farmer's crops. In
1986, the farmer plants a corn crop using $80,000 worth of seed
and other goods and services acquired on credit from supplier,
to whom the farmer gives a security interest in the corn. Sup-
136. U.C.C. § 9-312(2).
137. See, e.g., Dennis v. Connor (In re Connor), 733 F.2d 523, 525-26 (8th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Minster Farmers Coop. Exch., Inc., 430 F. Supp.
566, 570 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Decatur Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Murphy, 119 Ill. App.
3d 277, 289-90, 456 N.E.2d 267, 275 (1983); Production Credit Ass'n v. Jacobson,
131 Wis. 2d 550, 554 n.1, 388 N.W.2d 655, 657 n.1 (Ct. App. 1986); T. CRANDALL,
R. HAGEDORN & F. SMITH, supra note 28, % 7.07[4][d], at 7-121; 2 G. GILMORE,
supra note 35, § 32.5, at 868; J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 48, § 25-6, at
1052-53; Coogan & Mays, Crop Financing and Article 9: A Dialogue with Par-
ticular Emphasis on the Problems of Florida Citrus Crop Financing, 22 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 13, 49 (1967); Meyer, "Crops" as Collateral for an Article 9 Se-
curity Interest and Related Problems, 15 U.C.C. L.J. 3, 47-48 (1982); Meyer, Po-
tential Problems Connected with the Use of "Crops" as Collateral for an
Article 9 Security Interes4 3 AGRIC. L.J. 115, 147 (1981); Miller, supra note 135,
at 535; Phillips, supra note 135, at 406.
Recently, however, a court refused to read § 9-312(2) to mean that a crop
production security interest wins priority only over obligations that were in
default for more than six months before the crops became growing crops. In
First Nat'l Bank v. Hollingsworth, No. 86-218-H (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1986)
(WESTLAW, TN-CS data base), the court interpreted the section to give crop
production security interests priority over any earlier perfected interest secur-
ing obligations that were originally due more than six months before the
crops began to grow.
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plier properly files. Within three months after the supplier
first extends credit, the crops begin to grow, and several
months later the farmer reaps a bountiful harvest worth
$125,000. At about this point the lender accelerates the balance
of the farmer's $250,000 debt and claims the crops as after-ac-
quired collateral.
The lender wins the priority dispute with the supplier
under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of section 9-312(5)(a).
Under this rule the nature of the debt to the lender is irrele-
vant, and the extent of the lender's priority is measured by the
total amount of the unpaid obligation secured by the crops.
Section 9-312(2) does not aid the supplier because, as conven-
tionally interpreted, it is completely useless against an earlier
perfected interest securing a debt of any kind'3 8 to the extent
the debt is freshly due within or after the six-month period
before the crops started to grow. 3 9 If none of the debt underly-
ing the earlier interest was overdue when the six-month period
commenced, section 9-312(2), as currently construed, is alto-
gether inapplicable. The supplier's enabling security interest is
thus wholly subordinate, notwithstanding that the earlier se-
cured party contributed nothing to the production of the cur-
rent crop. If part of the debt securing the earlier interest was
overdue at the beginning of the six-month period, the crop pro-
duction secured party gets a limited priority. That is, the sup-
plier receives priority with respect to the then overdue portion
of the debt securing the earlier interest.140 The crop production
secured party wins total priority only if all of the debt securing
the earlier interest was overdue at the beginning of the six-
138. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 35, § 32.5, at 868-69.
139. Dennis v. Connor (In re Connor), 733 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Minster Farmers Coop. Exch., Inc., 430 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Ohio 1977);
B. CLARK, supra note 48, 8.5[2][c], at 8-54 (production lender is left with
goose egg if mortgage debt secured by the crops is accelerated within six-
month period); Clontz, supra note 135, at 143-44 (same); Coates, Financing the
Farmer, PRAC. LAw., Nov. 1974, at 45, 55 (§ 9-312(2) gives no priority over
debts freshly due after the six-month period); Miller, supra note 135, at 531-35
(production lender does not take priority over obligations due after the six-
month period cut-off date). Only recently, however, a lone voice opined that
§ 9-312(2) should be read purposively, and should be applied to give priority to
a crop production secured party over a lender with an earlier perfected secur-
ity interest who refuses to provide production credit even though the debt due
the lender was not technically due prior to the beginning of the six-month pe-
riod. In re Piwowar Farms, 66 Bankr. 23, 25-26 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986)
(dictum).
140. Decatur Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Murphy, 119 Ill. App. 3d 277, 289-90, 456
N.E.2d 267, 275 (1983).
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month period before the crops started to grow,141 and only if no
new debt was created during the period.
Obviously, section 9-312(2) so interpreted is at most a small
and fortuitous threat to the superiority of a lender's after-ac-
quired security interest in a farmer's crops. Conversely, a sup-
plier can never "make a crop loan on the strength of § 9-312(2)
with any certainty that he [will] end up with a clear priority"
over the lender's earlier perfected interest.142 No wonder sec-
tion 9-312(2) has been described as "hardly . . .worth hav-
ing,"143 "one of the Code's dead-letter provisions,"'144 "almost a
joke,"'145 an "Alice In Wonderland type rule,"'146 and, in sum,
"substantially meaningless."'147 The aptness of these descrip-
tions is borne out in practice: there are only three reported
cases in which crop production security interests have earned
any protection from UCC section 9-312(2). 14
141. See Bossingham v. Bloomington Prod. Credit Ass'n, 49 Bankr. 345, 352
(S.D. Iowa 1985), affd, 794 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1986).
142. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 35, § 32.5, at 870.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. B. CLARK, supra note 48, % 8.5[2][c], at 8-54.
146. Hawkland, The Proposed Amendment to Article 9 of the U.C.C. - Part
1. Financing The Farmer, 76 CoM. L.J. 416, 421 (1971). Accord Miller, supra
note 135, at 534 ("Alice-in-Wonderland priority rule").
147. R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-5, at 140 (1979). For similar descriptions, see R.
BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, supra note 106, at 462 ("The purpose of [§ 9-312(2)]
is to aid farmers in obtaining loans necessary to produce crops. The Subsec-
tion does not.., help a subsequent lender much and has proved to be of little
importance."); J. WHIE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 48, § 25-6, at 1052 ("scope
of [§ 9-312(2)] is carved down almost to insignificance"); Clark, supra note 68,
at 366 (referring to priority under § 9-312(2) as seriously limited and "so re-
stricted"); Coates, supra note 139, at 55 (§ 9-312(2) has "very limited applica-
tion"); Coogan & Clovis, The Uniform Commercial Code and Real Estate Law:
Problems for Both the Real Estate Lawyer and the Chattel Security Lawyer, 38
IND. L.J. 535, 544 (1963) (§ 9-312(2) is "so limited as to be of questionable prac-
tical value to anyone"); Coogan & Mays, supra note 137, at 48-49 (§ 9-312(2) is
unimportant because its scope is "so limited" and the section "does not go far
enough to accomplish its purpose"); Meyer, "Crops" As Collateral for an Arti-
cle 9 Security Interest and Related Problems, 15 U.C.C. L.J. 3, 47 (1982) (§ 9-
312(2) is "probably the strangest priority rule in the Code"); Meyer, Potential
Problems Connected with the Use of "Crops" as Collateral for an Article 9 Se-
curity Interes4 3 AGPiC. L.J. 115, 147 (1981) (§ 9-312(2) has "very little
meaning").
148. See Bossingham v. Bloomington Prod. Credit Ass'n, 49 Bankr. 345, 351-
52 (S.D. Iowa 1985), affd, 794 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1986); Decatur Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Murphy, 119 Ill. App. 3d 277, 289-90, 456 N.E.2d 267, 275-76 (1983);
First Nat'l Bank v. Hollingsworth, No. 86-218-I (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1986)
(WESTLAW, TN-CS data base). In two other cases, however, crop production
secured parties were denied priority under UCC § 9-312(2) only because they
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The conventional interpretation of section 9-312(2) is not,
however, the only possible reading of the provision and is al-
most surely not the reading its authors intended. The next part
of this Article reinterprets section 9-312(2) in light of the origi-
nal drafters' intentions and the purposes and policies behind
the section. These underpinnings have never before been con-
sidered or even mentioned by authorities construing the sec-
tion. This oversight may explain why the conventional
interpretation renders the provision meaningless. Read in light
of its drafting history, section 9-312(2) is a vital rule. By giving
priority to enabling interests, it is fully consistent with the per-
vasive policy, expressed in the law generally and in Article 9
particularly, of preventing the unfair and monopolizing effects
of floating liens. Reinterpretation is justified and important be-
cause the law, as it currently stands, chains farmers to their
lenders by arbitrarily denying suppliers any reliable means of
insuring that investments in crop production credit will not be
gobbled up by a lender's sprawling, voracious after-acquired in-
terest in the collateral. 149
failed to comply with the section's procedural requirements, that is, they failed
to perfect their new-value security interests. Walker v. Planter's Bank &
Trust Co. (In re Rogers), 39 Bankr. 295, 298 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984); United
Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Wells, 490 S.W.2d 152-54 (Ky. 1973). In another case
a bank was denied priority under § 9-312(2) because the money loaned the
debtor did not enable production of the crops. Production Credit Ass'n v.
Jacobson, 131 Wis. 2d 550, 388 N.W.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1986) (loan proceeds used
to satisfy enabling credit supplied by a third party).
149. Only through rare fortuity does Article 9, as currently applied and
apart from § 9-312(2), permit a supplier's production money security interest
in crops to achieve priority over a lender's after-acquired interest in the collat-
eral. The supplier will win if the lender and debtor failed to satisfy Article 9's
requisites for creating a security interest. In this event, the lender stands as
an unsecured creditor as to the crops with no claim whatsoever to the prop-
erty. The supplier also wins if the lender's financing statement is somehow
defective as to substance or place of filing. The first-to-file-or-perfect rule, § 9-
312(5)(a), works only for secured parties who properly file.
The supplier can achieve priority beyond Article 9 through a subordina-
tion agreement with the lender. Subordination agreements are contracts gov-
erned largely by the common law. Although not within Article 9's scope, these
agreements can override the statute's priority rules. U.C.C. § 9-316. By subor-
dinating her security interest a secured party "waives her priority" in favor of
some other claimant of the collateral such as another secured party with a jun-
ior claim under § 9-312. A-W-D, Inc. v. Salkeld, 175 Ind. App. 443, 446, 372
N.E.2d 486, 488 (1978). The rank of the two security interests is thereby re-
versed altogether or in part, depending on the terms of the subordination
agreement. See R. HniziAN, J. McDONNELL & S. NIcxLES, supra note 29,
24.03. Because contractual subordination requires the lender's consent, it is a
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III. A DIFFERENT READING OF UCC SECTION 9-312(2)
The history of Article 9's crop financing provisions and
early commentary that fully reveals the purposes of section 9-
312(2) and explains its structure make clear that the conven-
tional interpretation of section 9-312(2) defies the original
drafters' intention. Rather than giving crop production security
interests a narrow, fortuitous priority over after-acquired inter-
ests in the collateral, section 9-312(2) was designed to achieve
the opposite result. Read purposively, in line with Article 9's
overarching policy of priority for enabling interests, section 9-
312(2) dictates that a crop production security interest always
outranks an earlier perfected, after-acquired interest except to
a small, always limited extent when the earlier interest secures
a purchase-money debt for, or rent owed on, the farmland. If
the earlier interest secures anything other than new value
given to produce the crops, the crop production security inter-
est enjoys complete priority.
To fully understand UCC section 9-312(2), its three essen-
tial parts should be considered separately. The first part
provides:
A perfected security interest in crops for new value given to enable
the debtor to produce the crops during the production season and
given not more than three months before the crops become growing
crops by planting or otherwise takes priority over an earlier perfected
security interest .... 150
To this point, section 9-312(2) closely resembles sections 9-
312(3) and 9-312(4), which give priority to purchase money se-
curity interests over conflicting interests in the same collateral
very narrow and shallow harbor for suppliers seeking to protect crop produc-
tion security interests against lenders' after-acquired interests.
By happenstance, perhaps in the language that a lender uses in refusing to
subordinate, a supplier might conceivably collect facts sufficient to support a
claim of priority based on the common-law doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Cases exist in which a secured party has been estopped to assert priority
earned under Article 9 because of culpable conduct that misleads a junior se-
cured party or other subordinate claimant of the collateral. See id. 24.04[2].
These cases are rare, however, and typically involve clearly egregious conduct
such as deliberately lying about the very existence of any claim to the prop-
erty.
Existing law offers nothing else to protect crop production security inter-
ests against after-acquired interests in the collateral. Suppliers are thus rele-
gated to relying on production money interests in crops that the law creates
and protects against after-acquired interests. Typically, however, this protec-
tion does not extend to the full range of services and goods that a farmer
needs to produce crops. See supra note 114.
150. U.C.C. § 9-312(2) (emphasis added).
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if certain procedural requirements are satisfied.151 This resem-
blance is not accidental.
From its earliest days, Article 9 has equated crop produc-
tion and purchase money security interests. The true precursor
of the present section 9-312 appeared in the Spring 1950 draft of
the Code. The section number was the same, and the substance
of the early provision was little different from its modern coun-
terpart. The 1950 version established the principle of first-to-
file as the basic and residual rule of priority among conflicting
security interests. 5 2 The precursors to the present sections 9-
312(3) and 9-312(4) were combined in a single section which
provided that notwithstanding the rule of first-to-file, "a
purchase money security interest is prior to a conflicting inter-
est in the same collateral under an after-acquired property
clause." 5 3
The precursor of the present section 9-312(2) appeared in
1950 as section 9-312(4).'54 The two versions of the provision
are materially identical so that the 1950 commentary to section
9-312(4) applies equally well to its successor section 9-312(2).
This commentary describes the section as simply another "in-
stance of the preference which this Code gives a new value
lender."'155 Commentary from the 1952 Official Draft Text of
the Code describes the section, which then appeared as section
9-312(6), as "another instance of the preference which this Arti-
cle gives a secured party who makes a present advance over one
who takes security for an old debt."'156 The other instances of
preference which these descriptions refer to are the rules giv-
ing priority to purchase money security interests. The com-
mentary to the present section 9-312(2) similarly describes the
151. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.152. U.C.C. § 9-312(1) (Proposed Final Draft Spring 1950).
153. 1&L § 9-312(2).
154. See id § 9-312(4). The section provided:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) in case the collateralis growing crops the interest of a lender who makes an advance, in-
curs a new obligation or releases a perfected security interest during
the production season or not more than three months before the
crops are planted or otherwise become growing crops, in order to en-
able the debtor to produce them, takes priority over the interest of an
earlier secured lender to the extent that the earlier lender's interest
secures obligations (such as rent, interest or mortgage principal amor-
tization) due more than six months before the crops are planted or
otherwise become growing crops even though the earlier lender's in-terest was perfected prior to the interest of the later enabling lender.
Id.
155. Id. § 9-312 comment 6.
156. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 8 (Official Draft Text and Comments 1952).
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provision as giving "priority to a new value security interest."'
57
These comments equate, in principle, crop production and
purchase money security interests, and put section 9-312(2) on a
par structurally with the provisions in section 9-312 that give
priority to purchase money security interests. The first part of
section 9-312(2) is consistent with this equation and thus is the
general rule of the provision. Stated simply, a crop production
security interest takes priority over an earlier perfected secur-
ity interest if certain procedural requirements are satisfied.
The third and last part of the section simply makes clear that
this general rule of priority is unaffected if the holder of the
crop production security interest knows of the earlier interest.
The middle or second part of section 9-312(2) is key. In
some sense, it limits the general rule of the section by adding
that priority is taken "to the extent that such earlier interest
secures obligations due more than six months before the crops
become growing crops by planting or otherwise."'
158 The con-
ventional interpretation of section 9-312(2) reads this part as
qualifying the general rule of the section in every case without
regard to the nature of the debt underlying the earlier inter-
est.'5 9 As a result, the priority of a crop production security in-
terest over an earlier perfected security interest is always
limited to the extent that the earlier interest secures debts of
any kind that are more than six months overdue when the
crops begin to grow. Moreover, this limitation is construed lit-
erally and broadly so that section 9-312(2) does not apply, and
the earlier perfected interest takes priority under section 9-
312(5)(a), to the extent that any of the debts underlying the
earlier interest are due within or after the six-month period.
160
This broadly construed qualification, of course, swallows the
general rule established in the first part of the section and
leaves a crop production security interest with a tiny, fortuitous
priority only over stale debts.
161
157. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 2 (emphasis added).
158. Id. § 9-312(2).
159. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 35, § 32.5, at 868-69.
160. See authorities cited in supra note 139.
161. Reason in itself for doubting the soundness of the conventional inter-
pretation is the lack of any believable justification why a crop production se-
curity interest should prevail over an earlier interest simply because the debt
securing the earlier interest was six months overdue when the crops began
growing. A possible rationale is to encourage secured parties to keep collec-
tions current. Yet, there is no obvious reason for encouraging such a practice
only among secured parties with after-acquired interests in crops; and there is
no apparent explanation why failing to adhere to the practice should be pun-
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The second part of section 9-312(2) was designed, however,
as an occasional, narrow exception to the general rule of the
provision, not as a wide and blanket limitation on the rule.
Proving this conclusion requires a short lesson in the history of
crop financing under Article 9.
Until 1972, the statute prohibited after-acquired security
interests in crops planted more than one year after execution of
the security agreement.162 The intended effect was to limit the
use of crops as collateral to current production or enabling
loans and credit.163 This prohibition, however, did not corn-
ished by loss of priority only when the later, conflicting interest is a crop pro-
duction security interest.
162. This prohibition appeared in the earliest complete draft of the Code
when the article on secured transactions was Article 7. Section 7-510(3) pro-
vided in pertinent part that "[a] lien on crops 'to be grown' or the like includes
only crops produced or to be planted during [the planting season of the year of
execution of the agreement] [the year following the execution of the agree-
ment]" (bracketed language in original). U.C.C. § 7-510(3) (Draft May 1949).
The prohibition reappeared in slightly different form in subsequent drafts
and as UCC § 9-204(4)(a) in the 1952, 1957, 1958, and 1962 Official Texts. Origi-
nally, the provision left open the period of effectiveness of an after-acquired
property clause on crops. Each state was free to decide for itself how far into
the future an after-acquired interest in crops could reach. In the words of the
drafters, the provision "leaves the determination of the time limit to local pol-
icy." U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 6 (Official Draft Text and Comments 1952).
Eventually, however, the drafters decided on a uniform one-year limit. The
apparent reasoning was that, although "[u]nder existing [pre-Code] statutes va-
rying time limits are stated, the most frequent... [is] one year." U.C.C. § 9-
204 comment 6 (Official Text 1957). Significantly, and surely not by accident,
the limitation of one-year conformed "neatly to the schedule of annual crop
production loans, where the time-limit will always be met." Clark, supra note
68, at 364.
A few states still retain the one-year limitation on after-acquired interests
in crops, see, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-204(4)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1970) & § 335.9-204(2)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) (effective July 1,
1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 9-204(4)(a) (1966), or impose a similar limita-
tion. The North Dakota codification of § 9-204, N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-17(1)
(Supp. 1985), provides an explicit exemption for crops. See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 35-05-01.1 (Supp. 1985) ("A security interest upon crops shall attach only to
the crop next maturing after the delivery of the security agreement. The pro-
visions of this section shall not apply to liens by contract given to secure the
purchase price or the rental of land upon which the crops covered by the lien
are to be grown.")
163. Professor Barkley Clark has speculated that "the eastern draftsmen
felt paternalistic toward the solitary yeoman and sought to protect him in this
way from overreaching creditors." Clark, supra note 68, at 364. The drafters
themselves explained the limit on after-acquired interests in crops as simply a
codification of pre-Code law in many farm states. They commented that the
limit "follows many state statutes which invalidate long-term mortgages of fu-
ture crops." U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 6 (Official Draft Text and Comments
1952). In any event, most commentators were critical of the limit or ques-
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pletely outlaw after-acquired interests in crops; rather, it
banned long-range interests spanning more than a year.164
Significantly, the drafters recognized a logical exception to
this limited ban. Contract vendors, purchase money mortga-
gees, and lessors of farmland sometimes take a consensual chat-
tel interest in the debtor's present and future crops to secure
the land debts owned them.1 65 As to these creditors, to whom
this Article refers as land financers, the ban on long-range af-
ter-acquired security interests in crops was lifted. The Spring
1950 draft of Article 9 provided in pertinent part:
No security interest attaches under an after-acquired property clause
.* . to crops planted or otherwise becoming growing crops more than
one year after the agreement for the security interest is made except
that a security interest in crops to be planted which is given in con-
junction with a lease, land purchase mortgage or contract may if so
agreed attach to crops to be grown on the land subject to such lease,
mortgage or contract during the period of such real estate transaction
166
tioned its soundness. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 68, at 364 (reflects "naivet6
toward modem large-scale commercial agriculture"); Coates, Farm Secured
Transactions Under the UCC, 23 Bus. LAW. 195, 199 (1967) ("This one-year
limitation is no more than a carryover from the past. It is a limitation on the
freedom of contract between farm lender and farm borrower. It has only its
age to support its existence."); Coogan & Clovis, supra note 147, at 546 (laws
that are paternalistic toward farmers are "hard to understand").
164. Some might argue that the very existence of this ban argues for the
conventional interpretation and against the different reading suggested here,
the assumption being that the ban was the device for bridling floating liens on
crops. The answer is two-fold: First, the ban was not complete. After-ac-
quired interests that attached within one year of executing the security agree-
ment were effective. The need remained to bridle floating liens, even though
short-lived, that just as easily as an ancient after-acquired interest could be un-
related to crop production. Second, if the ban by itself accomplished the goal
of harnessing floating liens so as to insure completely that crops were avail-
able on a first-priority basis for crop production credit, there was no reason to
include anything like § 9-312(2).
165. The land financer's interest in the real estate does not necessarily en-
compass crops grown on the land, especially not as against a third person with
a specific interest in the crops. R. BROWN, supra note 39, § 17.3, at 594 ("crops
grown and harvested by the mortgagor while he is still in possession of the
mortgaged premises and before his right to the property is foreclosed belong to
him"); W. BuRBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 10, at 17-18
(1965) (mortgagor's right to crops harvested before foreclosure, and tenant's
right as against landlord to crops planted during tenancy under doctrine of
emblements); Annotation, Priority as Between Mortgagee of Real Property, or
Receiver Appointed at His Instance, and Chattel Mortgagee of Crops, 47 A.L.R.
772, 772-74 (1927) (chattel mortgage on crops generally takes priority over ear-
lier mortgage on the real estate).
166. U.C.C. § 9-203(3)(a) (Proposed Final Draft Spring 1950) (emphasis ad-
ded). This exception appeared in every version of Article 9 that contained the
ban on long-range after-acquired interests in crops.
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There is a critical link between section 9-312(2) and this excep-
tion to the prohibition on long-range after-acquired security in-
terests in crops.
The drafters created the exception because they reasoned
that in financing the farmer's purchase or use of the farmland,
the land financer gave value that enabled the farmer to pro-
duce crops throughout the term of the mortgage, lease, or land
sale contract. 167 Allowing the land financer qua enabling
lender to take an after-acquired interest in crops produced
throughout the term of the land transaction, therefore, was
consistent with limiting the use of crops as collateral to current
production or enabling loans and credit.
The drafters of course recognized that the after-acquired
interest of a land financer would conflict with a supplier's or
another secured party's crop production security interest, to
which section 9-312 generally gave priority over any earlier per-
fected security interest. This conflict is somewhat unique. The
land financer's interest in crops is not just any kind of interest,
but, to an extent, it too is a production money interest. As ex-
plained in the 1950 comments to section 9-312(4), which is the
present section 9-312(2), both the land financer and the current
crop lender or other supplier "are in a real sense enabling the
farmer to produce a crop--one furnishing land, the other
money."168
The second part of section 9-312(2) was therefore added as
a narrow exception to the first part of the section to protect the
earlier perfected, after-acquired interest of a land financer in
crops qua new-value secured party with an enabling crop pro-
duction security interest. The effect, first priority to the land
financer over a supplier of other production credit, was consis-
tent with deciding a conflict between purchase money secured
parties on the basis of which secured party first gave value,
which was the rule under the 1950 draft of Article 9. This pro-
tection was justified because the land financer contributes to
the production of every year's crop by enabling the debtor to
167. In commenting on the exception appearing in the Spring 1950 draft of
the Code, the drafters wrote:
The "except" clause permits such a security interest in future crops
where the interest is given as part of a transaction by which the
farmer acquires the land on which the crop is to grow. Here the value
given (transfer of land) pertains to many production seasons, unlike a
loan to finance a particular crop.
U.C.C. § 9-203 comment 2 (Proposed Final Draft Spring 1950).
168. I& § 9-312 comment 6.
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own or rent the farmland on which the crops are grown. The
drafters did not intend anybody else to benefit from the second
part of section 9-312(2). Indeed, the 1950 version of section 9-
312(2) explicitly provided in the provision itself that the prior-
ity of the earlier security interest relates to "obligations," de-
fined parenthetically to mean "rent, interest or mortgage
principal amortization."'1 69 Notably, this definition survives in-
tact in the modern commentary to section 9-312(2).170
Equally important, the second part of section 9-312(2) was
designed to limit even the protection given the earlier interest
of a land financer. In exempting land financers from the ban
on long-range after-acquired interest in crops, the drafters ex-
pressly stated in their 1950 commentary that the priority of a
land financer's after-acquired interest was limited by section 9-
312(4), now section 9-312(2). They described the provision as
giving higher priority "to security interests attaching to secure
current obligations than to a security interest attaching in a
real estate arrangement ... to secure last year's rent or pay-
ments due on a real estate mortgage.' 171
This priority result is confirmed by the 1950 commentary
to section 9-312, which gives the following example:
A farmer farming under a lease but behind in his rent for an earlier
year gives his landlord as security for the past due rent a crop security
169. I& § 9-312(4). The very earliest antecedent of the modern § 9-312(2)
suggests even more clearly that, from the beginning, the drafters intended to
subordinate a production money security interest to an earlier security interest
only when the earlier interest secures a debt owed for the price or use of the
farmland. This earliest antecedent, which is a common ancestor of the present
§ 9-312(2) and the 1950 § 9-312(4), was § 7-508(l)(a), which appeared in March,
1949, when the secured transactions article was Article 7. The section
provided:
A farm products lien given for new value ranks ahead of a farm prod-
ucts lien given pursuant to or as part of an earlier real estate transac-
tion to the extent such liens secures [sic] indebtedness rent, purchase
price or interest becoming due more than one year before the date
that such new value is given.
U.C.C. § 7-508(1)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 3, March 1, 1949).
170. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 2.
171. U.C.C. § 9-203 comment 2 (Proposed Final Draft Spring 1950). The
complete text of this sentence in the comment is somewhat garbled: "Section
9-312(4) on priorities limits the use of such a clause to security interests at-
taching to secure current obligations than to a security interest attaching in a
real estate arrangement by giving higher priority to secure last year's rent or
payments due on a real estate mortgage." The confusion is attributable to the
apparent misplacement of an interlineation in the original manuscript of the
Spring 1950 draft. In the papers of Karl Llewellyn, who was the overall archi-
tect of the Uniform Commercial Code, is a typed version of that draft in which
the full text of the second comment to § 9-203 appears exactly as follows:
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interest on a crop to be produced. He then borrows from the bank the
funds needed to produce this year's crop giving a security interest in
the same crop as that given to the landlord.
172
The analysis of this example is:
If both [a real estate lessor and a bank] claim security in this year's
crop to secure this year's rent and this year's seed purchase, normal
rules of priority should govern (first to perfect). But a real estate les-
sor may... attempt to make a current crop security for current and
past due rent. This subsection [meaning § 9-312(4), which is now § 9-
312(2)] provides that security for current advances for crop production
takes precedence over security for past due claims. 173
The rationale is that the land financer's security interest is en-
titled to priority only to the extent of new-value contributions
enabling production of the current crop. The credit extended
by the land financer for last year's rent, or last year's mortgage
payments, however, does not amount to new value contributing
to this year's crop. In the language of section 9-312(4) in 1950,
and section 9-312(2) today, the land financer's contribution of
new value to any particular crop, and the limit of his priority
over a crop production secured party, is the farmer's obligation
to pay the purchase price of the land or rent due within "six
months before the crops are planted or otherwise become grow-
ing crops."
Especially important is the drafters' description of this obli-
gation as "rent, interest or mortgage principal amortization."174
This description was part of the section itself in 1950 and pres-
ently appears in the commentary to section 9-312(2).175 The im-
plication, then and now, is that the land financer's contribution
of new value to any particular crop, and thus the priority his
2. Subsection (3) (a) follows a not uncoon statutory prohibition
against a long term mortgage of crops by a farmer. Only crops to become growing
crops within one year of the agreement may be the subject to a security interest.
The date of planting rather than the date of harvesting is used so that a security
interest in crops with a long production season (e.g. nursery stock) may continue
until harvesting. The "except" clause permits such a security interest in future
crops where the interest is given as part of a transaction by which the farmer
acquires the land on which the crop is to grow. Here the value given (transfer
of land) pertains to many production seasons, unlike a loan to finance a parti-
cular crop. Section 9-311 (4) on priorities limits the use of such a clause to
to a security interest attaching on a real estate arrangement by giving higher priority
security interests attaching to secure current obligations than/ene to secure last
year's rent or payments due on a real estate mortgage.
Typewritten Version of UCC § 9-203 comment 2 (Proposed Final Draft Spring
1950) in Karl Llewellyn Papers (available in University of Chicago Library,
microfilm roll XII, 8.b.
172. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 1(h) (Proposed Final Draft Spring 1950).
173. Id § 9-312 comment 6.
174. Id § 9-312(4) (emphasis added).
175. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 2.
19871 1197
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
interest enjoys over a crop production security interest in the
collateral, is limited to rent, interest, and amortized purchase
money payments due and unpaid during the six months before
the crops start to grow. Any part of the land debt attributable
to any period before the six months is not new value that con-
tributes to the production of a particular year's crop. Logically
then, a land financer's contribution of new value does not in-
clude, and thus his priority does not extend to, rent or purchase
money land obligations attributable to any period after the six
months because the credit these obligations represent did not
enable production of the current crop.
In sum, the land financer's priority over a crop production
secured party under section 9-312(2) amounts to six months'
rent or six months' interest and mortgage principal amortiza-
tion due at the time of planting the crops. This phrasing better
expresses the real intentions behind the second part of section
9-312(2). Interestingly, it was the phrasing used in the antece-
dent of section 9-312(2) that appeared in the first draft of the
complete Code in 1949.176 There is no evidence that the differ-
176. In 1949, when Article 9 was Article 7, the critical language provided:
A perfected farm products lien on products grown from the soil at-
taching pursuant to new value given under an agreement made not
more than [six months] before the crop was planted ranks ahead of a
lien on the same products attaching pursuant to any agreement secur-
ing an earlier indebtedness, rent, purchase price, or interest to the ex-
tent such lien secures more than one year's rent due or one year's
interest and amortization on principal due at the time the crop is
marketed
U.C.C. § 7-511(l)(b) (Draft May 1949) (emphasis added) (bracketed material in
original).
In an even earlier draft of just the secured transactions article, this provi-
sion appeared as § 7-508, which is the earliest antecedent of the present § 9-
312(2). Interestingly, this great-grandparent version read in part much like its
most modem counterpart:
A farm products lien given for new value ranks ahead of a farm prod-
ucts lien given pursuant to or as part of an earlier real estate transac-
tion to the extent such liens secures [sic] indebtedness rent, purchase
price or interest becoming due more than one year before the date
that such new value is given.
U.C.C. § 7-508(l)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 3, March 1, 1949) (emphasis added).
This "due more than" language first reappeared when the May 1949 draft
was revised in September, 1949. See ALI & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAws, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: SEPTEMBER 1949 REVIsIONS OF SEC-
TION 1-105, SECTION 6-303 AND ARTICLE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 73 (Sep-
tember 1949) [hereinafter Revisions September 1949]. In these revisions, the
article on secured transactions was Article 8, and the present UCC § 9-312(2)
appeared as § 8-406(4) which provided:
In case the collateral is growing crops the interest of a lender who
gives new value during the production season or not more than three
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ent phraseology in the 1950 version of section 9-312(2), which
persists today, was intended to effect a change in substance.
Possibly, the drafters changed the phrasing simply because
technical rules of writing style reserved possessives for owner-
ship by a person.
Substance was changed in 1972 when the official text of
Article 9 was amended to eliminate altogether the limited ban
on long-range after-acquired interests in crops that applied to
lenders who were not land financers. This change, however, in
no way affects section 9-312(2). The sole purpose of the change
was to make Article 9 consistent with actual practice. Lenders
who were not land financers had routinely skirted the ban.
They would file a financing statement covering crops that was
effective for a full five years and then have the farmer annually
execute a new security agreement covering the current year's
crops. The 1972 amendments to Article 9 simply validated this
practice by allowing any lender to acquire crops as collateral
years into the future through the expedience of an after-ac-
quired property clause in the parties' original security
agreement. 177
This recent technical or housekeeping change regarding
how a lender acquires an interest in future crops, however, in
no way dilutes the interpretative force of intentions and reason-
ing originally behind section 9-312(2) regarding the priority of
production money security interests in current crops. Indeed,
the 1972 change actually increases the importance of giving
wide priority to production money interests inasmuch as the
change enables lenders who have contributed nothing to the
production of current crops to more easily claim them as collat-
eral. Further, the net effect of the 1972 change was simply to
months before the crops are planted or otherwise become growing
crops takes precedence over the interest of a lender whose interest is
first perfected to the extent the interest of such earlier lender secures
obligations (such as rent, interest or mortgage principal amortization)
due more than six months before the crops are planted or otherwise
become growing crops.
U.C.C. § 8-406(4) (Revisions September 1949).
177. In the judgment of the Review Committee that recommended the 1972
Amendments to Article 9, the ban on long-range after-acquired security inter-
ests in crops only complicated the pattern of a farmer's usual lender financing
successive crops by requiring a new security agreement each year. Therefore,
the Review Committee recommended eliminating the ban because it "appears
to be meaningless in operation except to cause unncessary paperwork." PER-
AL4ANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL RE-
PORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 207 (April 25, 1971).
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give after-acquired property clauses affecting crops the same
reach into the future that such clauses covering inventory and
equipment have. The longevity of after-acquired interests in in-
ventory and equipment has never been considered a reason to
read narrowly the purchase money priority rules of sections 9-
312(3) and 9-312(4) which counteract those interests.
Moreover, the committee responsible for the 1972 amend-
ments to Article 9 "determined... to leave... [§ 9-312(2)] un-
changed."'178 These people did share what has become the
conventional interpretation of the section, which they accord-
ingly described as having "little practical effect."'1 79 Yet, be-
cause they left section 9-312(2) untouched, their reading of it
cannot in any sense override the original design and true inter-
pretation of the section. The original drafters' intent, there-
fore, should continue to guide interpretation of section 9-312(2).
Read consistently with the original drafters' intentions,
section 9-312(2) should be reinterpreted by reading the provi-
sion as follows: A perfected security interest in crops for new
value given to enable the debtor to produce the crops during
the production season and given not more than three months
before the crops become growing crops by planting or otherwise
(that is, a production money security interest) takes priority
over an earlier perfected security interest even though the per-
son giving new value had knowledge of the earlier interest, ex-
cept that the earlier interest takes priority if, and to the extent
that, it secures unpaid rent or purchase money obligations for
the land on which the crops are grown that are attributable to
the six-month period before the crops become growing crops by
planting or otherwise.
Pursuant to this reinterpretation of section 9-312(2), when
a crop production security interest conflicts with an after-ac-
quired interest that secures any obligation other than rent or
the purchase price of the farmland, the crop production interest
completely prevails even though the other interest was filed
first. The applicable rule is the first part of section 9-312(2).
The except clause of the section, as reinterpreted, is completely
inapplicable. This result is perfectly consistent with the way in
which Article 9 decides priority between a purchase money se-
cured party and an earlier secured party who perfected first but
contributed no new value to make possible the debtor's acquisi-
tion of the collateral.
178. Id. at 208.
179. Id.
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If the earlier interest secures rent or a purchase money ob-
ligation for the farmland, the except clause applies. Yet, the
clause limits the land financer's priority to rent or obligations
owed on the purchase price of the land that are attributable to
the six-month period before the farmer planted the crops.
Rent or purchase money payments due before or after the six-
month period receive no priority. If all of the payments due
during the period have been made, the production money se-
curity interest has complete priority.
Also, if a purchase money debt on the farm is accelerated
during the six-month period, or sometime after the crops begin
growing, the priority of the land financer's security interest in
the current crop should extend only to the interest and mort-
gage principal amortization actually due and unpaid for the six-
month period. Only to this extent did the land financer enable
production of the current crop, not to the extent of the full
principal balance becoming due fortuitously through accelera-
tion during or after the six-month period. No matter how re-
payment of the purchase money obligation was structured, and
even if the principal was payable in a lump sum rather than on
an amortized basis, the land financer's priority should never ex-
ceed an amount of principal that is fairly attributable to the
six-month period and that has not been paid. Only to this ex-
tent did the land financer contribute new value to the current
crop.
The result under the reinterpretation is not only consistent
with the reasoning originally behind section 9-312(2), but also
with the modem method for resolving priority conflicts be-
tween two purchase money security interests, which is accord-
ing to the usual rule of first-to-file-or-perfect.1 80 Indeed, there
is perfect consistency with this method inasmuch as the extent
to which the land financer is considered to have given new
value, and thus the extent to which she has priority because of
her earlier filing, is measured by the same gauge used to decide
the extent to which a security interest is a purchase money in-
terest: the amount of secured value contributed toward the
purchase price that was actually used in buying the property.' 8 '
By limiting the land financer's priority in crops under section 9-
180. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 35, § 29.2, at 784. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-313(7)
(priority between a construction money mortgage on real property and a
purchase money security interest in fixtures attached to the realty).
181. A security interest securing a loan of money is a purchase money se-
curity interest only to the extent that the loan was "in fact so used" to enable
the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-107(b).
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312(2) to unpaid obligations attributable to the six months
before the crops began growing, the statute estimates conclu-
sively the total financed rent or purchase money actually used
in producing the particular crop.182
In determining priority between two or more crop produc-
tion security interests, section 9-312(2) does not apply at all.
The governing rule is section 9-312(5)(a), first-to-file-or-per-
fect,L8 3 which also applies in resolving conflicts between con-
flicting purchase money security interests in the same
collateral.184 The symmetry between crop production and
purchase money interests is thereby fully maintained.
Overall, this reinterpretation of section 9-312(2) makes
sense of the section by reading it in light of underlying inten-
tions, in harmony with the structure of section 9-312 as a whole,
and consistent with Article 9's normal preference for enabling
interests. The great mystery, then, is the source of the conven-
tional interpretation, which reads the section as a meaningless
joke, giving only a narrow, fortuitous priority to crop produc-
tion security interests. The case which serves as the lodestar
with respect to the conventional interpretation is United States
v. Minster Farmers Cooperative Exchange, Inc.'8 5 The court's
construction of section 9-312(2) in Minster was based solely and
completely on a secondary source, the first edition of a popular,
182. The most accurate measure of this value may be the depreciation in
land value caused by growing the crops. This standard, however, involves bur-
densome problems of proof and too much speculation. The amount of rent or
mortgage principal amortization (plus interest) that became due during the
year that the crops were grown is a much more convenient and rational mea-
sure.
To measure the land financer's priority under § 9-312(2) by the total value
she gave the farmer, or the balance of the total the farmer still owed, would
mean that ordinarily a crop production security interest would be largely or
completely squeezed out because mortgage balances often approach or exceed
the worth of the entire crop. This result would discourage crop production se-
curity interests in contradiction to Article 9's scheme for increasing credit
availability by giving overriding preference to enabling interests.
There is no similar danger in determining priority among purchase money
security interests on the basis of first-to-file-or-perfect. When there are two
purchase money security interests in goods, the secured parties' total contribu-
tion will not exceed the price of the goods; and each secured party's contribu-
tion will be fully or largely supported by the collateral's value because
ordinarily the debtor will not have paid a price for the goods that greatly ex-
ceeded the property's worth.
183. 2 G. GILMoRE, supra note 35, § 32.5, at 867-68; Phillips, supra note 135,
at 407.
184. See authorities cited supra note 48.
185. 430 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
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generally reliable commercial law treatise.1 8 6 The treatise has
a very small section on section 9-312(2), where the authors
opine that "subsection (2) entitles one to priority only over obli-
gations more than six months overdue at the time the crops in
question become growing crops."'81 7 The authors do not explain
how they came to this interpretation, and they cite no authority
for it.' 8 8
Possibly, the authors were influenced by Professor Grant
Gilmore's monumental treatise on secured transactions, in
which he advances the same interpretation. 8 9 Gilmore's con-
struction of any Article 9 provision is normally entitled to
much weight inasmuch as he was a principal architect of the
statute. In this instance, however, and these next words are
written with great respect and unlimited deference, there is
cause to doubt Gilmore because of his uncharacteristically shal-
low analysis of section 9-312(2), and because another Article 9
insider interpreted the provision very differently.
Gilmore's treatise recognizes that the priority of section 9-
312(2) is "extremely limited" compared to the "absolute prior-
ity" accorded purchase money security interests.19° Indeed, the
treatise describes "the § 9-312(2) priority [as] hardly ... worth
having,"'19 ' and the section itself "as one of the Code's dead let-
ter provisions."'192 Conspicuously absent is any explanation
why an "extremely limited," "hardly worth having," "dead let-
ter" provision was included in Article 9. It is almost as though
Gilmore confronted section 9-312(2) for the first time when he
wrote about it in his treatise and was surprised and perplexed
by the meeting.
Significantly, Professor Gilmore, a Yale law professor, was
not the sole author of Article 9. At least in the beginning,
there were three other principal coauthors: 93 Allison Dun-
ham, who was then teaching at Columbia Law School in New
York City; Fairfax Leary, then on the law faculty of the Uni-
186. See id. at 570 (citing J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25.6, at 923 (1972)).
187. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 186, § 25.6 at 923, quoted in Min-
ster, 430 F. Supp. at 570.
188. In the second edition of their treatise, Professors Summers and White
state the very same opinion, citing the Minster case as authority. J. WHITE &
R. SUMMERS, supra note 48, § 26-6, at 1052-53 & n.59.
189. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 35, § 32.5.
190. Id. at 869.
191. Id. at 870.
192. Id.
193. See U.C.C. § 7-101 comment (Draft May 1949).
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versity of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia; and Charles Bunn,
then a professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School, in
the heart of the agrarian Midwest.
Professor Bunn's understanding of section 9-312(2) was
very different from Gilmore's. A seldom-cited piece coauthored
by Bunn at about the same time Gilmore's treatise was pub-
lished offers the following explanation of section 9-312(2):
Quite frequently (or should we say "traditionally"?) a farm is mort-
gaged. Perhaps the mortgage also covers future crops. Yet the farmer
needs a current loan to "enable" him to plant this year's crop. Or,
perhaps earlier in the year a farmer has obtained a secured loan
against his crop and now wants another loan from a different lender.
The UCC deals with these problems, and incidentally affects priorities
in land security transactions, as follows: [UCC § 9-312(2) is quoted.]
This is tricky; we'll leave it to you to apply it. Here's the main
idea though: Do you recognize this as a variation on the "purchase-
money" theme? The thought is that the "old credit" (any debt "due"
more than six months before the crops become growing crops) hasn't
helped produce the COLLATERAL, at least not as much as the "en-
abling advance." Careful though: It's "due" more than six months,
etc., not "incurred" more than six months, etc. So? Well, those cur-
rently due installments on the realty mortgage could take priority
over the enabling advance .... 194
A fuller explanation would have been nice. Yet, enough is
written to confirm that the reinterpretation of section 9-312(2)
urged in this Article is true to the understanding of an original
drafter who, although not as well known, was probably closer
to agriculture and more attentive to section 9-312(2) than Gil-
more. More important, the reinterpretation is true to Article 9's
pervasive and sound policy of preferring enabling, new-value
security interests, which policy was nothing less than the "main
idea" behind section 9-312(2)195 and thus should be given effect.
IV. RIGHTING THE ANOMALY: A LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSAL IN AID OF CERTAINTY
The courts are free to reinterpret UCC section 9-312(2) in a
manner consistent with the different reading this Article urges.
The long-lived, wide-spread acceptance of the conventional in-
194. C. BUNN, H. SNEAD & R. SPEIDEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 419-20 (1964). A student author also understood U.C.C.
§ 9-312(2) as allowing the earlier secured party to win only as to real estate
mortgage installments due within the six months before the crops began grow-
ing. Note, Farm Financing Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 44 N.D.L.
REV. 553, 561 (1968).
195. C. BUNN, H. SNEAD & R. SPEIDEL, supra note 194, at 420.
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tepretation does not compel its perpetuation.196 Yet, farm lend-
ers who wish to preserve the priority of aged floating liens for
stale loans will undoubtedly cry that they relied on the conven-
tional interpretation in making the loans. Reliance, however,
in and of itself, is no reason for clinging to a particular con-
struction of a statute.19 7 Moreover, cries of reliance would be
unbelievable because it is unlikely that farm lenders actually
made loans years ago that they then expected to satisfy from
crops grown years later. Also, cries of reliance on the conven-
tional interpretation of section 9-312(2) would be unmoving.
Relying on crops to be grown years in the future as collateral
for present advances is, and always has been, unreasonable in
light of the many economic and natural uncertainties of farm-
ing that make even current production financing a risky ven-
ture. Finally, real and justified reliance on the conventional
interpretation of section 9-312(2) argues only against retroac-
tively applying the proper construction of the provision, and
not against prospectively reinterpreting it. 198
Judicial reinterpretation of section 9-312(2) is not, however,
a quick and dependable solution to the problems that the con-
ventional interpretation of the provision causes and that the de-
196. Legislative unresponsiveness to the courts' interpretation of a statute
is not a definite signal that the courts have correctly determined legislative in-
tent, or that the legislature adopts the interpretation. See Grabow, Congres-
sional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent A Venture into
"Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U.L. REV. 737 (1985). See also authorities cited
infra note 201, regarding the absence of a constitutional bar to reinterpreting
U.C.C. § 9-312(2).
197. Reliance alone is not a substantive limitation on the power of a court
to reinterpret a statute or the power of a legislature to alter an existing law.
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930) (over-
ruling a law established by previous decisions "on which a party relied" does
not give rise to a due process claim); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444,
450 (1924) (reversal of a decision to the prejudice of a party does not give rise
to a due process claim); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917)
("No person has a vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that
it shall remain unchanged for his benefit.").
Constitutional arguments that may be encountered in retroactively reor-
dering priority, either through judicial decision or legislative action, are dis-
cussed infra note 201.
198. Courts can, and occasionally do, overrule themselves prospectively.
See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 295 (1970)
("[D]ecisions construing federal statutes might be denied full retroactive ef-
fect, as for instance where this Court overrules its own construction of a stat-
ute .... "); Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 609, 249
S.W.2d 973, 978 (1952) (prospectively reinterpreting state constitutional usury
provision); see also Traynor, Quo Vasid, Prospective Overruling: A Question
of Judicial Responsibility, 28 HAsTiNGs L.J. 533 (1977).
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pressed farm economy currently exacerbates. Furthermore,
rereading the present section 9-312(2) will create the kind of
uncertainty about its scope and application that accompanies
the enactment of a completely fresh statute. This uncertainty
is no reason for courts to refuse to reinterpret the section. Re-
ducing uncertainty, however, is good reason for legislating a re-
interpretation that addresses up front the most important
interpretative issues and also makes adjustments to accommo-
date the most serious, legitimate concerns of farm lenders.
Accordingly, here is a statutory substitute for the present
section 9-312(2) that mainly codifies, in clearer and more defi-
nite form, the intent and purpose of the original section to give
broad priority generally to crop production security interests.199
Additionally, it aids certainty by defining in detail certain criti-
cal terms and promotes accommodation by conditioning the pri-
ority on satisfying procedural requirements designed to guard
against misleading farm lenders and other third parties.2° °
199. This is not the first call for legislative change. See Clontz, supra note
135, at 144 (arguing for amending § 9-312(2) "to give the same type of priority
to a lender enabling the debtor to grow 'current crops' that we find given a
lender financing Inventory for a businessman"); Hawkland, The Proposed
Amendment to Article 9 of the U..CC - Part 1: Financing the Farmer, 76
COM. L.J. 416, 421-22 (1971). Professor Hawkland wrote in the following
strong terms about changing § 9-312(2) to provide a broad enabling priority for
crop production security interests:
This Alice-in-Wonderland type rule is uncommercial, out of keeping
with parallel rules for businessmen and flies in the face of the doc-
trine of unjust enrichment by failing to recognize that the first lender
would have no collateral upon which his security interest could attach
but for the enabling loan made by the second lender. It also has the
unfortunate effect of deterring seed loans and driving the farmer back
to the first lender for all his credit needs. It is high time that the dis-
crimination against the seed lender be ended.
Id. Professor Hawkland added that this "situation of unjust enrichment...
would not be tolerated for a single moment in a parallel commercial context."
Id. at 422.
200. The following is a statutory substitute for the present § 9-312(2) that
changes the section only to the minimal extent necessary to accomplish the in-
tentions and purposes of the different reading this Article urges:
A perfected security interest in crops for new value given to enable
the debtor to produce the crops during the production season and
given not more than three months before the crops become growing
crops by planting or otherwise takes priority over an earlier perfected
security interest except to the extent such earlier interest secures an
amount of any purchase money obligation or rent for the land where
the crops are grown that is determined by law to be proportionately
attributable to the six-month period before the crops became growing
crops, even though the person giving new value had knowledge of the
earlier security interest.
This statute would leave unanswered fundamental issues that have been dor-
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Commentary accompanies the proposed substitute both to ex-
plain and amplify it. Notes adorn the statutory language and
the comments to further justify certain language and also to
suggest alternative wording that limits or broadens the effects
of the whole provision or parts of it.
Any changes in section 9-312(2) could constitutionally be
applied to security interests created before the changes were
enacted if the legislature so intended. 20 Where this intention
mant under the conventional interpretation of the present § 9-312(2): When
must the new-value interest be perfected? Under what circumstances does
new value enable crop production? What is crop production? Crop production
financers would be reluctant to rely on the statute until the courts answered
these questions, and even then the statute's essential purpose would be ful-
filled only if the courts' answers liberally and reliably favored crop production
security interests.
201. Certain provisions of the federal Constitution and some state constitu-
tions might appear at first glance to prevent retroactively applying either a
newly enacted priority statute or a fresh construction of a long-standing prior-
ity statute. On closer examination, however, nothing in any constitution
stands in the way of legislatively or judicially modifying priority rules as ap-
plied to existing interests.
Reordering the priority of interests in collateral is not an unconstitutional
taking of property. In United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70
(1982) the takings clause of the fifth amendment was raised as a bar to retro-
active application of a provision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. As ap-
plied in that case, the provision in question allowed the debtor to entirely
avoid liens that had been created prior to passage of the Act. The lower court
held the retroactive application of the law unconstitutional under the takings
clause. Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (1981), aff'd
sub norm United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982). The
Supreme Court avoided ruling on the constitutional question by construing the
statute as applying only prospectively. In discussing the constitutional ques-
tion, the Court stated:
Since the governmental action here would result in a complete de-
struction of the property right of the secured party, the case fits but
awkwardly into the analytic framework employed in Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), and PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), where governmental
action affected some but not all of the "bundle of rights" which consti-
tute the "property" in question.
Security Indus. Bank 459 U.S. at 75-76 (emphasis added). This concept of the
"bundle of rights" has been relied upon in several cases to uphold governmen-
tal actions against challenges under the takings clause. Where something less
than the entire "bundle" is adversely affected, the Court has not found a "tak-
ing." See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82 ("[]t is well established that 'not every
destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a
"taking" in the constitutional sense.'" (quoting Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960)); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) ("At least
where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of
one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be
viewed in its entirety."); Penn Cent, 438 U.S. at 130 (" 'Taking' jurisprudence
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accompanies enactment of the statute proposed here, the enact-
ing legislation should clearly state that it applies retroactively.
does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to deter-
mine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.").
Retroactive application of either proposal in this Article would be sustain-
able under this theory. The bundle of rights is not affected in its entirety.
Neither the judicial reinterpretation nor the legislative enactment would avoid
the secured party's interest; the secured party remains a secured party, not a
general unsecured creditor. Cf. Security Indus. Bank 459 U.S. at 75. Priority
is the only strand of the bundle that is disturbed. Moreover, a portion of the
mortgagee's interest would be ranked along with other production input inter-
ests.
The Court has also recognized that regulatory restrictions on property are
to be distinguished from actual physical intrusions on property. Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) ("[WMe have
long considered a physical intrusion by government to be a property restric-
tion of an unusually serious character for purposes of the Takings Clause.").
Another factor that the Court has frequently emphasized in takings cases
is whether the restriction impairs the "investment-backed expectations" of the
property holder. See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426; Penn Cent, 438 U.S. at 124.
This factor alone, however, should not raise a governmental restriction on
property to the level of a taking. Virtually any restriction placed on the dispo-
sition of property will defeat an expectation of economic use, and, indeed, the
Court has sustained fairly drastic restrictions on property uses. See, e.g., Penn
Cent, 438 U.S. at 138.
Retroactive application of the proposed § 9-312(2) may also result in a
challenge under the contracts clause. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("No State
shall... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. .. ."). This
clause has been held to apply only to legislative action, not judicial interpreta-
tion. Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 451 (1923); Moore-Mansfield Con-
str. Co. v. Electrical Installation Co., 234 U.S. 619, 624 (1914). In Toledo, D. &
B. R.R. v. Hamilton, 134 U.S. 296 (1890), the Court held that when at the time
the mortgage on the railroad's property was executed there was no mechanic's
lien statute in force, the mortgagee took its vested priority and any subsequent
lien was subordinate to the mortgage. Id. at 301. The Court concluded that
the priority of the mortgage was "beyond the power of the ... legislature
thereafter to disturb." Id. Since 1890, however, the contours of the contracts
clause have become less certain and the Court has upheld the retroactive ap-
plication of state legislation restricting the right of a mortgagee to foreclose on
a mortgage, Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444-45 (1934),
the right of a certificate holder to withdraw from a building and loan associa-
tion, Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940), and the
adjustment of creditors' claims against insolvent municipalities, Faitoute Iron
& Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1942).
In 1978 the Court decided Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438
U.S. 234 (1978). Spannaus struck down the retroactive application of a state
law regarding the vesting of employees' interests in benefit plans. The law re-
quired that certain categories of employers were subject to a "pension funding
charge" if a plan were terminated or a state office or plant were closed. Id. at
238. The Court relied on the analysis in Blaisdell and focused on five signifi-
cant factors. The Court looked to 1) a legislative declaration "in the Act itself"
of an "emergency need"; 2) whether the state was acting "to protect a basic
societal interest, not a favored group"; 3) whether the legislation was "appro-
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(2)(a) A crop production security interest is a security
priately tailored" to meet the emergency; 4) whether "the imposed conditions
were reasonable"; and 5) whether the term of the legislation was "limited to
the duration of the emergency." Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 242 (citing Blaisdel
290 U.S. at 444-47). In addition, the Court made clear that the level of scrutiny
given legislative action will vary in direct relation to the impairment of the
contract. '"Minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end the inquiry
at its first stage. Severe impairment, on the other hand, will push the inquiry
to a careful examination of the nature and purpose of the state legislation."
Id at 245 (footnote omitted).
Arguably, the proposed substitute § 9-312(2) will pass constitutional mus-
ter under Spannaus/Blaisdell. Initially, there must be a legislative declaration
in the act itself of an emergency need. The subject of the Blaisdell action was
a moratorium on mortgage foreclosures responding to the conditions of the
Depression of the 1930s. Blaisdel4 290 U.S. at 421 n.3. The Spannaus opinion
notes, however, that the legislation need not be responding to an emergency of
such "great magnitude." 438 U.S. at 249 & n.24. Moreover, the Court has indi-
cated that the legislation "need not be addressed to an emergency or tempo-
rary situation." Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co.,
459 U.S. 400, 412 (1983) (citing United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.
1, 22 n.19 (1977)); see also Veix, 310 U.S. at 39-40. In any event, legislatures
considering proposed § 9-312(2) should include in the bill itself explicit find-
ings regarding the crisis in agriculture and in rural communities.
The legislation also must be aimed at protecting a basic societal interest.
Energy Reserve, 459 U.S. at 412; Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 242. In Spannaus the
Court found that protecting the benefits of employees whose benefit plans had
terminated or whose employers had closed operations was protection of a
"narrow class." Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 249. While it is true that proposed § 9-
312(2) would most directly affect production input suppliers, the protection
would also operate to open additional credit to farmers. In light of the impact
the farm crisis has on rural communities, the effect of the proposed change
would be beneficial to the rural sector of the economy as a whole.
Spannaus additionally focused on whether the legislation was narrowly
tailored to meet the emergency and whether the conditions imposed were rea-
sonable. Id at 242. The Spannaus Court found that the legislation before it
failed in both respects. Indeed, in some cases the legislation resulted in
charges to covered employers of up to $19 million. Id. at 248 n.20. The propo-
sal in this Article, however, is narrowly tailored and reasonable. It would re-
order the priority of mortgagees only as to after-acquired interests in crops.
Even then it would allow a certain amount of the mortgage to be accorded
first priority as a production input of land.
The fifth factor the Spannaus Court considered was whether the legisla-
tion was temporary. Id. at 242, 250. In Spannaus the legislation was not of
limited duration. While this fact alone would not be fatal, the Court did find it
significant. Id. Proposed § 9-312(2) would be permanent. In light of the mini-
mal intrusion into the total ability of a mortgagee to recover and the minimal
scrutiny to which this proposal should be subject, however, permanence alone
should not be sufficient grounds for unconstitutionality. The Court has upheld
permanent "emergency" state laws. See Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412; Veix,
310 U.S. at 39.
The Court in Spannaus also noted that the state law in question was in an
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area "never before subject to regulation by the state." Spannaus, 438 U.S. at
250. Priority, on the other hand, has long been the domain of state law.
This final point raises a question that may be dispositive of a contracts
clause challenge. As discussed above, questions as to priority have been raised
under the clause. The most fundamental question, however, is whether such a
case rightly involves the contracts clause. As early as Sturges v. Crownin-
shield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall recognized a dis-
tinction between the obligation arising from a contract and the state-provided
remedy to enforce that obligation. Id. at 200. Chief Justice Hughes noted this
distinction with approval in Bkaisdell and quoted Sturges: "'Without impairing
the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the
wisdom of the nation shall direct.'" Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 430 (quoting Sturges,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 200). Except in cases involving subordination agree-
ments, priority is not resolved by referring to a contract. The state acts as refe-
ree in these disputes and determines priority by reference to rules wholly
apart from the agreement between the parties. While it may be true that par-
ties enter into an agreement with reference to a particular priority regime,
changing the regime does not alter the obligations arising from the contract.
Some state constitutions also contain provisions that prohibit retroactive
laws that impair contracts or "vested rights." E.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 22,
construed in State ex reL Highsmith v. Brown Serv. Funeral Co., 236 Ala. 249,
253, 182 So. 18, 21 (1938) (legislative enactment cannot be amended or repealed
if the effect is to destroy contract or property rights which have become vested
under it); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 16, construed in Josic v. Josic, 78 Ill. App. 3d 347,
350, 397 N.E.2d 204, 207 (1979) (legislature may not give retrospective effect to
act which will affect vested rights); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 23, construed in
Gould v. Concord Hospital, 126 N.H. 405, 408, 493 A.2d 1193, 1195 (1985) ("A
law is retrospective [and thus prohibited under this article] if it impairs a
vested legal right."). Some jurisdictions have held that priority is a vested
right. E.g., Bourgette v. Williams, 73 Mich. 208, 215-16, 41 N.W. 229, 231-32(1889) (lien could not be asserted on materials supplied under contract entered
into prior to passage of the law creating the lien); North Am. Mfg., Inc. v.
Crown Int'l, Inc., 115 N.H. 114, 116, 335 A.2d 660, 662 (1975) (priority under
mechanics' lien statute could not be asserted against mortgage taken prior to
enactment of the mechanics' lien statute).
The concept of "vested rights" is found in many diverse areas of the law
and is not subject to precise definition. There is no clear analytic framework
for precisely defining a vested right. See Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested
Rights, 6 TEx. L. REV. 409, 409-10 (1928). Courts have used a variety of charac-
terizations in attempting to define vested, as opposed to nonvested, rights.
One characterization that is common to many jurisdictions is that a "vested"
right cannot be dependent on a future event or on the action or inaction of a
third party. See, e.g., Hatch v. Tipton, 131 Ohio St. 364, 368, 2 N.E.2d 875, 877
(1936) ("A right which is not absolute but is dependent for its existence upon
the action or inaction of another is not basic or vested.... ."). Accord State v.
Estes Corp., 27 Ariz. App. 686, 688, 558 P.2d 714, 716 (1976); Vaughn v. Nadel,
228 Kan. 469, 473-74, 618 P.2d 778, 783 (1980); Rodriguez v. City Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 337 So. 2d 308, 310 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
In the context of after-acquired interests, the creation of the interest itself
is dependent on the acquisition of property at some later time by the debtor.
See, e.g., Dunham Lumber Co. v. Gresz, 71 N.D. 491, 496, 2 N.W.2d 175, 178
(1942) ("Whether any building would be annexed to the land after the mort-
gage was executed was purely a matter of speculation."). In the terms of the
UCC, the after-acquired interest of a creditor does not attach until the debtor
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interest in crops for new value given 2° 2 while the crops are
being produced, or not more than one year before the crops
become growing crops by planting or otherwise,20 3 to en-
acquires rights in the collateral. In other words, with respect to the after-ac-
quired property, the creditor does not even become a "secured party" within
the meaning of Article 9 until the debtor acquires rights. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203,
9-204. Absent such status as a secured party, the claim to a vested right in pri-
ority is reduced to a claim in the continuance of existing law. "[A] mere ex-
pectancy of future benefit, or a contingent interest in property founded on
anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute a vested right."
Vaughn, 228 Kan. at 473-74, 618 P.2d at 783. Accord Talandis Constr. Corp. v.
Illinois Bldg. Auth., 60 Ill. App. 2d 715, 720, 377 N.E.2d 237, 241 (1978). By this
reasoning, therefore, the priority of a mortgagee in crops to be grown at some
future date is not a vested right; changing the priority with respect to those
future crops is within the power of the legislature notwithstanding the consti-
tutional provisions discussed above.
202. The definition does not require proof that the new value given to en-
able crop production was in fact used to produce the collateral. In this regard,
the proposed statute follows the present UCC § 9-312(2) which does not condi-
tion priority on the crop production secured party seeing to the application of
funds by the debtor. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 35, § 32.4 at 866; Clontz,
supra note 135, at 142. The lack of a tracing requirement thus makes the defi-
nition of crop production security interest different from the meaning of
purchase money security interest, which qualifies purchase money status on a
demonstrable link between the new value given by a secured party and actual
purchase of the goods in which a purchase money interest is claimed. U.C.C.
§ 9-107. For a discussion and defense of this tracing requirement applicable to
purchase money security interests, see Jackson & Kronman, supra note 83, at
31-36; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 6, at 1175-78.
203. The language of the present § 9-312(2) requires giving the production
credit "not more than three months before the crops become crops by planting
or otherwise." Presumably, this language does not mean that the credit must
be given during the three-month period so as to exclude credit given after
planting and during production. See In re Piwowar, 66 Bankr. 23, 25-26
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) (any production credit qualifies that is given during the
growing season or harvest period) (dictum); Bossingham v. Bloomington Prod.
Credit Ass'n, 49 Bankr. 345 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1985) (by implication). The dif-
ferent language used here makes explicit this presumption and should be read
in conjunction with the definition of "producing crops" which also appears in
subsection (2)(a).
The three-month period is extended to one year to insure coverage of all
kinds of production credit, whenever given. This extension is especially im-
portant if an interest securing operating loans is included in the definition of
crop production security interest. See infra note 205.
The original provision requires that the value be given to enable the
debtor to produce the crops during the production season. This language is
eliminated for two reasons. First, it seems unlikely, perhaps naturally impos-
sible, that crops will be produced at any time other than the regular produc-
tion season. Second, there is no good reason for denying priority to production
credit that enables the production of crops outside of the regular season.
The authors of an early commentary construed the language in the origi-
nal provision, "during the production season," as modifying when the new
value must be given. Hunt & Coates, The Impact of the Secured Transactions
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able the debtor to produce the collateral by acquiring
goods 2°4 or services to be used in producing the crops.20 5
Article on Commercial Practices with Respect to Agricultural Financing, 16
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 179 (1951). If this construction is accurate, the
language should nevertheless be eliminated for the same reasons that justify
dropping it as a condition on when the debtor must be enabled to produce the
crops.
204. The financer of farm machinery or certain other kinds of farm equip-
ment perhaps enables the production of crops even under the "direct connec-
tion" test laid down in the commentary accompanying the proposed statute.
See text following note 209 infra. Thus, a security interest that the financer
takes in crops to secure the price of the equipment is arguably a crop produc-
tion security interest. Cf. Miller, supra note 135, at 534 (suggesting that an
equipment financer can qualify for priority under the present § 9-312(2)). Yet,
this person has the security of a first claim to the equipment itself. Therefore,
as to the crops, she arguably should perhaps rank below suppliers of goods,
services, and money that is consumed in the production process. If this policy
issue is decided against the equipment financer, the decision can be expressed
in the statute either by adding, parenthetically, the words "(other than dura-
ble equipment)" after the word "goods" in the definition of crop production
security interest, or by substituting for the last word "crops" in the definition
the following.
crops, except that a security interest in crops taken or retained by the
seller, lessor, or any other supplier or financer of durable equipment
to secure a debt owed with respect to the equipment is not a crop pro-
duction security interest.
205. The definition does not include a security interest in crops for ad-
vances to cover current operating expenses and to sustain the farmer and her
family. This exclusion is consistent with the usual understanding that a
lender who extends credit to a manufacturer or retailer to enable the debtor
to pay overhead and the like does not thereby acquire a purchase money se-
curity interest in goods the debtor thereafter buys. Arguably, however, farm
operating loans are more directly related to crop production than overhead
loans are to the purchase of equipment or inventory. Also, very recently a
court construing the present UCC § 9-312(2) interpreted the language "for new
value given to the debtor to produce the crops" to include ordinary and reason-
able living expenses of the farmer-debtor. First Nat'l Bank v. Hollingsworth,
No. 86-218-II (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1986) (WESTLAW, TN-CS data base).
Moreover, the proposed statute may not stand a chance of passing any legisla-
ture without greater accommodations for farm lenders. For these reasons, it
may be desirable to broaden the definition of crop production security interest
to include farm operating loans. In this event, the following language should
be substituted for the last word "crops" in the first sentence of subsection(2)(a):
crops, or by paying necessary farm operating expenses, including the
debtor's normal personal and family expenses, except that operating
expenses do not include obligations of any kind owed with respect to
land.
Also, a corresponding addition to the commentary should be made, to wit:
Operating expenses are the costs of doing business, i.e., the usual and
necessary costs of maintaining the farming operation that produces
the collateral, excluding obligations owed with respect to the farm-
land such as rent, mortgage principal or interest. Land obligations are
excluded because subsection (2)(c)(ii) deals explicitly with the only
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Producing crops includes any activity that causally relates
to the growing of crops or marketing of crops.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), a crop produc-
tion security interest takes priority over an earlier perfected
security interest, and also in the proceeds of the collat-
eral,20 6 even though the person giving new value had
knowledge of the earlier security interest.
(c) The priority provided for in subsection (b) is subject
to these limitations:
(i) The crop production security interest has prior-
ity only to the extent that before the debtor receives
value, or within ten days thereafter, a financing state-
ment covering the collateral is filed.207
such debts that are entitled to the special priority this subsection
creates.
206. Explicitly extending the priority to proceeds is consistent with UCC
§ 9-312(4) and, to a lesser extent, § 9-312(3) (purchase money priority as to in-
ventory only carries over to certain proceeds).
More so with crops than with inventory, equipment, or other goods, prod-
ucts of the collateral are a concern. If the crops are confused with other goods
to produce a product, any security interest in crops, whether or not a crop pro-
duction security interest, would likely continue in the product under UCC § 9-
315. In other cases, the survival of the security interest is unclear under the
existing terms of Article 9. To clarify the law in these cases, and also to insure
that the priority of a crop production security extends to situations within § 9-
315, two additions in the proposed statute are necessary.
First, add to subsection (2)(b): "Iis priority extends to products of the
collateral."
Second, to insure that all security interests in crops continue in products
of the crops, and also to continue the perfected status of any such interest, add
a subsection (2)(e), which provides:
(e) Unless otherwise agreed, a security interest in crops continues in
products of the collateral; and the security interest in products is a
continuously perfected security interest if the interest in the original
collateral was perfected.
If conditions on the continuation of the perfected status are desirable, they can
easily be tacked to the very end of the additional subsection. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-
306(3).
207. As the commentary accompanying the proposed statute explains, the
filing requirement corresponds to the perfection requirement of UCC § 9-
312(4) for purchase money security interests in collateral other than inven-
tory. The purpose is to protect subsequent creditors.
Because farm lenders who make operating loans to the farmer, or other
crop production secured parties, are likely to extend value repeatedly on the
security of current crops, they are arguably entitled to the additional protec-
tion of direct, personalized notice if their preexisting claims to the collateral
have been publicized. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) (purchase money secured party
must personally notify earlier perfected secured parties to qualify for priority
as to inventory).
If the policy decision is made similarly to condition the priority this sub-
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(ii) An earlier perfected security interest that
secures a purchase money obligation, or rent, for the
land on which the crops were grown 2°8 has priority to
the extent of an amount of the obligation or rent that is
determined by law to be proportionately and fairly at-
tributable to the six-month period before the crops be-
came growing crops by planting or otherwise.
(iii) Subsection (5) governs priority between con-
flicting crop production security interests.
(d) Creating or perfecting a crop production security
interest shall not operate under any circumstances as a de-
fault on, an accelerating event under, or otherwise as a
breach of, any note or other instrument or agreement of
any kind or nature to pay debt; any loan or credit agree-
ment; or any security arrangement of any kind or nature
whether the collateral is real or personal property.2 0 9
Proposed Official Comment
Subsection (2) is an instance of the preference which this
Code gives a new-value secured party. The principle of this provi-
sion is that a person who extends credit that enables a debtor to
produce new crops, and secures this credit with a security inter-
est in the crops she enabled the debtor to produce, gets first
claim to the collateral, outranking the interest of another secured
party who claims the collateral merely as after-acquired property
to secure a debt not directly related to the production of the
crops. So subsection (2) creates an exception to the first-to-file-or-
section gives a crop production secured party, this additional limitation should
be added to subsection (2)(c):
The crop production security interest has priority over a conflicting
security interest only if the crop production secured party sends a no-
tification in writing to the holder of the conflicting security interest if,
before the date of the filing made by the new-value secured party, the
holder had filed a financing statement covering all or part of the same
crops, and the notification states that the person giving the notice has
or expects to acquire a security interest in crops of the debtor, identi-
fies the debtor, and describes the year or years in which the crops will
be grown and the land where the crops are growing or to be grown.
208. Changing the wording slightly from "on which the crops were grown"
to "on which the crops, or part of the crops, were grown" would avoid difficult
problems of proof for land financers seeking to rely on this exception, and
would also widen the scope of the exception.
209. Clauses in security agreements or other loan documents that define
default to include further encumbering the collateral are generally regarded
as valid. See U.C.C. § 9-311 (negative implication of last clause). Subsection
(2)(d) of the proposed statute is thus extraordinary, but there is explicit prece-
dent in the UCC itself for limiting the parties' freedom of contract in specific
cases where sound policy so dictates. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) & comment 2.
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perfect rule of subsection (5), as do subsections (3) and (4). The
purposes behind all these exceptions are the same: to enable
free-market forces to operate with respect to the debtor's acquisi-
tion of new property and to prevent unjust enrichment. Subsec-
tion (2) has the effect of putting farming on a par with any other
business with respect to secured financing.
Priority under this subsection is not conditioned on the crop
production secured party being without notice or knowledge of
the conflicting security interest: She takes priority although she
actually or constructively knows of it. In this respect, subsection
(2) is no different from subsections 9-312(3) and (4).
The filing requirement serves subsequent creditors by provid-
ing a means whereby they can learn of existing or expected inter-
ests in the collateral. Cf. Section 9-312(4). A crop production
secured party may extend value more than once with respect to
the same crops. She need not file each time value is extended.
Rather, a single filing, properly accomplished, protects her as to
all enabling value she contemporaneously and subsequently ex-
tends with respect to crops covered by the filing.
Priority among crop production security interests, like prior-
ity between conflicting purchase money security interests, is gov-
erned by subsection 9-312(5) because conflicts between enabling
interests in the same collateral are ordinarily determined by the
fundamental principle of first in time, first in right.
A secured party with an interest in the crops to secure the
purchase price of the land where the crops were grown, or to se-
cure rent for the land, is not a crop production secured party. So
her earlier perfected security interest in the crops is not protected
by section 9-312(5) as against a crop production security interest
entitled to priority under this subsection. Yet, such a land fi-
nancer directly enabled the production of the crops to the extent
of the land obligations that are attributable to the particular
crops. Consistent with the notion of ranking enabling interests
according to the first-in-time principle, subsection (2)(c)(ii) gives
priority to the earlier perfected security interest of a land financer
to the extent of her contribution to the crops. This contribution is
measured in every case as so much of the land obligation as is
fairly attributable by law to the six-month period before the crops
began to grow. In measuring the land financer's contribution, no
agreement of any sort between the land financer and the debtor
is controlling because the ultimate issue is the extent of the land
financer's priority as against third parties. A secured party can-
not be allowed by contract with her debtor to determine the ex-
tent to which her interest will outrank the claims of other
creditors.
The value that will support a crop production security inter-
est includes a loan of money by a lender or other financer or an
extension of credit by a seller or other supplier of goods or serv-
ices. See Section 1-201(44). A crop production security interest is
created for new value given in the good faith belief that the value
will be used to enable the debtor to produce or raise the collateral
even though the value is not in fact so used by the debtor. Con-
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ditioning the priority of a crop production security interest on
proof that the value was actually used in producing or raising the
collateral would impose on farm lenders and suppliers unreason-
able burdens of accounting and tracing.
Producing crops entails a wide range of many activities, each
of which is useful or necessary to the process. Security interests
based on value extended for all of these activities must qualify
for the priority of this subsection so that the debtor can freely
shop for enabling credit at every step of production. Thus, the
subsection deliberately defines "producing crops" broadly: any
causally related activity, including activities associated with mar-
keting the collateral.
Producing crops thus includes preparing the land for plant-
ing, planting, cultivating or otherwise tending crops, harvesting,
preparing crops for sale or storage prior to sale, storing crops
prior to sale, transporting to sale, selling, or engaging in any
other activity that proximately relates to the growing and market-
ing of crops.
Security interests in crops to secure credit that would directly
enable the debtor to engage in any of these activities with respect
to the collateral can qualify as crop production security interests.
Of course, deciding if the credit enables the activity is a distinct
issue. The test is whether there exists a direct link between the
goods and services that are, or would be, purchased with the
credit, and the production of crops. This test excludes credit for
general operating expenses and the like which are one step re-
moved from crop production and only indirectly make it
possible.
The purposes behind this subsection could be frustrated by
typically unbargained-for, boilerplate language in loan agree-
ments that could be construed to prohibit a debtor from creating
production money security interests. So this sort of language is
neutered. See Subsection (2)(d). A creditor should not be allowed
through contract to accomplish a result that contravenes the pol-
icy of positive law.
CONCLUSION
Floating liens are common in the law of creditors' reme-
dies. These liens, whether created by law or agreement, attach
automatically to property the debtor acquires after the liens are
created. Because the law generally ranks liens according to a
first-in-time principle of priority, a floating lien that attaches to
the debtor's property is preferred to other liens arising after
the floating lien was created.
This principle, fully applied, would mean that a floating
lien on after-acquired property of the debtor outranks even a
lien securing credit given to enable the debtor to acquire the
property. Creditors would therefore be discouraged from ex-
tending enabling credit to a debtor whose estate was shadowed
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by a floating lien. The debtor would thus be dependent on, and
financially bound to, the creditor with the floating lien. This
kind of enslavement can have undesirable effects, including the
promotion of economic inefficiency and the stifling of en-
trepreneurial enterprise.
To avoid these effects, and also to insure fairness, the law
generally recognizes an exception to the first-in-time principle
of priority that subordinates a floating lien on after-acquired
property to a lien securing credit extended to enable the debtor
to acquire the property. This exceptional priority for enabling
interests is pervasive throughout the law of creditors' remedies,
and is often applied without regard to how the liens were cre-
ated or the nature of the collateral. It is in UCC Article 9, how-
ever, that this priority for enabling interests is most clearly
stated and most consistently applied.
Anomalously, Article 9 does not presently give priority to
enabling security interests in crops that secure credit given to
enable the farmer to produce the collateral, that is, crop pro-
duction security interests. Farmers are thereby bound, in po-
tentially monopolistic financial relationships, to their creditors
who have floating liens on all the farmers' future crops. The
lack of priority under Article 9 for crop production security in-
terests results from the wide-spread, conventional interpreta-
tion of UCC section 9-312(2) which construes the section
narrowly and gives only a tiny, fortuitous priority to crop pro-
duction security interests over floating liens attaching to the
collateral.
The conventional interpretation construes section 9-312(2)
apart from its drafting history and also apart from the inten-
tions and purposes of the original drafters. These underpin-
nings support a different reading of the section that gives wide
priority to crop production security interests and thereby treats
them on par with other kinds of enabling interests, especially
purchase money security interests. This intended symmetry
can be achieved through purposive, judicial reinterpretation of
section 9-312(2) or, more quickly and with greater certainty, by
enacting a new, clearer section 9-312(2), such as the legislative
substitute this Article suggests. The common objective is to
right the unintended anomaly of section 9-312(2), as conven-
tionally interpreted, and thereby set farmers free, in the mar-
ketplace for production credit, from the monopolistic, unfair
effects of unbridled floating liens on their crops. This freedom
is already enjoyed by all other businesspeople shopping for en-
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abling credit, and no principled basis exists for continuing to
deny it to farmers.
